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Internet sex crimes and child sexually abusive material in Michigan

These are general answers about Michigan law, not advice about your situation. Each answer links to the statute, court rule or case it rests on. Last reviewed October 2026.

By Mitchell S. Bisson, Michigan attorney (P79807). Reviewed October 2026.

Quick answers

The short version

What Michigan laws are used to charge internet sex crimes and child sexually abusive material cases?

Three statutes are central to these cases: MCL 750.145d (using the internet or a computer to communicate for the purpose of committing a listed sex crime against a minor or someone believed to be a minor), MCL 750.145a (accosting or enticing a child under 16), and MCL 750.145c (child sexually abusive material). The Computer Crimes Act adds computer fraud, unauthorized access and using a computer to commit any crime. Counts can be charged together in a single case.

What does the prosecutor have to prove for using the internet to commit a sex crime against a minor, and how is the penalty set?

The prosecutor must prove that you used the internet or a computer to communicate with someone, that the purpose was to commit, attempt, conspire to commit or solicit one of the listed offenses, and, for the sex offenses, that the other person was a minor or that you believed so. A conviction on the underlying offense is not required. The maximum penalty depends on the maximum for the underlying offense, from a 1-year misdemeanor up to a 20-year felony.

The person I was chatting with turned out to be an undercover officer, not a minor. Can I still be charged?

Yes. The statutes reach a person the defendant believed to be a minor, so a real child is not required. MCL 750.145d covers communication with someone who "is believed by that person to be a minor," and MCL 750.145a covers an individual believed to be under 16. The Michigan Supreme Court has never recognized impossibility as a defense to an attempt charge. The real fights are about belief, identity and sometimes entrapment.

Michigan law, reviewed October 2026. General information, not advice about your situation. Select a question for the full answer and the authority behind it.

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Questions on this page

What Michigan laws are used to charge internet sex crimes and child sexually abusive material cases?

Three statutes are central to these cases: MCL 750.145d (using the internet or a computer to communicate for the purpose of committing a listed sex crime against a minor or someone believed to be a minor), MCL 750.145a (accosting or enticing a child under 16), and MCL 750.145c (child sexually abusive material). The Computer Crimes Act adds computer fraud, unauthorized access and using a computer to commit any crime. Counts can be charged together in a single case.

Michigan sorts online sex cases into three families. First, MCL 750.145d makes it a crime to use the internet or a computer to communicate with any person for the purpose of committing, attempting, conspiring to commit or soliciting a listed offense, such as child sexually abusive activity, criminal sexual conduct, kidnapping or enticing a child, when the victim is a minor or is believed by the defendant to be a minor. The list also includes stalking and a few explosives offenses, which do not require a minor. A computer includes a cell phone and other handheld devices. Second, MCL 750.145a punishes accosting, enticing or soliciting a child under 16, or an individual believed to be under 16, with intent to induce an immoral act, sexual intercourse, gross indecency or an act of depravity, and it also reaches encouraging that conduct. It is a felony with a 4-year maximum. Third, MCL 750.145c covers child sexually abusive material: producing it, distributing or promoting it, and possessing it or knowingly seeking and accessing it. Separately, the Computer Crimes Act punishes computer fraud (MCL 752.794), unauthorized access (MCL 752.795) and using a computer to commit, attempt, conspire to commit or solicit any crime (MCL 752.796), with penalties in MCL 752.797. Section 145d allows separate charges for the online communication and for the underlying offense, and it allows consecutive sentences, as does the computer-crime penalty section. One chat thread and one device can therefore produce several counts, and which counts survive affects the prison exposure and can affect the sex offender registration tier.

Authority: MCL 750.145d(1)-(5); MCL 750.145a; MCL 750.145c(2)-(4); MCL 752.794, 752.795; MCL 752.796, 752.797; M Crim JI 35.10. Reviewed Oct. 2026.

What does the prosecutor have to prove for using the internet to commit a sex crime against a minor, and how is the penalty set?

The prosecutor must prove that you used the internet or a computer to communicate with someone, that the purpose was to commit, attempt, conspire to commit or solicit one of the listed offenses, and, for the sex offenses, that the other person was a minor or that you believed so. A conviction on the underlying offense is not required. The maximum penalty depends on the maximum for the underlying offense, from a 1-year misdemeanor up to a 20-year felony.

The model jury instruction for MCL 750.145d breaks the charge into three parts. First, the defendant used the internet, a computer, a computer program, network or system to communicate with any person. Second, the communication was done for the purpose of committing, attempting, conspiring to commit or soliciting the listed offense. Third, for the offenses involving a minor, the victim or intended victim was a minor, meaning under 18, or the defendant believed so. The statute applies whether or not anyone is convicted of the underlying offense (MCL 750.145d(5)). Grading follows the maximum penalty of the underlying offense: an underlying maximum under 1 year makes the internet count a misdemeanor with a 1-year maximum and a $5,000 fine; 1 year to under 2 years makes it a 2-year felony; 2 to under 4 years a 4-year felony; 4 to under 10 years a 10-year felony; 10 to under 15 years a 15-year felony; and 15 years or life a 20-year felony with a fine up to $20,000. An underlying offense with a 4-year maximum, such as accosting a child, therefore lands in the 10-year tier. For sentencing guidelines, a 145d count falls in a class from G through B depending on its penalty tier (MCL 777.16g(1)), and the offense category, offense variable level and prior record variable level follow the underlying offense (MCL 777.16g(2)). Where the chat itself is the case, the contested issues are usually the purpose element, meaning whether the messages show a plan to commit the listed offense instead of talk, and identity, meaning who was at the keyboard.

Authority: MCL 750.145d(1)-(3), (5), (9); M Crim JI 35.10; MCL 777.16g. Reviewed Oct. 2026.

The person I was chatting with turned out to be an undercover officer, not a minor. Can I still be charged?

Yes. The statutes reach a person the defendant believed to be a minor, so a real child is not required. MCL 750.145d covers communication with someone who "is believed by that person to be a minor," and MCL 750.145a covers an individual believed to be under 16. The Michigan Supreme Court has never recognized impossibility as a defense to an attempt charge. The real fights are about belief, identity and sometimes entrapment.

Sting cases are charged under the same statutes as cases with a real child. MCL 750.145d applies when the victim or intended victim "is a minor or is believed by that person to be a minor," and MCL 750.145a applies to a person who accosts, entices or solicits "an individual whom he or she believes is a child less than 16 years of age." The model jury instruction for accosting a child says it does not matter if the complainant was older, so long as the prosecutor proves the defendant believed the complainant was under 16. In People v Thousand, 465 Mich 149 (2001), a man chatted online with an undercover officer posing as a minor and was charged with attempt; the Michigan Supreme Court said that impossibility, factual or legal, has not been recognized in Michigan as a defense to an attempt under MCL 750.92. In People v Meyers, 250 Mich App 637 (2002), the Court of Appeals reached the same place on sex offender registration, holding that impossibility principles did not excuse a person convicted of attempting an online accosting from registering. Because the other person's real age is not the issue, the proof usually centers on what the defendant believed: the age stated in the profile or early messages, whether the defendant kept going after an age was given, and whether the messages show a purpose to meet or to commit a listed act. Identity is another common issue, since the State has to tie the account, the device and the messages to the defendant. Entrapment is a separate defense with its own test.

Authority: MCL 750.145d(1)(a); MCL 750.145a; M Crim JI 20.40; People v Thousand, 465 Mich 149, 162-164 (2001); People v Meyers, 250 Mich App 637, 650-655 (2002). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Can I raise entrapment if police pushed me in an online sting?

Possibly, but the bar is high. Michigan recognizes entrapment in two situations: police conduct that would induce a law-abiding person, in similar circumstances, to commit the crime, or police conduct so reprehensible that a court cannot tolerate it. Merely giving a person the chance to commit a crime is not entrapment. Because a trial judge's ruling is reviewed for clear error on appeal, the chat logs and the record made at the entrapment hearing carry most of the weight.

In People v Fyda, 288 Mich App 446 (2010), the Court of Appeals stated Michigan's two-part test: entrapment exists if (1) the police engaged in impermissible conduct that would induce an otherwise law-abiding person, in similar circumstances, to commit a crime, or (2) the police conduct was so reprehensible that it cannot be tolerated. The Michigan Supreme Court reviews a lower court's entrapment finding for clear error, which means the factual record made in the trial court is what matters later (People v Johnson, 466 Mich 491 (2002)). In an online sting the usual questions are who raised sex first, who set the age, whether the defendant hesitated or tried to end the conversation and was pursued, how many messages the officer initiated, and whether the officer used pressure, flattery or repeated contact beyond providing an opportunity. A defendant who started the sexual talk and kept it going is in a weaker position than one who was pushed over several weeks after saying no. Entrapment is separate from the argument that the messages do not show the required purpose, and the two can be raised together. Because the logs are the evidence, they should be requested in discovery in full and not in summary form.

Authority: People v Fyda, 288 Mich App 446, 456 (2010); People v Johnson, 466 Mich 491, 497 (2002). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

What counts as child sexually abusive material in Michigan, and what are the penalties for making, sharing or having it?

It is any depiction of a child, or one that appears to include a child, engaging in a listed sexual act, in any form from a printed photo to a video file or computer-generated image. Producing carries up to 20 years, distributing or promoting up to 7 years, and possessing or knowingly seeking and accessing up to 4 years. Each tier goes higher (25, 15 and 10 years) when the material involves a prepubescent child, sadomasochistic abuse or bestiality, a video, or more than 100 images.

MCL 750.145c defines child sexually abusive material as any depiction, however produced, including a photograph, film, video, electronic image, computer-generated image or sound recording, that is of a child or appears to include a child engaging in a listed sexual act. A child is anyone under 18, with an affirmative defense for a person emancipated by operation of law. The listed acts are sexual intercourse, erotic fondling, sadomasochistic abuse, masturbation, passive sexual involvement, sexual excitement and erotic nudity. The statute has three levels. Producing or making material, or causing or allowing a child to take part, is a felony with a 20-year maximum and a $100,000 fine (MCL 750.145c(2)(a)). Distributing or promoting, or receiving to distribute or promote, is a 7-year felony with a $50,000 fine (subsection (3)(a)). Knowingly possessing, or knowingly seeking and accessing, is a 4-year felony with a $10,000 fine (subsection (4)(a)). Each level steps up to 25 years and $125,000, 15 years and $75,000, and 10 years and $50,000 when the material involves a prepubescent child, sadomasochistic abuse or bestiality, or includes a video or more than 100 images. Each level also requires that the person knew, had reason to know, or should reasonably be expected to know the person depicted was a child or appeared to be, or failed to take reasonable precautions to determine age. A second or later offense can carry a mandatory minimum of at least 5 years under MCL 750.145g. The three levels are separate crimes, and a charge at a higher level needs proof of the extra conduct, not just proof that files existed (People v Tombs, 472 Mich 446 (2005)).

Authority: MCL 750.145c(1), (2)-(4); MCL 750.145g; People v Tombs, 472 Mich 446, 464 (2005). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

I did not know the files were on my computer or I only looked at them online. Is that still possession?

It can be. Michigan requires knowing possession, but the Supreme Court held in People v Flick that a person who intentionally seeks out and views images online can constructively possess them, even if the images sit only in temporary internet files. Constructive possession means knowingly having the power and intention to exercise control over the material. Files that arrived without the user's knowledge are a different case, and who had access to the device becomes the main question.

The possession charge under MCL 750.145c(4) covers a person who "knowingly possesses or knowingly seeks and accesses" the material. In People v Flick, 487 Mich 1 (2010), the Michigan Supreme Court held that "possesses" includes actual and constructive possession, and that constructive possession exists when a person knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over the thing, directly or through another. The defendants in that case intentionally went looking for and viewed the material, and the Court found possession even though the images were in temporary internet files. The model jury instruction requires the prosecutor to prove the defendant possessed the material or intentionally looked for it to view it, that the defendant knew or should reasonably have known the person shown was under 18 or failed to take reasonable precautions to learn the age, and that the defendant knew of the possession or knowingly looked for the material. That makes the questions about knowledge. Who else used the computer, phone or account? When were the files created and were they ever opened? Were they in a cache, an unallocated area or a download folder? Did the search terms or browsing history show a person looking for the material, or a pop-up, a bundled download or a shared folder? These are the questions a forensic review is meant to answer, and the answers often turn on the examiner's report and not on the headline charge. Distributing is a different crime: People v Tombs, 472 Mich 446 (2005), held that merely obtaining and possessing material over the internet does not violate the distribution subsection, which needs criminal intent.

Authority: MCL 750.145c(4); M Crim JI 20.38c; People v Flick, 487 Mich 1, 4, 22 (2010); People v Tombs, 472 Mich 446, 464 (2005). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Is computer-generated, cartoon or AI-made material treated as child sexually abusive material?

It can be. The statute covers a computer-generated image of a child or one that "appears to include a child." If no real person under 18 was used to make it, the material still counts only when it also meets three conditions: it appeals to a prurient interest by community standards, it lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value, and it shows a listed sexual act in a patently offensive way. A defendant who wants to prove no real minor was used must file a written notice by the statute's deadline or lose that defense.

MCL 750.145c defines child sexually abusive material to include a computer or computer-generated image that is of a child or appears to include a child engaging in a listed sexual act. A depiction "appears to include a child" when it appears to include, or conveys the impression that it includes, a person under 18, and either (i) it was created using a depiction of any part of an actual person under 18, or (ii) it was not created from an actual person under 18 but all of three things are true: the average individual applying contemporary community standards would find it, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; a reasonable person would find it lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value; and it depicts or describes a listed sexual act in a patently offensive way. The model jury instruction tells jurors the same thing for depictions of a person who only appears under 18. The label on the file, such as AI-made, drawn or edited, does not control; what controls is whether the first or second route applies. If the images show a real adult, route (i) cannot apply and the prosecutor has to meet all three conditions in route (ii). If a defendant plans to offer evidence that a depiction was not created from any part of an actual person under 18, MCL 750.145c(8) requires a written notice to the prosecutor at arraignment on the information or within 15 days after, and not less than 10 days before trial, unless the court sets another time, and the notice must name the witnesses and the facts. The statute says that failing to file a timely notice precludes the defendant from offering this defense, so the notice should be calendared as soon as the charge is filed. How the statute applies to a particular AI-generated image is fact specific.

Authority: MCL 750.145c(1)(b), (1)(o), (8); M Crim JI 20.38c. Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Police seized my phone and computer with a warrant in an internet crimes case. What does the warrant have to cover, and what are they allowed to search?

A judge or magistrate must find probable cause from a sworn affidavit before issuing the warrant. In People v Hughes (2020), the Michigan Supreme Court held that a warrant to search phone data for evidence of one crime does not authorize a search of the same data for evidence of a different crime without a second warrant, and that the search must be reasonably directed at the crime the warrant names. In People v Carson (2025), the Michigan Supreme Court added that the warrant itself must be as particular as the circumstances allow, so a warrant to search everything on a phone is not enough. A reasonably thorough search is allowed, and officers need not stop when they happen to find something else.

Under MCL 780.651(1), a search warrant issues on a sworn affidavit presented to a judge or magistrate showing probable cause. Phones and computers hold far more than a house search ever did, and the U.S. Supreme Court said so in Riley v California, 573 US 373 (2014), which requires a warrant to search a phone seized in an arrest. The Michigan Supreme Court's decision in People v Hughes, 506 Mich 512; 958 NW2d 98 (2020), addressed what a warrant covers once the phone is in police hands. Police had a warrant to search for drug-trafficking evidence and, a month later, searched the extracted data for evidence of an unrelated robbery. The Court held that the second search required a second warrant. Digital searches must be reasonably directed at the criminal activity named in the warrant, and the Court listed factors for reasonableness, including the crime, the type of data, how the data was segregated, timing, the technology used, the device, the search protocol and any concealment. In People v Carson (Mich July 31, 2025) (Docket No. 166923), the Michigan Supreme Court added that the warrant itself must be as particular as the circumstances allow: a warrant that lets officers search the whole phone is not particular enough, and when the time frame of the criminal activity is known, the warrant should state it. A reasonably thorough search of the phone for the named crime is permitted, and an officer who comes across evidence of another crime during that search need not stop. In an internet crimes case, those rules turn into specific questions. Does the warrant name the offense that was actually charged? Does it limit categories of data and date ranges? Was the extraction done within the time the warrant allowed? Did officers search for a second offense, such as a new charge, without returning to the judge? The affidavit and warrant are discoverable (MCR 6.201(C)(4)), and the affidavit becomes public on the 56th day after issuance unless a court seals it (MCL 780.651).

Authority: MCL 780.651(1), (8), (9); People v Hughes, 506 Mich 512 (2020); People v Carson (Mich July 31, 2025) (Docket No. 166923) (affirming the Court of Appeals); Riley v California, 573 US 373 (2014); MCR 6.201(C)(4). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Can police or a judge make me unlock my phone or give up my password?

This question is unsettled in Michigan. As of Oct. 2026, no published Michigan appellate decision has squarely decided whether police or a court can compel a person to unlock a phone or give a passcode, and courts in other states have disagreed. A search warrant lets police search the data they can lawfully reach, but a warrant does not by itself answer whether a person can be ordered to unlock a device. A person with a locked device and a pending investigation should talk with a lawyer before answering any request.

A warrant gives police authority to search the data on a seized device. It does not say who has to help open it. The compelled-unlocking question is usually argued under the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination (US Const, Am V) and its Michigan counterpart (Const 1963, art 1, section 17), which turn on whether giving a passcode, or using a fingerprint or face to unlock, is compelled testimony. As of Oct. 2026, searches of Michigan appellate decisions did not locate a published Michigan decision resolving that question, so no binding Michigan authority is cited here and no prediction is offered. Courts elsewhere have not agreed. The New Jersey Supreme Court allowed compelled disclosure of a phone passcode where the foregone-conclusion test was met (State v Andrews, 234 A3d 1254 (NJ 2020)), while the Indiana Supreme Court held that compelling a suspect to unlock her phone violated the Fifth Amendment (Seo v State, 148 NE3d 952 (Ind 2020)). Neither decision binds a Michigan court. Some points do not depend on the open law. A person who is asked for a passcode during an investigation is being asked a question, and the answer is a statement that can be used. A prosecutor's request or a motion to compel should get a prompt response from counsel, because the record made in the trial court is the record an appeal is decided on. And a locked phone does not stop a warrant: police can seek to extract data by other means, and the limits on what a warrant covers still apply to whatever they get.

Authority: US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, section 17; State v Andrews, 234 A3d 1254 (NJ 2020); Seo v State, 148 NE3d 952 (Ind 2020). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Will my lawyer get copies of the images and the forensic report, and can a defense examiner look at the devices?

The forensic report, the search warrant papers and the list of evidence are discoverable on request under MCR 6.201, and the court rule lets a party ask the court to allow testing of physical evidence without destruction on good cause. For the images themselves, MCL 750.145c(11) says the court must deny a request to copy or photograph the pictures if the prosecutor makes them reasonably available for inspection by the defendant, the lawyer and any person the defense may seek to qualify to give opinion testimony at trial, at a facility the prosecutor approves.

Discovery in a Michigan criminal case runs mainly through MCR 6.201. On request, each side must provide the other with its witness list, a description of and opportunity to inspect tangible physical evidence, with copies on request, and the qualifications and report of any examiner the party may call at trial (MCR 6.201(A)(1), (3), (6)). The prosecutor must also provide any police report, any statement by the defendant, and any affidavit, warrant and return for a search or seizure (MCR 6.201(C)). The default time to comply is 21 days from the request (MCR 6.201(G)). On good cause, the court may allow testing of physical evidence without destruction. Child sexually abusive material follows a special rule. MCL 750.145c(11) says the court must deny a defense request to copy or photograph pictorial evidence if the prosecutor makes it reasonably available for inspection by the defendant, defense counsel and any person the defense may seek to qualify to give opinion testimony at trial, at a facility the prosecutor approves. Defense review of the images therefore happens at a facility the prosecutor approves, which makes early scheduling important. A forensic report is the starting point and is not the end of the review: the questions of who used the device, when files were created or opened, and what the browsing and search history show are often answered by the underlying extraction and not by a summary, so a defense request should ask for the extraction and the tool settings, not just the report.

Authority: MCR 6.201(A), (C), (G); MCL 750.145c(11). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

How are sentences set in an internet sex crime or child sexually abusive material case, and why does the charge I plead to matter so much?

The sentencing guidelines are advisory, and a judge who goes outside the range is reviewed for reasonableness. The statute puts each charge in an offense class, from class B for production and for the aggravated possession tier to class F for ordinary possession and for accosting a child. Because the subsection of conviction also controls the sex offender registration tier and whether a mandatory minimum applies, the exact count in a plea matters as much as the number of years.

Michigan's sentencing guidelines have been advisory since People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358 (2015); judges must consult them, and a sentence outside the range is reviewed for reasonableness. The guidelines work from the class assigned to the charged offense and then from scoring of offense variables and prior record variables. Under MCL 777.16g, producing child sexually abusive material under MCL 750.145c(2)(a) or (2)(b) is class B; distributing under (3)(a) is class D and under (3)(b) is class C; ordinary possession under (4)(a) is class F; aggravated possession under (4)(b) is class B; and accosting a child under MCL 750.145a is a class F offense against a person. An MCL 750.145d count falls in a class from G through B depending on its penalty tier (MCL 777.16g(1)), and its offense category, offense variable level and prior record variable level follow the underlying offense (MCL 777.16g(2)). Statutory add-ons matter as well: MCL 750.145g sets a mandatory minimum of at least 5 years for a second or later offense, and MCL 750.145d(3) and MCL 752.797 allow consecutive sentences. The charged subsection is also the hinge for registration. A conviction for possession under MCL 750.145c(4) is a Tier I offense, while production or distribution under subsections (2) or (3), accosting under MCL 750.145a and online communication under MCL 750.145d(1)(a) are Tier II. For that reason, a plea to one subsection instead of another changes the registration period as well as the sentence range.

Authority: People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358, 365 (2015); MCL 777.16g; MCL 750.145g; MCL 28.722. Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Will I have to register as a sex offender after an internet sex crime or a child sexually abusive material conviction, and for how long?

Usually yes. Possession of child sexually abusive material under MCL 750.145c(4) is a Tier I offense (15 years). Producing or distributing under 145c(2) or (3), accosting a child under MCL 750.145a, and online communication under MCL 750.145d(1)(a) are Tier II offenses (25 years), and attempts and conspiracies are covered too. Computer Crimes Act sections such as unauthorized access are not listed. The registration clock excludes time in custody, and removal petitions are limited.

The Sex Offenders Registration Act lists the offenses that require registration and assigns each to a tier (MCL 28.722). Possession or accessing under MCL 750.145c(4) is Tier I. Accosting a child under MCL 750.145a, producing or distributing under MCL 750.145c(2) or (3), and using the internet to commit a listed offense under MCL 750.145d(1)(a), except offenses arising from MCL 750.157c, are Tier II, and attempts and conspiracies to commit a listed offense are covered. Unauthorized computer access under MCL 752.795 does not appear in the lists of registrable offenses in MCL 28.722. Any other Michigan offense that by its nature is a sexual offense against a minor falls in Tier I under the catch-all in MCL 28.722(r)(viii) unless it is listed in a higher tier. Under MCL 28.725, registration lasts 15 years for Tier I and 25 years for Tier II, and the periods exclude time spent incarcerated for a crime and time under civil commitment. A Tier I registrant can petition the court for removal after 10 or more years if there has been no later felony or listed offense, supervision was completed without revocation, and a sex offender treatment program was completed (the court may waive the treatment requirement if treatment was not a condition of confinement, release, probation or parole). The court may grant the petition but not if it finds the person is a continuing threat to the public (MCL 28.728c(11), (12)). Outside that Tier I provision, the statute allows petitions only in narrow situations, such as certain consensual offenses between people close in age and certain juvenile adjudications (MCL 28.728c(13) to (15)), so a Tier II registrant has no general petition path. In 2025 the Michigan Supreme Court held in People v Kardasz that the 2021 version of the act (2020 PA 295) is punishment but is not cruel or unusual under the Michigan Constitution, facially or as applied to a Tier III registrant, which limits cruel-or-unusual-punishment challenges to the current act. Attempts matter: People v Meyers, 250 Mich App 637 (2002), held that an attempted online accosting required registration even though the person on the other end was not a child.

Authority: MCL 28.722; MCL 28.725(11)-(14); MCL 28.728c(11)-(15); People v Meyers, 250 Mich App 637, 650-655 (2002); People v Kardasz, No. 165008 (Mich Dec. 19, 2025). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Can an internet sex crime or child sexually abusive material case be charged in both Michigan state court and federal court?

Yes. Under the dual-sovereignty rule, the state and the federal government can each prosecute the same conduct as separate offenses. The U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed that in Gamble v United States (2019), and the Michigan Supreme Court holds that the state double jeopardy clause does not bar a Michigan prosecution after a prosecution in another state. A federal case, a state case or both can follow one investigation.

The Double Jeopardy Clause bars a second prosecution for the same offense by the same sovereign, but not by a different one. In Gamble v United States, 587 US 678 (2019), the Supreme Court declined to overturn the dual-sovereignty doctrine and held that a state may prosecute even if the federal government has prosecuted the same conduct. Michigan's own constitutional clause does not change the result: People v Davis, 472 Mich 156 (2005), involved a defendant who stole a vehicle in Michigan, drove it to Kentucky and was prosecuted in both states; the Michigan Supreme Court held that the Michigan Constitution does not bar successive prosecution by separate sovereigns and overruled the earlier decision that had balanced the states' interests. Online sex and child sexually abusive material cases cross state lines easily, since files and messages travel across networks, so an investigation can involve local police, the state police and federal agents at once, and the charging decision can be made by either prosecutor. Whether a person faces state charges, federal charges or both is a charging decision, not a defense. Federal law separately makes it a crime to produce, receive, distribute or possess child pornography (the term used in the federal statutes; 18 USC 2251, 2252 and 2252A), and to use the internet or another facility of interstate commerce to persuade, induce, entice or coerce a minor to engage in sexual activity, including attempts (18 USC 2422(b), which carries a mandatory minimum of 10 years in prison). Some other federal child exploitation offenses also carry mandatory minimum prison terms. Federal cases follow federal procedure and federal sentencing rules, not Michigan's.

Authority: Gamble v United States, 587 US 678; 139 S Ct 1960, 1964-1965 (2019); People v Davis, 472 Mich 156 (2005); 18 USC 2422(b); 18 USC 2251, 2252, 2252A. Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Detectives want to talk to me about messages or files on my devices. Should I talk to them?

Anything said to investigators can be used against you, and staying quiet protects a person only if the right is invoked clearly. Under Berghuis v Thompkins, a suspect must unambiguously invoke the right to remain silent, and a suspect who did not say he wanted to remain silent or did not want to talk to the police had his later answers used. Saying out loud that you want a lawyer and will not answer questions, and then stopping, is the plain way to protect the right.

Many internet-crime investigations begin with a knock on the door, a search warrant being executed, or a call asking a person to come in and clear things up. In Berghuis v Thompkins, 560 US 370 (2010), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a suspect who wants to rely on the right to remain silent must invoke it unambiguously. The opinion stressed that "Thompkins did not say that he wanted to remain silent or that he did not want to talk with the police," and his answers during the interview could be used. Silence by itself is not the same as saying the right is being invoked. The plain move is to say, clearly, that you want a lawyer and will not answer questions, and then say nothing else. That applies to the questions that matter in these cases: whose device it is, who has the passwords, who else uses the account, what was searched for, and what the messages meant. Those are the same facts the prosecutor needs for knowledge, possession and purpose, and an explanation given without a lawyer, even a truthful one, can fill gaps in the State's proof. A person can be polite, give a name and address if asked, and still decline to be interviewed. This point is about interviews with police and agents; it does not change what a warrant allows them to take.

Authority: Berghuis v Thompkins, 560 US 370 (2010). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

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This page provides general information about Michigan law and is not legal advice. Reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Laws change and every case turns on its own facts. Consult a licensed attorney about your specific situation.

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