Contract disputes, guaranties and collecting a judgment in Michigan

You have to prove three things by a preponderance of the evidence: a contract existed, the other side breached it, and the breach caused you damages. A valid contract itself requires competent parties, a proper subject matter, legal consideration, mutuality of agreement, and mutuality of obligation. The Michigan Supreme Court laid out these elements in Bank of America v First American Title.

Most disputes turn on the second and third elements: what the contract actually required, whether the other side fell short, and what the shortfall cost you. Michigan courts enforce unambiguous contract language as written unless a provision would violate law or public policy, so the exact words matter more than what either side remembers saying. That is why the signed agreement, emails, invoices, and payment history are the place to start.

A breach claim also has to be filed on time. The general period is 6 years under MCL 600.5807(9), but a contract can shorten it, and sales of goods have their own 4-year period. Whether an oral agreement is enforceable depends on the statute of frauds, which is covered in a separate answer. If you are weighing a contract claim, bring every version of the agreement and every communication about performance to the consultation.

Authority: Bank of America NA v First American Title Ins Co, 499 Mich 74 (2016); Bloomfield Estates Improvement Ass'n v City of Birmingham, 479 Mich 206, 212 (2007); MCL 600.5807(9). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

The general deadline is 6 years from when the claim accrued, under MCL 600.5807(9). A contract for the sale of goods has a 4-year period under the UCC, MCL 440.2725, and a covenant in a deed or mortgage has 10 years. A written contract can shorten the period, so the contract language should be checked before relying on the statutory deadline.

The 6-year period applies to a breach of contract that is not covered by a more specific subsection of MCL 600.5807. The clock runs from accrual, and Michigan courts treat each distinct breach as having its own accrual date, which is why a long-running contract can produce several claims with different deadlines.

Three points matter in a contract dispute. First, whether the deal is a sale of goods, which brings in the 4-year UCC period. Second, whether the contract itself shortens the time to sue. Michigan courts generally allow that, but a shortened period in a boilerplate employment agreement must be reasonable (Rayford, 2025), and the kind of contract matters before assuming a clause will be enforced as written. Third, whether anything extends the period, such as a fraudulent concealment of the claim under MCL 600.5855, which allows suit within 2 years after discovery even if the period has otherwise run.

Because a missed deadline can bar the claim, the safe course is to treat the earliest plausible date as the deadline until the documents show otherwise. A related blog post on this site walks through the deadline in more detail.

Authority: MCL 600.5807(9); MCL 440.2725(1); Miller-Davis Co v Ahrens Constr, Inc, 495 Mich 161 (2014); MCL 600.5855; Rayford v American House Roseville I, LLC, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 163989). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Each distinct breach has its own starting date. In Miller-Davis v Ahrens the Michigan Supreme Court held that a subcontractor's failure to build to the plans and its later refusal to indemnify were two breaches that accrued separately. For sale-of-goods contracts, MCL 440.2725(2) starts the 4-year clock at the breach whether or not you knew about it.

In Miller-Davis the general contractor's first claim, for the subcontractor's nonconforming work, was untimely, but the separate claim for the subcontractor's refusal to honor its indemnity promise had its own, later accrual date. That is the practical lesson: do not assume one start date for the whole contract.

Under the UCC the rule is stricter. A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when delivery is tendered, unless the warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must wait for that performance, in which case the claim accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.

For non-UCC contracts, each promise that was broken should be mapped to the date it was broken. If you are close to a deadline, raise it early with a lawyer, with the contract and a timeline, because the answer can change claim by claim.

Authority: Miller-Davis Co v Ahrens Constr, Inc, 495 Mich 161 (2014); MCL 440.2725(2); MCL 600.5807(1). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

A suit for breach of a contract for the sale of goods has 4 years under MCL 440.2725. But in Fisher Sand & Gravel the Michigan Supreme Court held that an action on an open account or an account stated is a separate claim governed by the 6-year contract period in MCL 600.5807, and an open account claim generally accrues on the date of each item in the account.

Suppliers often have both kinds of claim. If you delivered goods under a sales contract and the buyer breached, the UCC 4-year period governs that breach claim. If you instead sued on the running account between the parties, Fisher Sand & Gravel treats that as an action on an express or implied contract with the 6-year period, with each item generally accruing on its own date.

That difference matters for older unpaid balances. A claim for goods delivered five years ago may be too late as a UCC breach claim yet still be timely as an open account claim, depending on how the account was kept and what the parties agreed.

The contract can also change the answer, because the original agreement may reduce the UCC period to not less than 1 year. Useful documents include the credit application, invoices, statements, and any payment history. The fee arrangement is explained at the consultation, before you decide whether to hire a lawyer.

Authority: MCL 440.2725(1); Fisher Sand & Gravel Co v Neal A Sweebe, Inc, 494 Mich 543 (2013); MCL 600.5807(9). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Often yes, but it depends on the kind of contract. Michigan courts generally allow a contract to shorten the time to sue. In an insurance policy, an unambiguous shortened period is enforced as written unless it violates law or public policy (Rory v Continental Insurance). In a boilerplate employment agreement, Rayford v American House Roseville I (2025) requires reasonableness and unconscionability review. For sales of goods, MCL 440.2725(1) lets the original agreement cut the 4-year period to not less than 1 year.

In Rory, the Michigan Supreme Court enforced a one-year suit period in an uninsured motorist policy. It held that a judge's view that a period is unreasonable is not a reason to refuse to enforce an unambiguous insurance clause. In 2025, in Rayford, the Court held that a boilerplate, non-negotiated employment agreement that shortens a limitations period (there, 180 days in place of three years) must be examined for reasonableness, and that Rory's language reaching beyond insurance is nonbinding dicta as applied to such agreements. The Court has not squarely decided which approach governs other contracts, such as commercial leases and consumer contracts. Rayford says it limits Rory to insurance contract cases and restores the reasonableness review of Camelot, but its holding concerns adhesive employment agreements, so a shortened period in those other contracts is neither safe to ignore nor automatically unenforceable until the agreement is read and the current law is checked.

Insurance policies, construction contracts, vendor agreements, leases, and employment paperwork sometimes require suit within a year or less. For a sale of goods, the statute allows the original agreement to reduce the period to not less than 1 year but not to extend it. The safe course is to read the whole agreement, including amendments, and calendar the shortest deadline.

Authority: Rory v Continental Ins Co, 473 Mich 457 (2005); Rayford v American House Roseville I, LLC, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 163989); MCL 440.2725(1). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Not always, but MCL 566.132 makes certain agreements void unless they are in a writing signed by the party you are suing. The list includes agreements not to be performed within 1 year, a special promise to answer for another person's debt, a commission on the sale of real estate, assignments of things in action, and warranties of cure in medical care.

For the listed agreements, subsection (1) accepts either the agreement itself or a note or memorandum of it, as long as it is signed with an authorized signature by the party to be charged. Subsection (2) is stricter for financial institutions: a person cannot sue a bank or similar lender to enforce a promise to lend, extend credit, renew, modify, or waive a loan term unless the promise itself is in a signed writing. Subsection (3) separately requires a signed writing to enforce a real estate commission agreement against the owner or purchaser.

Many oral agreements fall outside the list and are not barred by this statute, though other statutes add writing requirements, such as for the sale of land or a lease longer than 1 year (MCL 566.108) and for the sale of goods for $1,000 or more (MCL 440.2201). Either way, proving what was said is harder than proving what was signed. Whether a particular email or text exchange satisfies the signature requirement depends on the documents and the circumstances, so they need to be reviewed before advising. If your claim rests on a handshake deal, bring any texts, emails, invoices, or payments that show its terms.

Authority: MCL 566.132(1)-(3); MCL 566.108; MCL 440.2201. Reviewed Oct. 2026.

If your promise is a special promise to answer for someone else's debt, yes. MCL 566.132(1)(b) makes it void unless the promise, or a note or memorandum of it, is in writing and signed by the party to be charged. A lender relying on an oral assurance from an owner or friend to cover a business loan may therefore lack an enforceable guaranty.

This comes up when a business owner says on the phone, I will make sure you get paid, and the supplier extends credit to the owner's company. If the promise is a special promise to answer for the company's debt, the statute requires a signed writing from the person being asked to pay.

Two cautions. First, the line between a promise to pay someone else's debt and a promise to pay one's own obligation is a factual question, and it depends on who was primarily liable and what was said. Second, the exact wording of any signed document matters, because the Court of Appeals in Comerica Bank v Cohen, quoting the Supreme Court, said a guaranty contract is, like a surety contract, a special kind of contract whose undertaking receives strict interpretation, and also that guaranty contracts are construed like other contracts.

If someone is demanding payment on a debt you promised to cover, or you are a creditor trying to collect from a promisor, the paper trail and the statute should be reviewed before any demand letter goes out.

Authority: MCL 566.132(1)(b); Comerica Bank v Cohen, 291 Mich App 40, 46-47 (2010). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

The goal is to put you in as good a position as if the contract had been performed, according to Corl v Huron Castings. That usually means the money you lost because of the breach, plus statutory interest under MCL 600.6013 and taxable costs. Attorney fees are generally not recoverable unless a statute, court rule, or other recognized basis allows them.

Depending on the facts, the loss can include the price you paid and did not get back, the profit you would have earned, or the cost to repair or replace nonconforming work. You still have to prove the amount, and you generally have to take reasonable steps to limit your losses.

Contract terms can change the number. Michigan courts enforce unambiguous contract language as written unless a provision violates law or public policy, so a liquidated damages clause, a cap on liability, or a clause that waives certain damages can raise or lower what you recover. A liquidated damages clause is enforced if it is reasonable in relation to the possible injury and not excessive.

Interest on a money judgment is set by MCL 600.6013, and that is covered in a separate answer. If you are deciding whether a claim is worth pursuing, weigh the contract, the proof of loss, any caps, and the cost of litigating before choosing a course of action.

Authority: Corl v Huron Castings, Inc, 450 Mich 620 (1996); MCL 600.6013; Bloomfield Estates Improvement Ass'n v City of Birmingham, 479 Mich 206, 212 (2007); UAW-GM Human Resource Ctr v KSL Recreation Corp, 228 Mich App 486 (1998). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

For complaints filed on or after January 1, 1987, interest runs from the filing date at 1% plus the average 5-year Treasury note auction rate for the six months before each July 1 and January 1, compounded annually. If the complaint was filed on or after July 1, 2002 and the judgment is on a written instrument evidencing indebtedness with a specified rate, that rate applies, up to 13% compounded annually. Interest is calculated on the whole judgment, including costs and attorney fees.

MCL 600.6013(8) sets the general rate. It is recalculated at 6-month intervals using the state treasurer's certified auction figure, so the rate in your case depends on the filing date and moves over time.

A different rule applies to a written instrument evidencing indebtedness with a specified interest rate. For complaints filed on or after July 1, 2002, interest follows the rate stated in the instrument if that rate was legal when the instrument was signed. A variable rate is fixed at the rate in effect when the complaint is filed, and the rate cannot exceed 13% compounded annually under subsection (7). For a judgment on a written instrument where the complaint was filed on or after January 1, 1987 and before July 1, 2002, subsection (5) uses 12% unless the instrument carries a higher legal rate.

For complaints filed on or after October 1, 1986, the statute does not allow interest on future damages from the filing date to the entry of judgment. In a tort action, a bona fide, reasonable written offer of settlement that is rejected and filed with the court can cut off interest (a defendant's offer) or raise the rate by 2 percentage points (a plaintiff's offer). Confirm the rate for your filing date before quoting a total.

Authority: MCL 600.6013(1), (5), (7)-(9), (13)-(15). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Courts sustain a liquidated damages clause if the amount is reasonable in relation to the possible injury and is not unconscionable or excessive, according to UAW-GM Human Resource Center v KSL Recreation. Whether a clause is a valid liquidated amount or an unenforceable penalty is a question of law for the judge, so the numbers and the nature of the harm matter.

A liquidated damages clause is simply an agreement fixing the amount of damages in case of a breach. In UAW-GM, the Court of Appeals upheld a cancellation formula that set damages as a percentage of the expected revenue, noting that the formula was negotiated by the parties and appeared reasonable in relation to the potential injury. The clause also included the defendant's promise to make every effort to re-rent the facilities.

If you are the one who would pay, the argument is usually that the amount is out of proportion to any real loss. If you are the one who would collect, the argument is that actual damages were hard to measure and the number bears a sensible relationship to the harm that was foreseeable.

Because the court decides validity as a matter of law, this issue is often resolved on motion rather than at trial. Useful documents include the contract and anything that shows how the number was negotiated or calculated.

Authority: UAW-GM Human Resource Ctr v KSL Recreation Corp, 228 Mich App 486 (1998). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Michigan requires efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to minimize the economic harm, not the highest standard of diligence, according to Morris v Clawson Tank Co., an employment discharge case. Whether your efforts were reasonable is generally a question for the trier of fact. Document what you did to reduce the loss, such as replacement purchases or job applications.

The duty to mitigate is a limit on what you can recover. If a wrongdoer can show that you could have avoided part of the loss through reasonable steps, a jury or judge may reduce your award. The standard is reasonableness under the circumstances, not perfection, and the Supreme Court in Morris described it as reasonable efforts to minimize the economic harm caused by the wrongdoer.

For a business, mitigation might mean finding a substitute supplier or buyer, reselling goods, or reducing idle costs. For an individual after a termination, it usually means a reasonable job search. Morris itself arose from a discharge claim, so you should expect courts to apply the same reasonableness idea to contract and commercial settings while looking closely at the facts.

Keep a file with dates, quotes you obtained, offers you declined and why, and expenses you incurred while trying to limit the loss. That record is often the most useful response to a mitigation defense when the issue is raised.

Authority: Morris v Clawson Tank Co, 459 Mich 256 (1998). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Michigan does not recognize an independent tort claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, according to Ulrich v Federal Land Bank, and the Court of Appeals has also declined to recognize it as a stand-alone contract claim. Your remedy is usually a breach of contract claim based on the contract's actual terms. A tort claim exists only where there is a legal duty that arises apart from the contract promise.

People often use the phrase bad faith to describe a business partner or lender who technically followed the contract but acted unfairly. In Michigan, that frustration does not by itself give rise to a separate tort lawsuit, and the Court of Appeals has said Michigan does not recognize a stand-alone claim for breach of the implied covenant in contract either (Belle Isle Grill Corp v Detroit, 256 Mich App 463, 476 (2003)). Ulrich held that a lender had no independent tort liability on that theory, and that if the relationship creates a legal duty without enforcing the contract promise itself, a tort action may lie, but otherwise it does not.

The better way to frame these disputes is usually to look at what the written agreement allows, whether discretion given to one side was used in a way the contract limits, and whether another claim, such as fraud, breach of a fiduciary duty, or a statutory claim, fits the facts.

Because courts generally enforce unambiguous terms as written, the specific language about notice, consent, and discretion is where these cases are won or lost. Useful documents include the contract and any correspondence in which the other side exercised the power being challenged.

Authority: Ulrich v Federal Land Bank, 192 Mich App 194 (1991); Bloomfield Estates Improvement Ass'n v City of Birmingham, 479 Mich 206, 212 (2007); Belle Isle Grill Corp v City of Detroit, 256 Mich App 463, 476 (2003). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Often it blocks fraud claims built on promises made outside the written contract. In UAW-GM v KSL the Court of Appeals held that with a valid merger clause, the only fraud that can undo the contract is fraud relating to the merger clause itself or fraud that invalidates the whole contract, because relying on outside statements is unreasonable once the parties signed an integrated writing.

A merger or integration clause says the written agreement is the entire deal. In UAW-GM the plaintiff alleged that a hotel promised to use union employees, but the written letter of agreement said nothing about it and contained a merger clause. The Court held the fraud counts failed because the merger clause made reliance on the unwritten promise unreasonable. In Novak v Nationwide, a similar result followed for an oral promise that contradicted a signed contract with an integration clause.

The exceptions are narrow. If you were tricked into signing the merger clause itself, or the fraud goes to the validity of the entire contract, the claim may survive. A misrepresentation that is also written into the contract is a contract claim, not a fraud claim based on outside statements.

If you are negotiating, put every promise you are relying on into the signed document. If you are already in a dispute, every draft and the final agreement are needed to compare what was said with what was signed.

Authority: UAW-GM Human Resource Ctr v KSL Recreation Corp, 228 Mich App 486, 502-505 (1998); Novak v Nationwide Mut Ins Co, 235 Mich App 675, 686-689 (1999). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Unjust enrichment requires two things: the defendant received a benefit from you, and keeping it without paying would be inequitable. The Court of Appeals stated these elements in Morris Pumps v Centerline Piping. A court implies a contract only when no express contract covers the same subject matter between the same parties.

In Morris Pumps, suppliers delivered materials to a project and were not paid by the subcontractor that ordered them. The general contractor retained a replacement contractor, who used the materials to finish the job, and the suppliers were never paid. The court allowed the suppliers to recover from the general contractor because there was no express contract between the suppliers and that defendant, even though express contracts existed with the subcontractor.

That shows both sides of the rule. If you have a written contract with the party you are suing about the same subject, an implied-contract theory is generally unavailable. If you have no contract with the party who benefited, or the contract does not cover the subject, unjust enrichment may fit.

The claim depends on proof that the defendant actually received a benefit from you and that retention was unjust, not merely that you lost money. Court rules allow separate and even inconsistent claims in one complaint (MCR 2.111(A)(2)), so unjust enrichment can be pleaded alongside a contract claim in case the contract is found unenforceable. The statutes do not name unjust enrichment, so the likely deadline should be identified early and the shortest plausible one calendared. Useful documents include invoices, delivery records, and any communications showing who asked for the work.

Authority: Morris Pumps v Centerline Piping, Inc, 273 Mich App 187, 194-195 (2007); MCR 2.111(A)(2). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Promissory estoppel requires a promise that the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action of a definite and substantial character, and that in fact produced reliance or forbearance such that the promise must be enforced to avoid injustice. Courts apply it with caution. Novak v Nationwide rejected the claim where the alleged oral promise contradicted a signed contract with an integration clause.

The elements, as the Court of Appeals stated them in Novak, are a promise, reasonable expectation of inducing action, and actual reliance in circumstances where the promise must be enforced to avoid injustice. The court looks objectively at the words and actions around the promise and the relationship between the parties, and it applies the doctrine only where the facts are unquestionable and the wrong to be prevented undoubted.

Promissory estoppel is not a way around a written deal. In Novak an agent claimed he was told his at-will contract did not apply to him. The signed contract said otherwise and had an integration clause, so the court found no clear promise and dismissed the claim.

The doctrine fits where there is no enforceable contract, the promise was specific, and you changed your position because of it, such as quitting a job, buying equipment, or giving up another opportunity. Useful documents include any messages or documents that show the promise and what was done afterward.

Authority: Novak v Nationwide Mut Ins Co, 235 Mich App 675, 686-687 (1999). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

After a judgment, the creditor files a verified request and the clerk of the court that entered it issues a writ of garnishment under MCR 3.101. The writ must be served on the garnishee, such as an employer or bank, within 182 days after issuance. The garnishee must file a verified disclosure within 14 days after service and must deliver a copy of the writ to the debtor within 7 days.

The request must state that the judgment remains unsatisfied, the amounts of the judgment, interest, costs, and payments, and that the creditor has good reason to believe the named person holds the debtor's property, owes the debtor money, or makes periodic payments to the debtor. Unless the court orders otherwise, periodic garnishments, such as wages, salary, commissions, rent, and land contract payments, stay in effect until the amount withheld equals the unpaid judgment, interest, and costs, or the creditor files a notice that the amount withheld exceeds what remains or that the judgment has been satisfied. A second writ cannot be obtained on a garnishee who makes periodic payments to the debtor while a prior writ on the same judgment remains in effect.

The debtor is told that unless objections are filed within 14 days after service of the writ on the debtor, the property or debt held may be applied to the judgment without further notice. That 14-day window is short, so read the papers when they arrive.

If you are a creditor, the request needs to be prepared and service tracked. If you are a debtor, check the amount, the exemptions, and whether the writ was properly served. Useful documents include the writ and the judgment.

Authority: MCR 3.101(B), (D)-(H). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

For an ordinary judgment debt, federal law limits the amount garnished from your weekly disposable earnings to the lesser of 25% of them or the amount by which they exceed 30 times the federal minimum hourly wage, under 15 USC 1673(a). Michigan's garnishment rule refers to that federal limit. Support orders, bankruptcy orders, and some tax debts are treated differently.

Michigan's court rule on garnishment says an employer is liable for the portion of the debtor's earnings that is not protected from garnishment by law, and it points to the federal limit as an example. If another garnishment or order with higher priority is already in effect, the employer withholds under a lower-priority writ only to the extent the amount being withheld is less than the legal maximum.

The federal statute applies to disposable earnings, which is why the numbers depend on pay period and take-home pay rather than gross wages. For pay periods other than a week, the Secretary of Labor sets an equivalent multiple of the minimum wage.

The percentages are different for orders for support of a person, which can reach 50% to 65%, and they do not limit garnishment for state or federal tax debts or certain bankruptcy court orders.

If your paycheck is being garnished, the writ, your last few pay stubs, and the judgment are needed to check the amount being withheld. If a creditor is trying to collect, the same documents show what the law allows.

Authority: 15 USC 1673(a)-(b); MCR 3.101(B)(1)(c), (G)(1)(f). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

MCL 600.6023(1) lists property of a judgment debtor and the debtor's dependents that is exempt from levy and sale under an execution. Examples include family pictures, wearing apparel, and provisions and fuel for 6 months; household goods up to $1,000 in value; tools or a vehicle needed for the debtor's trade up to $1,000; disability insurance benefits; individual retirement accounts; and qualified ERISA retirement plans, with limits.

The statute covers levy and sale under an execution, which is a different tool from a writ of garnishment, so the exemptions for wages and bank accounts can come from other law, including the federal limit on wage garnishment.

Several details matter. The household goods and trade tools exemptions have dollar caps of $1,000 each. The disability benefit exemption applies to money paid by an insurance company on account of disability due to injury or sickness, with an exception for actions to recover necessities contracted after benefits accrue. The retirement account exemptions have conditions: for example, the individual retirement account exemption does not apply to contributions made within 120 days before a bankruptcy filing and does not apply to the extent of certain court orders.

The statute also contains a homestead provision with its own limits, and other statutes and bankruptcy law can change the analysis, so the current figures should be checked before advising.

If a creditor is seizing property or sending levy notices, the judgment, the levy papers, and a list of what was taken or threatened are needed to check which exemptions apply.

Authority: MCL 600.6023(1). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

A judgment of a court of record can be enforced by an action on the judgment brought within 10 years of its entry, and within that period an action may be brought upon the judgment for a new judgment, under MCL 600.5809(3). The new judgment is subject to the same rule. A judgment of a court not of record, including a small claims judgment, has a 6-year period.

A judgment is enforceable for a limited period, but a creditor can extend it by obtaining a new judgment within that period. The statute sets a 10-year period for an action founded upon a judgment or decree rendered in a court of record of this state, of the United States, or of another state, measured from the time of rendition. Child support orders follow a different rule in subsection (4). A judgment entered in the district court on or after May 25, 1973 is a judgment of a court of record, except one entered in the small claims division.

Because the statute allows an action on the judgment for a new judgment within the period, creditors who still want to collect should file before the 10 years run out, rather than waiting. Interest keeps running on a money judgment under MCL 600.6013 until it is satisfied.

For debtors, the same rule matters in the other direction: an old judgment that was never renewed may be unenforceable, but a debtor should not assume that without checking the dates and any new judgment.

Useful documents include the judgment, the entry date, and any payment history, so the dates can be calculated.

Authority: MCL 600.5809(3); MCL 600.6013. Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Under MCR 2.621, a creditor who obtains a money judgment may, by motion in the same action or a separate civil action, seek relief supplementary to judgment under MCL 600.6101 to 600.6143 and use discovery under the court rules. A subpoena to enjoin the transfer of assets under MCL 600.6119 must specify the amount claimed, and the court must endorse its approval of the subpoena.

The rule also allows the relief formerly obtainable by a creditor's bill and other relief in aid of execution authorized by statute or court rule. A creditor who seeks to reach an equitable interest of the debtor must file a verified motion or complaint stating the amount due and showing the debtor has equitable interests exceeding $100 in value.

A court can order the delivery of money or property to an officer holding a writ of execution, and when necessary to protect the creditor it can appoint a receiver. A person who violates the restraining provision of an order or subpoena can be punished for contempt, and a nonparty who violates it can face judgment for the unpaid portion of the judgment or the value of the property transferred, whichever is less.

The court controls repeat efforts. If there was a prior supplementary proceeding on the same judgment against the same party, a new proceeding needs leave of court, supported by an affidavit that the creditor has reason to believe the party has reachable property that was not known earlier and acts in good faith.

Useful documents include the judgment and anything known about the debtor's business, accounts, vehicles, or real estate.

Authority: MCR 2.621(A)-(G). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Michigan's voidable transactions statute (the former fraudulent transfer act) lets a creditor ask a court to treat certain transfers as voidable. A transfer qualifies if the debtor made it with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud a creditor, or without receiving reasonably equivalent value in the circumstances the statute lists. Courts may consider whether the transfer went to an insider, whether the debtor kept control, and whether the debtor had been sued or became insolvent. The creditor generally has the burden by a preponderance of the evidence. The deadline points back to MCL 600.5813 and 600.5855, so do not wait for a judgment to look into it if you can already see the transfers happening.

Michigan's voidable transactions statute, the former fraudulent transfer act, lets a creditor ask a court to treat certain transfers as voidable. Under MCL 566.34(1), a transfer qualifies if the debtor made it with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud a creditor, or without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange when the debtor's remaining assets were unreasonably small or the debtor was taking on debts beyond his or her ability to pay. Subsection (2) lists factors a court may consider, including whether the transfer went to an insider, whether the debtor kept possession or control, whether the transfer was concealed, whether the debtor had been sued or threatened with suit, whether it covered substantially all of the debtor's assets, and whether the debtor became insolvent. The creditor generally has the burden by a preponderance of the evidence, with a higher standard for a qualified disposition in trust. The deadline points back to MCL 600.5813 and 600.5855 under MCL 566.39, with a shorter one year period for one type of claim, so do not wait for a judgment to look into it if you can already see the transfers happening. Gather deeds, bank records, new business filings, vehicle titles and anything showing who got the property and what, if anything, was paid.

Authority: MCL 566.34(1)-(3); MCL 566.39. Reviewed Oct. 27, 2026.

A guarantor's liability depends on an independent collateral agreement to pay the obligation if the primary borrower fails, according to Comerica Bank v Cohen. The Court of Appeals described a guaranty, like a surety contract, as a special kind of contract whose undertaking receives strict interpretation, and also said guaranty contracts are construed like other contracts. That cuts both ways: the exact wording decides what you owe.

In Comerica, the Court of Appeals explained that a guaranty, like a surety contract, is a special kind of contract whose undertaking receives strict interpretation, and that a surety has a right to stand on the very terms of the contract. The court also said guaranty contracts are construed like other contracts, so clear wording controls. It also noted that a surety assumes liability as a regular party to the primary undertaking, while a guarantor's liability depends on a separate undertaking to pay if the primary payor does not.

That is why details in the guaranty document matter: whether it is absolute or limited, a guaranty of payment or of collection, continuing, capped at a percentage of the debt, or tied to specific loans, and what notices or waivers it contains. In Comerica, a limited guaranty capped the guarantor's obligation at a stated share of the debt and the guarantor was held to the contract's terms.

Before signing, ask what debts are covered, whether the amount is capped, whether the lender can change the loan without your consent, and how you can end the guaranty. If you already signed and the lender is demanding payment, the guaranty and the loan documents should be read together. Useful documents include the guaranty, the loan documents, and the default notices.

Authority: Comerica Bank v Cohen, 291 Mich App 40, 46-47, 54 (2010); MCL 566.132(1)(b). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

It depends on the guaranty. In Comerica Bank v Cohen the Court of Appeals held that where the guaranty was an absolute guaranty of payment, the lender was not required to foreclose on the real estate before proceeding against the guarantor. The guaranty there stated it was a continuing guaranty of payment and not of collection and waived any right to require the bank to proceed against the borrower or its collateral.

The guaranty in Comerica was also a limited guaranty, capped at 30% of the outstanding indebtedness plus certain other amounts, and the guarantor was held to the stated cap, not to the whole loan. The court enforced the guaranty according to its terms and rejected the argument that a late copy of a default notice to the borrower's attorney meant there was no default: the loan came due and went unpaid, the guaranty covered payment when due and waived notice to the guarantor, and the guarantor personally received the demand letter.

Two features usually decide these fights. First, whether the guaranty is one of payment or of collection. A guaranty of payment lets the lender go to the guarantor directly. Second, what the guarantor waived, such as the right to require the lender to proceed against the borrower or collateral first.

The loan agreement, the notice provisions, and the default definitions also matter, because a guarantor may be liable on events of default defined in those documents.

If a lender demands payment from you or you are a lender evaluating a guarantor claim, bring the guaranty, the loan agreement, the note, and the default notices.

Authority: Comerica Bank v Cohen, 291 Mich App 40, 43, 47-53 (2010). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Common Michigan deadlines include 6 years for breach of contract (MCL 600.5807(9)), 4 years for sales of goods (MCL 440.2725), 6 years for other personal actions such as fraud (MCL 600.5813), 3 years for injury to persons or property, including conversion (MCL 600.5805(2)), and 1 year for libel or slander (MCL 600.5805(11)). The Whistleblowers' Protection Act has 90 days, and a judgment can be enforced for 10 years.

Other periods to know: 3 years for products liability under MCL 600.5805(12); 2 years for most assault, battery, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and malpractice claims under subsections (3), (7), and (8); 3 years for Elliott-Larsen claims; 3 years from discovery for trade secret misappropriation under MCL 445.1907; 3 years from accrual or 2 years from discovery, whichever comes first, for LLC or shareholder oppression damages claims under MCL 450.4515 and 450.1489; 6 years for Consumer Protection Act claims or 1 year after the last payment, whichever ends later; and 12 months to file a wage complaint with the department.

A contract can shorten a period: an unambiguous shortened period in an insurance policy is enforced as written unless it violates law or public policy (Rory), boilerplate employment agreements get reasonableness review (Rayford), and the Supreme Court has not squarely decided other contracts. Fraudulent concealment of the claim can extend the time to 2 years after discovery under MCL 600.5855. Courts look at the true nature of a claim, not its label, as Adams v Adams shows. Claims against the State or a local government can require written notice much sooner than these periods, in some cases within 120 days or 6 months of the event (MCL 600.6431; MCL 691.1404).

Because a missed deadline can bar a claim, the safe course is to calendar the shortest plausible period for each theory, not the most generous. Useful documents include the dates of the key events and any contract that mentions notice or suit deadlines.

Authority: MCL 600.5805(2), (3), (7), (8), (11), (12); MCL 600.5807(9); MCL 440.2725; MCL 600.5813; Adams v Adams, 276 Mich App 704, 710 (2007); Tillman v Great Lakes Truck Ctr, Inc, 277 Mich App 47, 49 (2007); Major v Village of Newberry, 316 Mich App 527, 537 (2016); MCL 445.1907; MCL 450.4515(1)(e); MCL 450.1489(1)(f); MCL 445.911(9); MCL 408.481(1); MCL 600.5855; MCL 15.363(1); MCL 600.5809(3); Rayford v American House Roseville I, LLC, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 163989); Rory v Continental Ins Co, 473 Mich 457 (2005); MCL 600.6431; MCL 691.1404. Reviewed Oct. 2026.