Grand Rapids Deed Restrictions and Subdivision HOA Lawyer

Deed restrictions and subdivision associations: the recorded words decide most of these disputes

I am Mitchell Bisson, a Grand Rapids real estate lawyer. I have litigated for over 15 years. This page covers recorded deed restrictions and subdivision associations: whether a restriction binds your lot, how a court reads it and how it can be enforced or changed. I work with owners, buyers and associations on these questions, and I start every file the same way, by pulling the recorded documents and reading them before anyone argues about what they mean. I do not promise outcomes.

The short answer. The Michigan Supreme Court enforces an unambiguous deed restriction as written unless it contravenes law or public policy or has been waived by acquiescence to prior violations. Bloomfield Estates Improvement Ass’n v. City of Birmingham, 479 Mich. 206, 212-214 (2007). A restriction that is unclear is read in favor of the free use of the land. Thiel v. Goyings, 504 Mich. 484 (2019). A restriction that does not appear in your deed can still bind your lot, but the neighbors who say so must prove a plan that started with a common owner. Denhardt v. De Roo, 295 Mich. 223, 228 (1940). If the community is a condominium, the Condominium Act and the master deed and bylaws control instead. Nothing here predicts how your documents will be read.

These disputes tend to begin with a letter from a board or a neighbor, a title commitment that lists exceptions nobody has read, or a plan to rent a house, run a business from home, build a fence or add a structure. Whether you are the owner who wants to do something or the owner or association who wants to stop it, the first questions are the same. Which recorded documents apply to this lot? What do the words say? Has the person enforcing them let similar things go before? The answers come from the register of deeds and the case law more than from the argument about fairness.

Which kind of restriction do you have?

People use “HOA rules” for several different legal things. The source of the restriction decides who is bound, how it is read and who can change it. The table sets out the ones I sort first.

The condominium question matters more than it looks. A “site condominium” can look like an ordinary subdivision from the street. The Condominium Act defines a condominium project as a plan or project of at least two condominium units established in conformance with the Act, and a unit can be residential, office, industrial, business or recreational. MCL 559.104(1), (3). If the project was established under the Act, the master deed is where I start. If it was not, the recorded declaration and the plat are where I start.

How a restriction ends up binding a lot

The simple case is a restriction in your own chain of title. You bought a lot whose deed, or a recorded declaration incorporated into it, says residences only, or no fences over four feet, or no commercial use. Michigan treats that restriction as a contract. In Bloomfield Estates the Supreme Court said that a deed restriction represents a contract between the buyer and the seller, and that the Court has consistently supported the right of property owners to create and enforce covenants affecting their own property. Bloomfield Estates Improvement Ass’n v. City of Birmingham, 479 Mich. 206 (2007). The Court added that such restrictions generally constitute a property right of distinct worth.

The harder case is the restriction that is not in your deed. Neighbors say the whole subdivision is restricted and your lot is bound with the rest. The Supreme Court answered that in Denhardt: where there is no express restriction in the chain of title of the particular lot, there must be proof of a “scheme of restrictions” originating from a common owner. Denhardt v. De Roo, 295 Mich. 223, 228 (1940). The Court also said the burden of establishing the restrictions by way of reciprocal negative easement is on the plaintiffs, and that a general plan must have been maintained from its inception and understood, accepted, relied on, and acted upon by all in interest. Denhardt v. De Roo, 295 Mich. 223, 228-229 (1940).

Lanski states what the plan looks like when it does exist. There must have been a common owner of the related parcels, and in his grants of the lots he must have included some restriction, either affirmative or negative, for the benefit of the land retained, evidencing a scheme or intent that the entire tract should be similarly treated. Once the plan is effectively put into operation, the burden placed on the land conveyed is by operation of law placed on the land retained. Lanski v. Montealegre, 361 Mich. 44, 47 (1960). In practice this means the question is rarely answered by one deed. I pull the deeds from the developer for a sample of lots, the plat, and any declaration, and I look at whether the same restrictions were used across the tract.

How a court reads the words

Once a restriction applies, the fight is over its meaning. The Supreme Court has said that courts review restrictive covenants with a special focus on the restrictor’s intent, read the covenants as a whole rather than from isolated words, and construe the language with reference to the present and prospective use of the property. Thiel v. Goyings, 504 Mich. 484 (2019). In the same opinion the Court repeated that unambiguous restrictions are enforced as written, and then added the rule that matters to the owner who wants to use the land: any uncertainty or doubt must be resolved in favor of the free use of property. Thiel v. Goyings, 504 Mich. 484 (2019). The older cases say the same thing, that restrictions are construed strictly against those claiming the right to enforce them. Wood v. Blancke, 304 Mich. 283, 287 (1943).

That produces two different fights. If the words are clear, the argument is about facts: did the owner do the prohibited thing? If the words are not clear, the argument is about meaning, and the owner has the benefit of the free use rule. Thiel is a good example of the second kind. The covenants required all residences to be stick built on site and barred a pre-fabricated or modular home. The Court held that a home is a modular home under the covenants only if it is predominantly modular, and it reinstated the trial court’s decision allowing the home to remain, where the home was mostly site built with modular components. Thiel v. Goyings, 504 Mich. 484 (2019).

“Residential purposes only” is a common phrase and a common source of disputes. In Wood v. Blancke the Court said no clear and definite line can be drawn as to residential use, that the usual, ordinary and incidental use of property as a place of abode does not violate a covenant restricting use to residence purposes only, and that an unusual and extraordinary use may. It affirmed a decree that stopped the owner from keeping, housing or breeding pigeons on his lot. Wood v. Blancke, 304 Mich. 283, 288-289 (1943).

Commercial use, home businesses and rentals

A restriction that bars “commercial, industrial, or business” use is read more broadly than many owners expect. In Terrien, the Supreme Court held that operating a family day care home for profit was a commercial or business use of the property under covenants that barred such uses. Terrien v. Zwit, 467 Mich. 56, 63 (2002). It rejected the argument that the covenant was contrary to public policy because it found no definite indication in Michigan law against it. Terrien v. Zwit, 467 Mich. 56 (2002). The Court also described the general rule that a breach of a covenant, no matter how minor and no matter how de minimis the damages, can be the subject of enforcement. Terrien v. Zwit, 467 Mich. 56, 65 (2002). An earlier decision, Lanski, said that in its broad sense commercial activity includes any type of business or activity carried on for a profit, in a case where the plan was for a private resort area. Lanski v. Montealegre, 361 Mich. 44, 49 (1960).

Short-term rentals followed the same path. In Eager the Court of Appeals held that transient rentals of a lake house violated restrictions requiring private occupancy only and a private dwelling, and separately held that the act of renting property to another for short-term use is a commercial use, even if the activity is residential in nature. Eager v. Peasley, 322 Mich. App. 174, 190 (2017). The court limited the opinion to short-term, transient rentals and said it was not commenting on long-term rentals. Eager v. Peasley, 322 Mich. App. 174 (2017). In Aldrich the court applied that reasoning to a covenant limiting lots to residential purposes only and reserving commercial development to designated areas, and held that short-term rentals were a commercial use the covenant did not allow. Aldrich v. Sugar Springs Property Owners Ass’n, 345 Mich. App. 181 (2023). The court noted that the association’s later resolution addressing short-term rentals was not before it, so the decision does not tell an owner how a rental rule adopted after the fact would be tested. That is one of the questions I look at when a board adopts a rental rule.

Two cautions apply. First, these cases turn on the wording of the particular restrictions. A subdivision with different words, or one whose declaration expressly allows rentals, is read on its own terms. Second, the Supreme Court in Terrien rejected the argument that a use being permitted or even encouraged by law makes a private covenant against it unenforceable on public policy grounds, and it defined public policy by reference to laws actually enacted. Terrien v. Zwit, 467 Mich. 56 (2002).

Defenses that come up when a restriction is enforced

Acquiescence. An owner who is sued for a violation often answers that the neighbors let other violations go. The Supreme Court has addressed that directly. A restriction does not become void when earlier violations went unchallenged and a more serious one occurs, and the court compares the character of the earlier violations with the present one. Only if the present violation is a “more serious” one may the plaintiff contest it despite acquiescing in earlier violations of a less serious character. Bloomfield Estates Improvement Ass’n v. City of Birmingham, 479 Mich. 206 (2007). The Court listed factors that may show a more serious violation, including a new structure, a more extensive violation of size limits, a change from sporadic to continuous use, more noise or traffic, permitting an action that was previously prohibited, and a material change in the character of the use. Bloomfield Estates Improvement Ass’n v. City of Birmingham, 479 Mich. 206 (2007). I build a timeline for this defense: which lots, what uses, when each began and who knew. A single old violation is not the same as a pattern of open violations that nobody questioned.

Ambiguity. If the words can reasonably be read two ways, the free use rule helps the owner. Thiel v. Goyings, 504 Mich. 484 (2019).

The restriction does not reach the lot. For a restriction that is not in the owner’s chain of title, the plaintiffs must prove the plan that started with a common owner. Denhardt v. De Roo, 295 Mich. 223, 228 (1940). This is a factual defense, and it is won or lost in the register of deeds before it is argued in court.

Who may enforce. Before anyone files, I read the recorded documents to see who holds the benefit of the restriction, an association, individual neighbors or both. The reported cases do not always settle the point. In Aldrich the plaintiffs were owners who sued the association, and the association did not challenge their standing. Aldrich v. Sugar Springs Property Owners Ass’n, 345 Mich. App. 181 (2023).

Changing or ending a restriction

Amendment. The recorded restrictions may give owners a way to change them. Ardmore Park involved a fence limit adopted by a majority vote of owners under the original covenant. The Court of Appeals held that where a deed restriction properly allows a majority, or a greater percentage, of owners within a subdivision to change it, other owners are bound by properly passed and recorded changes. Ardmore Park Subdivision Ass’n v. Simon, 117 Mich. App. 57, 62 (1982). That makes three things worth checking in any amendment: the amendment clause, the vote that was required and the recording. A condominium follows the amendment rules in the Act instead.

Age. The Marketable Record Title Act gives a person with an unbroken chain of title of record for 40 years, for interests other than mineral interests, a marketable record title, subject to the interests the Act preserves or excepts. MCL 565.101. Subject to the exceptions in section 4, interests that depend on events before that period are void unless preserved by recording a notice of claim. MCL 565.103(1). The Act may not be applied to bar an interest created by a declaration or other instrument executed and recorded on or after January 1, 1950 that subjects the land to a use restriction on each lot, or an interest created by a recorded condominium master deed or its amendments. MCL 565.104(1)(g), (h). The section was amended by 2025 PA 13, effective September 29, 2025, and I check the current text for any restriction I am told is too old to enforce.

A court order. When owners disagree about whether a recorded restriction burdens a lot, a court can decide it. A Michigan court of record may declare the rights and legal relations of an interested party in a case of actual controversy, whether or not other relief is sought. MCR 2.605(A)(1). A person who claims any right in or interest in land may also sue in the circuit court anyone who claims an inconsistent interest. MCL 600.2932(1).

Remedies, injunctions and fees

The usual remedy for a violation is an order to stop it. In Eager the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for entry of judgment granting the plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief. Eager v. Peasley, 322 Mich. App. 174 (2017). The procedure matters. An injunction may not be granted before a hearing on a motion for a preliminary injunction or an order to show cause, except as a statute or rule provides, and the party seeking it has the burden of establishing that it should issue. MCR 3.310(A)(1), (4). The order must be specific in terms and describe in reasonable detail the acts restrained. MCR 3.310(C).

Fees are the part owners often misjudge. For a condominium the Act says that in a proceeding over an alleged default by a co-owner, the association or the co-owner, if successful, recovers the costs and reasonable attorney fees as determined by the court, to the extent the condominium documents expressly so provide. MCL 559.206(b). The same limit applies when a co-owner sues the association to compel enforcement. MCL 559.207. In Windemere Commons the Court of Appeals held that the party claiming costs and fees has the burden of proving the amount requested is reasonable. Windemere Commons I Ass’n v. O’Brien, 269 Mich. App. 681, 683 (2006). For a plain subdivision there is no equivalent section that I rely on, so I read the recorded declaration for a fee clause before I tell anyone what a dispute could cost.

When the subdivision is a condominium

A condominium is governed by the Condominium Act and its own master deed and bylaws, not by the restriction rules on this page. An association’s power to sue an owner can also depend on what its own bylaws require, so I ask for the approval record on either side of that kind of dispute.

Buying, selling and taking over from a developer

Several condominium rules matter more to a transaction than to a dispute.

Ask for the statement. A buyer of a condominium unit should request in writing a statement of what is owed to the association, because a purchaser who does not request it at least 5 days before the sale is liable for the unpaid assessments, interest, fines, late charges and collection fees. MCL 559.211(2). I make the request as early as the contract allows.

After a foreclosure. If a first mortgagee or other purchaser obtains title as a result of foreclosure of the first mortgage, it and its successors and assigns are not liable for assessments that became due before it acquired title. MCL 559.158. The Court of Appeals held in Wells Fargo that the bank acquired equitable title at the sheriff’s sale, so assessments that came due from that date were owed. Wells Fargo Bank v. Country Place Condominium Ass’n, 304 Mich. App. 582, 592 (2014). In Lagoons Forest the court held that MCL 559.158 controlled over the written statement rule of MCL 559.211(2). Federal National Mortgage Ass’n v. Lagoons Forest Condominium Ass’n, 305 Mich. App. 258, 267 (2014).

Developer control. The “transitional control date” is the date on which a board takes office in an election in which the votes of eligible co-owners unaffiliated with the developer exceed the developer’s votes. MCL 559.110(7). Several deadlines run from it. A service or management contract with the developer or its affiliates is voidable by the board on the transitional control date or within 90 days after, and on 30 days’ notice for cause after that. MCL 559.155(1). Claims against the developer, a residential builder, an architect, a contractor, a sales agent or a manager arising from the development or construction of the common elements, or from the management, operation or control of the project, are subject to MCL 559.276(1). If the claim accrued on or before the transitional control date, the action may not be maintained later than 3 years after that date or 2 years after accrual, whichever is later. If it accrued after, the limit is 2 years from accrual. MCL 559.276(1). Subsection (2) provides that subsection (1) applies only to projects established on or after the effective date of the amendatory act that added subsection (2), so the establishment date in the master deed has to be checked. MCL 559.276(2). In Reserve at Heritage Village the trial court found that the transitional control date was January 27, 2009, the association first raised the claims in an amended complaint filed more than three years later, and the Court of Appeals held Counts IV through XXVII properly dismissed as time barred under MCL 559.276(1). Reserve at Heritage Village Ass’n v. Warren Financial Acquisition, LLC, 305 Mich. App. 92, 110 (2014).

How I handle a deed restriction or subdivision association dispute

1. Pull the recorded documents. I get the chain of title, the plat, the declaration, every recorded amendment and, for a condominium, the master deed and bylaws, from the register of deeds. I do not rely on a copy someone emailed.
2. Decide what kind of restriction it is. I sort a deed restriction, a general plan, an amendable declaration and a condominium, because each has its own rule for who is bound.
3. Read the words in context. I read the disputed restriction against the whole instrument and the facts of the use, with the enforce as written rule on one side and the free use rule on the other.
4. Build the history. For acquiescence, I map the other lots, the other uses, the dates and who knew. For a general plan, I look at what the developer put in the other deeds.
5. Check the process. For an association I check its authority to act, any vote the bylaws require, notice and hearing requirements, recording of amendments and any dispute step in the documents.
6. Put the position in writing. I send or answer a letter that quotes the provision, states the facts and says what is asked. Many of these disputes end there.
7. Go to court when it is needed. If an injunction, a declaration or a defense is needed, I prepare the pleading and the motion around the exact words and the record.
8. Keep the cost in view. Because fee shifting depends on the documents, I tell you at the start what the documents say about fees and what a dispute could cost.

What I need from you

Bring your deed, your title commitment or title policy, the closing documents and every recorded document you have, including the declaration, the plat, the master deed, the bylaws and any amendment. Tell me where each copy came from. Bring the letters, violation notices, board minutes and emails about the dispute, and a short written timeline of what you did or what the other side did, with dates. If the dispute involves a rental, a business or a building project, bring the lease, the plans and any approval or denial. Associations should bring the resolutions behind the rule and the record of any vote. If you have been sued, bring the summons and complaint and note the date and manner of service, because your answer deadline runs from service. Do not alter or delete records, and do not sign an amendment, release or settlement until it has been read against the recorded documents.

Where your Kent County deed restriction or association case will be heard

I represent clients in Grand Rapids, Kentwood, Grandville, Wyoming and across Kent County. Under MCL 600.8301(1), the district court has exclusive jurisdiction in civil actions when the amount in controversy does not exceed $25,000. Michigan law sets the Kent County district courts by municipality. The 61st District Court serves the city of Grand Rapids, the 59th serves the cities of Grandville and Walker, the 62A serves the city of Wyoming and the 62B serves the city of Kentwood. MCL 600.8128a; MCL 600.8130(1)-(3). The 63rd District Court serves the rest of Kent County outside those five cities. MCL 600.8130(4). Circuit courts have original jurisdiction over civil claims that are not assigned exclusively to another court by the constitution or statute, and for Kent County the circuit court is the 17th Judicial Circuit. MCL 600.605; MCL 600.518. An action to determine interests in land under MCL 600.2932 is brought in the circuit courts, and a complaint in that kind of action must describe the land and state the interest each side claims. MCL 600.2932(1); MCR 3.411(B).

Why people hire me for a Michigan deed restriction or association matter

You work directly with me, the lawyer handling your matter. I give you the strengths and weaknesses of your position straight, including what it could cost you and what it could protect. I read the recorded documents first, I act for owners, buyers and associations as the facts require, and then we decide together how to proceed.

Fees depend on the type of work, its complexity and whether a dispute is likely to go to court. I explain my fee arrangement at the consultation, before you decide whether to hire me.

Related Michigan pages

• Grand Rapids Real Estate Attorney
• Condo and HOA disputes under the Condominium Act: assessments, liens, fines and bylaw changes
• Grand Rapids Deeds and Title Defects Lawyer
• Grand Rapids Boundary and Easement Dispute Lawyer
• Grand Rapids civil litigation attorney
• Michigan legal FAQs

Reviewed by Mitchell S. Bisson, October 28, 2026.

I advise owners, buyers and associations on deed restrictions and subdivision rules in Kent County and West Michigan. Contact me 24/7 by phone or email. Your Rights, My Fight! Call for a free initial consultation.

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Law Offices of Mitchell S. Bisson, 2828 Kraft Ave SE, Suite 295, Grand Rapids, MI 49512, serving Kent County and West Michigan.

MBisson@BissonLegal.com

This page provides general information about Michigan law and is not legal advice. Reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Laws change and every case turns on its own facts. Consult a licensed attorney about your specific situation.