These are general answers about Michigan law, not advice about your situation. Each answer links to the statute, court rule or case it rests on. Last reviewed October 2026.
By Mitchell S. Bisson, Michigan attorney (P79807). Reviewed October 2026.
Quick answers
The short version
MCL 780.972(1) lets a person who is not engaged in a crime use deadly force, with no duty to retreat, anywhere he or she has a legal right to be, if he or she honestly and reasonably believes deadly force is necessary to prevent imminent death, imminent great bodily harm, or imminent sexual assault of self or another. Both halves of the belief matter: it has to be honest and it has to be reasonable. The Act did not replace the older common-law defense, which still applies when the Act does not.
Do I have to try to retreat before I use force in Michigan?
Often not. Under MCL 780.972, a person who is not engaged in a crime and is somewhere he or she may lawfully be has no duty to retreat when the honest and reasonable belief the statute requires is present. Where the Act does not apply, the common law governs: retreat is a factor when it can be done safely, but it is never required in the face of a sudden, fierce and violent attack, and there is no duty to retreat in your own dwelling or its curtilage (MCL 768.21c).
In a Michigan self-defense case, who has to prove it, me or the prosecutor?
The prosecutor carries the final burden. Self-defense is an affirmative defense, so a defendant has to produce some evidence on each element before the judge must instruct on it. Once that is done, the prosecutor must disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt (People v Dupree, 486 Mich 693, 710 (2010); M Crim JI 7.20).
Michigan law, reviewed October 2026. General information, not advice about your situation. Select a question for the full answer and the authority behind it.
Michigan · 14 questions
Questions on this page
- What does Michigan's Self-Defense Act (the stand your ground law) actually say about using deadly force?
- Do I have to try to retreat before I use force in Michigan?
- In a Michigan self-defense case, who has to prove it, me or the prosecutor?
- Can I still claim self-defense if I started the argument or threw the first punch?
- I was doing something illegal when the fight started, such as carrying a gun I was not allowed to have. Does that kill my self-defense claim?
- What protection do I have if I use force against someone breaking into my home, business or car?
- Does self-defense still apply if the other person was not armed?
- Is pointing a gun at someone the same as using deadly force in a self-defense case?
- Can I be arrested and charged even if I acted in self-defense?
- If I acted in self-defense, can the other person or their family sue me?
- What will the judge tell the jury about self-defense in a Michigan case?
- Can I tell the jury that the person I fought with has a history of violence?
- Michigan has no imperfect self-defense that reduces murder to manslaughter if I honestly but unreasonably believed I was in danger. Is that right?
- What if I used more force than necessary, or kept going after the other person backed off?
What does Michigan's Self-Defense Act (the stand your ground law) actually say about using deadly force?
MCL 780.972(1) lets a person who is not engaged in a crime use deadly force, with no duty to retreat, anywhere he or she has a legal right to be, if he or she honestly and reasonably believes deadly force is necessary to prevent imminent death, imminent great bodily harm, or imminent sexual assault of self or another. Both halves of the belief matter: it has to be honest and it has to be reasonable. The Act did not replace the older common-law defense, which still applies when the Act does not.
The Self-Defense Act is MCL 780.971 to 780.974. Section 2, MCL 780.972(1), covers deadly force. A person who has not engaged and is not engaged in the commission of a crime at the time may use deadly force against another individual anywhere he or she has the legal right to be, with no duty to retreat, if either of two things is true: (a) the person honestly and reasonably believes deadly force is necessary to prevent the imminent death of or imminent great bodily harm to himself, herself, or another individual, or (b) the person honestly and reasonably believes it is necessary to prevent the imminent sexual assault of himself, herself, or another individual. Section 2(2) covers force short of deadly force and asks whether the person honestly and reasonably believes the force is necessary to defend against the imminent unlawful use of force by another.
The Michigan Supreme Court has described the Act as codifying the circumstances in which a person may use deadly force in self-defense or defense of another without a duty to retreat (People v Dupree, 486 Mich 693, 708 (2010)). It did not wipe out the common law. MCL 780.974 says the Act does not diminish the right to use force in self-defense or defense of another as provided by the common law in existence on October 1, 2006, and MCL 780.973 says that, except as section 2 provides, the Act does not modify the common law on the duty to retreat. In People v Leffew, 508 Mich 625; 975 NW2d 896, 906 (2022), the Court said that aside from limiting the duty to retreat, the Act did not modify or abrogate the common-law defenses of self-defense and defense of others.
Two features trip people up. First, the belief has to be honest (what the person actually believed) and reasonable (what a reasonable person would have believed), and jurors are told to judge the conduct by how the circumstances appeared to the defendant at the time (M Crim JI 7.15(2)-(3)). Second, the Act's protection is written for someone who is not engaged in a crime and is somewhere he or she may lawfully be. The phrase stand your ground does not appear in the statute.
Do I have to try to retreat before I use force in Michigan?
Often not. Under MCL 780.972, a person who is not engaged in a crime and is somewhere he or she may lawfully be has no duty to retreat when the honest and reasonable belief the statute requires is present. Where the Act does not apply, the common law governs: retreat is a factor when it can be done safely, but it is never required in the face of a sudden, fierce and violent attack, and there is no duty to retreat in your own dwelling or its curtilage (MCL 768.21c).
The Self-Defense Act removed the duty to retreat for a person who has not engaged and is not engaged in a crime, who is anywhere he or she has the legal right to be, and who honestly and reasonably holds the belief the statute describes (MCL 780.972(1) and (2)). Outside those conditions, MCL 780.973 leaves the common-law retreat rules in place, and MCL 768.21c(1) adds that where the Act does not apply, the common law applies except that the duty to retreat before using deadly force is not required in the person's own dwelling or within its curtilage.
The common-law rules were set out in People v Riddle, 467 Mich 116, 119-120 (2002). The necessity element of self-defense normally asks whether the person could have avoided deadly force by applying nondeadly force or taking an obvious and safe avenue of retreat. A person is never required to retreat from a sudden, fierce and violent attack, or from an attacker the person reasonably believes is about to use a deadly weapon. The one narrow case that imposes a duty to retreat on a person who did not start the trouble is voluntary mutual combat, where a participant is not justified in taking a life until he or she has retreated as far as safely possible. Riddle held that the old castle rule stopped at the dwelling and its attached appurtenances and did not reach the yard or curtilage. MCL 768.21c(1), effective October 1, 2006, now removes the duty to retreat before deadly force in a person's own dwelling or its curtilage where the Act does not apply. In People v Richardson, 490 Mich 115 (2011), the Court held that a defendant on his own porch had no duty to retreat.
At trial, M Crim JI 7.16 lets the jury consider whether the defendant could have safely retreated, but only where there is a dispute whether a duty to retreat existed (use note, citing Richardson). If that instruction is read, the same instruction tells jurors when no retreat is required. A mistake in these instructions can be reversible, as People v Ogilvie, 341 Mich App 28 (2022), shows.
In a Michigan self-defense case, who has to prove it, me or the prosecutor?
The prosecutor carries the final burden. Self-defense is an affirmative defense, so a defendant has to produce some evidence on each element before the judge must instruct on it. Once that is done, the prosecutor must disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt (People v Dupree, 486 Mich 693, 710 (2010); M Crim JI 7.20).
Michigan treats self-defense as an affirmative defense. A defendant who raises it must first produce some evidence on all of its elements before the trial court has to instruct the jury on it (People v Guajardo, 300 Mich App 26, 34-35 (2013)). That is a burden of production, not a burden of persuasion. In People v Dupree, 486 Mich 693, 710 (2010), the Michigan Supreme Court reaffirmed that once the defendant satisfies the initial burden of production, the prosecution bears the burden of disproving the common-law defense of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
The model instruction tracks that rule. M Crim JI 7.20 tells jurors that the defendant does not have to prove that he or she acted in self-defense and that the prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense. The use note says the instruction is given where there is some evidence of self-defense and that if there is no such evidence, no self-defense instructions are given.
The statute adds a charging rule. Under MCL 780.961(2), a prosecutor who believes deadly force or other force was unjustified under section 2 of the Self-Defense Act may charge the individual and shall present evidence to the judge or magistrate at the time of warrant issuance, at any preliminary examination, and at trial establishing that the actions were not justified. A self-defense claim that rests only on the jury being told about it, without evidence of an honest and reasonable belief, can fail at the instruction stage, as it did in Guajardo, where the defendant's own account was an accidental discharge.
Can I still claim self-defense if I started the argument or threw the first punch?
Starting an argument with words does not by itself end the right to self-defense. A person who starts a fight with fists or a weapon that is not deadly does not lose all right to self-defense, but if the other person responds with deadly force, he or she may act in self-defense only if he or she retreated where it was safe to do so (M Crim JI 7.16). For nondeadly force, the jury is told the person must not have acted wrongfully and brought on the assault, and a person who started an assault with deadly force or a dangerous or deadly weapon loses the claim unless he or she genuinely stopped and clearly communicated a wish to make peace.
Michigan courts say that, in general, a defendant does not act in justifiable self-defense when he or she uses excessive force or is the initial aggressor (People v Guajardo, 300 Mich App 26, 35 (2013)). People v Riddle, 467 Mich 116, 119 (2002), likewise describes justified self-defense as available to one who is free from fault. The model instructions turn that into practical rules.
For nondeadly force, M Crim JI 7.22(6) lists, as a condition, that the person claiming self-defense must not have acted wrongfully and brought on the assault, and adds an optional sentence that if the defendant only used words, that does not prevent him or her from claiming self-defense if attacked. For a defendant who began an assault with deadly force or a dangerous or deadly weapon, M Crim JI 7.18 says the defense is unavailable unless the defendant genuinely stopped fighting or assaulting and clearly let the other person know he or she wanted to make peace; if the other person then kept fighting or started again, the defendant has the same right to defend as anyone else. The use note says failure to give that instruction, if the facts support it, is reversible error. M Crim JI 7.16 adds that a defendant who assaults with fists or a weapon that is not deadly, insults someone with words, trespasses, or tries to take property in a nonviolent way does not lose all right to self-defense; if the other person responds with deadly force, the defendant may act in self-defense but only if he or she retreated where it would have been safe to do so.
The use notes to M Crim JI 7.15 and 7.16 say the court may instruct that a defendant engaged in some other crime does not lose the right to self-defense if that crime was not likely to lead to the other person's assaultive behavior (People v Townes, 391 Mich 578, 593 (1974)). The committee expressed no opinion where the other offense may lead to assaultive behavior.
I was doing something illegal when the fight started, such as carrying a gun I was not allowed to have. Does that kill my self-defense claim?
Not automatically. The Self-Defense Act's no-retreat protection is written for a person who is not engaged in a crime, but the Act preserves the older common-law defense, and the Michigan Supreme Court has held that self-defense and defense of others are not barred merely because the charge is a nonassaultive crime; whether the defense applies turns on the facts of the case. Whether the other crime is the kind that would provoke an attack, and whether it is tied to the force used, can matter a great deal.
MCL 780.972 gives its no-retreat protection to an individual who has not or is not engaged in the commission of a crime at the time he or she uses force. That limit does not end self-defense altogether. MCL 780.974 says the Act does not diminish the right to use force in self-defense as provided by the common law as of October 1, 2006, and in People v Leffew, 508 Mich 625; 975 NW2d 896, 906-907 (2022), the Michigan Supreme Court held that the Act did not abrogate the common-law defenses of self-defense and defense of others, that the Act's legal-right-to-be-there condition did not bar the defendants' common-law defense-of-others claims, and that the applicability of the defense must be determined on the particular facts of each case, not the charges the prosecution brings.
The same line runs through the firearm cases. In People v Dupree, 486 Mich 693 (2010), the Court held that common-law self-defense is generally available to a person charged with being a felon in possession if there is sufficient evidence. In People v Guajardo, 300 Mich App 26, 44 (2013), the Court of Appeals held that a felon possessing a firearm is not precluded from asserting self-defense under the Act when the evidence would let a jury conclude the possession was justified by an honest and reasonable belief that deadly force was necessary to prevent imminent death, great bodily harm, or sexual assault.
The jury instructions reflect the distinction. The use notes to M Crim JI 7.15 and 7.16 say that where the defendant was engaged in some other crime, the court may instruct that self-defense is not lost if the other offense was not likely to lead to the other person's assaultive behavior, citing People v Townes, 391 Mich 578, 593 (1974). The committee expressed no opinion on offenses that may lead to assaultive behavior. M Crim JI 7.25 adds, for felon-in-possession, a condition that the defendant must not have been engaged in a criminal act that would tend to provoke a person to try to defend himself or herself from the defendant, with a note that this paragraph is usually unwarranted if the defendant was, for example, in a drug transaction and was attacked without provocation.
What protection do I have if I use force against someone breaking into my home, business or car?
Michigan gives a rebuttable presumption that your fear was honest and reasonable when you honestly and reasonably believed the person was breaking in or committing home invasion, had broken in and was still there, or was unlawfully trying to remove someone from a dwelling, business or occupied vehicle against his or her will, and that was in fact what the person was doing. The presumption has listed exceptions, and the prosecutor can overcome it by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that you did not have the belief.
MCL 780.951(1) creates a rebuttable presumption, in a civil or criminal case, that a person who uses deadly force or other force under section 2 of the Self-Defense Act had an honest and reasonable belief that imminent death, sexual assault or great bodily harm would occur, if two things are true. First, the person against whom force was used was in the process of breaking and entering a dwelling or business premises or committing home invasion, or had done so and was still present, or was unlawfully attempting to remove another individual from a dwelling, business premises or occupied vehicle against his or her will. Second, the person using force honestly and reasonably believed that was happening. M Crim JI 7.16a states the presumption for jurors and says the prosecutor can overcome it by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not have the belief.
Subsection (2) lists situations where the presumption does not apply. They include a case in which the person against whom force was used had the legal right to be in the dwelling, business or vehicle and was not subject to a domestic violence protective injunction or a written pretrial supervision, probation or parole order of no contact; removal of a child, grandchild or person in lawful custody of the person against whom force was used; a defendant who is engaged in a crime or using the premises to further one; a peace officer acting in the line of duty; and certain domestic situations where the defendant has a prior history of domestic violence as the aggressor.
The vehicle language is narrow. In People v Thigpen, 349 Mich App 437 (2023), the Court of Appeals said a defendant in a vehicle, as opposed to a dwelling or business, can rely on the presumption only when the other person was unlawfully attempting to remove the defendant from the occupied vehicle, and a person who merely jiggled the door handle did not satisfy it. Separately, where section 2 of the Act does not apply, MCL 768.21c(1) provides that the common law applies except that there is no duty to retreat before deadly force in a person's own dwelling or its curtilage. The model instruction on the older common-law defense of the home, M Crim JI 7.17, carries a use note questioning whether that defense survives the statute, a question the committee left open.
Does self-defense still apply if the other person was not armed?
It can. The test is whether you honestly and reasonably believed you were in danger of death, great bodily harm or sexual assault, not whether the other person had a weapon. Whether the person was armed is one circumstance the jury considers, along with size and strength, the nature of the attack or threat, and any prior violence you knew about. A fear of only minor injury does not justify deadly force.
MCL 780.972(1) turns on the defendant's honest and reasonable belief that deadly force was necessary to prevent imminent death, imminent great bodily harm, or imminent sexual assault. Nothing in the text requires the other person to hold a weapon. M Crim JI 7.15(4) tells jurors that a person may not kill or seriously injure another just to protect against what seems like a threat of only minor injury, and that in deciding whether the defendant was afraid of death, serious physical injury or sexual assault they should consider all the circumstances, listing the condition of the people involved including relative strength, whether the other person was armed with a dangerous weapon or had some other means of injuring the defendant, the nature of the attack or threat, and whether the defendant knew of previous violent acts or threats by the other person.
So an unarmed attacker can still present a justifying danger when the circumstances listed in M Crim JI 7.15(4), such as the relative strength of the people involved or some other means of injuring the defendant, support an honest and reasonable fear of death or serious injury. M Crim JI 7.15(3) adds that if the belief was honest and reasonable, the defendant could act immediately even if it later turned out he or she was wrong about how much danger there was. People v Riddle, 467 Mich 116, 119 (2002), frames the question the same way: whether, under all the circumstances, the defendant honestly and reasonably believed he or she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that deadly force was necessary.
The other side of the rule matters just as much. M Crim JI 7.15(4) says a person may not kill or seriously injure another just to protect against what seems like a threat of only minor injury, and nondeadly force under MCL 780.972(2) and M Crim JI 7.22 is the more fitting framework. The jury also asks whether the amount of force was necessary, and may consider whether the defendant knew of other ways to protect himself or herself while also considering the excitement of the moment (M Crim JI 7.15(5)).
Is pointing a gun at someone the same as using deadly force in a self-defense case?
Not necessarily. In People v Ogilvie, 341 Mich App 28 (2022), the Court of Appeals held that, under the circumstances there, pointing a loaded gun without firing it or otherwise showing an intent to cause death or serious harm was a threat of deadly force and not the use of deadly force, so the jury should have been instructed on nondeadly force. The Act sets a lower belief threshold for nondeadly force, and the court left room for the question to go to a jury in another case.
The Self-Defense Act has two tracks. Deadly force requires an honest and reasonable belief that it is necessary to prevent imminent death, great bodily harm or sexual assault (MCL 780.972(1)). Force other than deadly force requires an honest and reasonable belief that it is necessary to defend against the imminent unlawful use of force by another (MCL 780.972(2)). The Act does not define either term.
In People v Ogilvie, 341 Mich App 28; 989 NW2d 250 (2022), the defendant pointed a loaded gun at another person without firing. The Court of Appeals held that, under the circumstances, he did not use deadly force, that the jury should have been instructed on nondeadly force, and that a threat of deadly force should not be treated as a use of deadly force. Pointing a gun was still force, not no force. The court also held that the retreat instruction, which asked for a belief in deadly force, held him to a higher standard than MCL 780.972(2) requires. Counsel's failure to object was ineffective assistance, and the convictions were reversed. The opinion states that it did not foreclose the possibility that whether a defendant used deadly or nondeadly force could be a jury question in an appropriate case.
The model instructions have followed. M Crim JI 7.22 covers nondeadly force in self-defense or defense of others. M Crim JI 7.25a, adopted in March 2024, covers self-defense as a defense to brandishing a firearm and notes in a footnote that Ogilvie holds merely pointing a firearm is not deadly force, while the committee expressed no view on whether its limitation of brandishing to danger of death, great bodily harm or sexual assault may be too restrictive. Because Ogilvie turned on its facts, a case where a shot is fired, or where the circumstances show intent to kill or seriously injure, would be analyzed differently.
Can I be arrested and charged even if I acted in self-defense?
Yes. Police can arrest on reasonable cause and a prosecutor can charge, and the Self-Defense Act does not stop either. MCL 780.961 says a person who uses force in compliance with the Act and who is not engaged in a crime commits no crime, but it also lets a prosecutor who believes the force was unjustified bring charges, and requires the prosecutor to present evidence of that at the warrant, any preliminary examination, and trial.
MCL 780.961(1) provides that an individual who uses deadly force or other force in compliance with section 2 of the Self-Defense Act, and who has not or is not engaged in the commission of a crime, commits no crime in using that force. Subsection (2) then allows for the practical reality: if a prosecutor believes the force was unjustified under section 2, the prosecutor may charge the individual and shall present evidence to the judge or magistrate at warrant issuance, at any preliminary examination, and at trial establishing that the actions were not justified. A peace officer may arrest without a warrant when the officer has reasonable cause to believe a felony, or a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for more than 92 days, has been committed and reasonable cause to believe the person committed it (MCL 764.15(1)(d)).
At the preliminary examination, the district court looks at the whole record. In People v Schurr, 350 Mich App 47; 29 NW3d 511 (2024), the Court of Appeals stated that criminal defenses are considered at the preliminary examination, that a court may not bind over a defendant whose undisputed evidence establishes a complete defense as a matter of law, but that where the evidence supports competing inferences about self-defense the court must bind over if the probable-cause standard is met and leave the conflicts to the jury. The prosecution at that stage needs evidence sufficient to cause a person of ordinary prudence and caution to entertain a reasonable belief of guilt.
The Self-Defense Act does not provide a separate pretrial immunity hearing. The self-defense claim is considered at the preliminary examination and, if the case is bound over, is a defense at trial.
If I acted in self-defense, can the other person or their family sue me?
A lawsuit can be filed, but Michigan gives civil immunity to a person who used force in self-defense or defense of another in compliance with section 2 of the Self-Defense Act. If the court finds that the person used force in compliance with the Act and is immune, it shall award actual attorney fees and costs to the person who was sued (MCL 600.2922b and 600.2922c).
MCL 600.2922b provides that an individual who uses deadly force or force other than deadly force in self-defense or in defense of another individual in compliance with section 2 of the Self-Defense Act is immune from civil liability for damages caused by that use of force to the individual against whom the force was authorized, and to any individual claiming damages arising out of that person's injury or death based on a relationship to that person. That second group covers family members bringing wrongful death or similar claims.
MCL 600.2922c adds a fee-shifting rule. The court shall award the payment of actual attorney fees and costs to an individual who is sued for civil damages for allegedly using deadly force or other force against another individual if the court determines that the individual used the force in compliance with section 2 of the Self-Defense Act and that the individual is immune from civil liability under section 2922b.
The immunity is tied to compliance with section 2 of the Act (MCL 780.972), so the same questions come up as in a criminal case: whether the person was engaged in a crime, whether he or she had the legal right to be where he or she was, and whether the belief in the need for force was honest and reasonable. A criminal acquittal or a decision not to charge is not a statutory condition of the immunity. The statutes say nothing about how or when the court makes the determination or how fees are calculated.
What will the judge tell the jury about self-defense in a Michigan case?
If there is some evidence of self-defense, the judge reads the model instructions in Chapter 7 of the Michigan Model Criminal Jury Instructions: the elements of self-defense (M Crim JI 7.15 for deadly force, 7.22 for nondeadly force, 7.21 for defense of others), the retreat rules (7.16), the presumption for break-ins (7.16a), and the prosecutor's burden (7.20). Which ones are read depends on the evidence, and the wrong instruction can be grounds for a new trial.
Chapter 7 of the Model Criminal Jury Instructions, last updated August 31, 2026, covers defenses. M Crim JI 7.15 is the deadly-force self-defense instruction: the defendant must have honestly and reasonably believed he or she was in danger of being killed, seriously injured or sexually assaulted, must have been afraid of more than minor injury, and must have honestly and reasonably believed the force was immediately necessary. M Crim JI 7.16 covers retreat and was combined with former 7.19 in May 2023, so older references to 7.19 are out of date. M Crim JI 7.16a states the presumption in MCL 780.951. M Crim JI 7.17 covers defense of the home. M Crim JI 7.18 covers the deadly aggressor, 7.20 the prosecutor's burden, 7.21 defense of others with deadly force, 7.22 nondeadly force, 7.23 past violence by the complainant or decedent, and 7.24 attack by more than one person. M Crim JI 7.25 and 7.25a cover felon in possession and brandishing.
The use notes say these are given when some evidence of self-defense has been introduced or elicited. A defendant must produce some evidence on all elements of the defense before an instruction is required (People v Guajardo, 300 Mich App 26, 34-35 (2013)), and once that is done the prosecution must disprove it (People v Dupree, 486 Mich 693, 710 (2010)). Under MCR 2.512(D)(2), pertinent portions of the model instructions must be given if they are applicable, accurately state the law, and are requested by a party (MCR 6.001(D) applies the civil rules in criminal cases).
Instruction errors in this area do matter. In People v Ogilvie, 341 Mich App 28 (2022), the jury was given deadly-force and retreat instructions that did not match the Act's nondeadly-force standard, the Court of Appeals found trial counsel ineffective for not objecting, and the convictions were reversed.
Can I tell the jury that the person I fought with has a history of violence?
Sometimes. When self-defense is at issue, Michigan allows evidence of a deceased victim's violent reputation, and the defendant's knowledge of it matters when it is offered to show the defendant's state of mind. Evidence of specific violent acts the defendant knew about can be offered to show the defendant's fear was reasonable. Specific past acts generally cannot be used to prove the other person was the aggressor. The current text of MRE 404(a)(2)(B), which allows a defendant to offer evidence of the alleged victim's trait for aggression when self-defense is an issue, is written for homicide cases.
People v Harris, 458 Mich 310, 316, 319 (1998), is the leading Michigan Supreme Court decision. It held that the trial court erred in excluding reputation evidence that the decedent was violent, because that evidence tended to show the defendant's fear was real. Harris explained that reputation evidence offered to show the defendant's state of mind requires that the defendant knew of the reputation (458 Mich at 316). The Court explained that, under the rules of evidence, specific acts of the victim may not be used to show that the victim was the aggressor, though specific acts may be shown to establish the defendant's reasonable apprehension of harm. The model instruction M Crim JI 7.23 reflects this: for specific acts, jurors may consider the evidence in deciding whether the defendant honestly and reasonably feared for his or her safety if the defendant knew about the acts; for general reputation, jurors may consider it in deciding whether the complainant likely threatened the defendant and whether the defendant honestly and reasonably feared for his or her safety.
The rule text has since been restyled. MRE 404(a)(2)(B), in the version published by the Michigan courts and current through September 1, 2026, says that in a homicide case, when self-defense is an issue, the defendant may offer evidence of the alleged victim's trait for aggression.
If the defense offers evidence of the alleged victim's trait for aggression, the prosecution may offer evidence of the defendant's same trait and evidence of the alleged victim's trait for peacefulness to rebut a claim that the victim was the first aggressor.
Michigan has no imperfect self-defense that reduces murder to manslaughter if I honestly but unreasonably believed I was in danger. Is that right?
Largely right. In People v Reese, 491 Mich 127, 130 (2012), the Michigan Supreme Court held that imperfect self-defense does not exist in Michigan law as a freestanding defense mitigating murder to voluntary manslaughter. The Court did recognize that the factual circumstances that have been called imperfect self-defense may negate the malice element of second-degree murder.
Some states reduce a homicide from murder to manslaughter when a defendant honestly but unreasonably believed deadly force was necessary. The Michigan Court of Appeals had applied that doctrine in some decisions, and in People v Reese, 491 Mich 127 (2012), the Michigan Supreme Court took the case to decide whether Michigan law recognizes imperfect self-defense as an independent theory that automatically reduces liability from murder to voluntary manslaughter when a defendant acts as the initial aggressor and claims the victim's response necessitated force.
The Court's answer, at 491 Mich at 130, was that the doctrine of imperfect self-defense does not exist in Michigan law as a freestanding defense mitigating murder to voluntary manslaughter, although the factual circumstances that have been characterized as imperfect self-defense may negate the malice element of second-degree murder. In practice that means a defendant who killed under an honest but unreasonable belief can argue that the prosecution has not proved malice, the state of mind that separates murder from manslaughter. Murder requires malice, and a killing without malice may be manslaughter if the other elements are met.
The ordinary self-defense defense is unaffected. A full acquittal on self-defense still requires an honest and reasonable belief and the other elements in M Crim JI 7.15, and the prosecution must disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt.
What if I used more force than necessary, or kept going after the other person backed off?
Self-defense covers only the force that honestly and reasonably seemed necessary at the time, and only for as long as the need lasts. A defendant who uses excessive force does not act in justifiable self-defense, and the model instruction on nondeadly force says the right to defend lasts only as long as it seems necessary for protection. Juries are also told to weigh the excitement of the moment.
Necessity is the center of the defense. People v Guajardo, 300 Mich App 26, 35 (2013), states that a defendant does not act in justifiable self-defense when he or she uses excessive force, and People v Riddle, 467 Mich 116, 119 (2002), describes the necessity element as normally requiring a person to try to avoid deadly force if that can be done safely and reasonably.
The model instructions turn this into questions for the jury. M Crim JI 7.15(5) says a person may use only as much force as he or she thinks is necessary at the time, and in deciding whether the amount of force seemed necessary jurors may consider whether the defendant knew of other ways of protecting himself or herself while also considering how the excitement of the moment affected the choice. M Crim JI 7.22(4) says the defendant must have used the kind of force appropriate to the attack made and the circumstances as the defendant saw them, and M Crim JI 7.22(5) says the right to defend only lasts as long as it seems necessary for the purpose of protection.
Related
More questions and pages
- All criminal charges questions in Michigan
- Assault, domestic violence and stalking
- Weapons, resisting arrest, sex offenses, child abuse and other charges
- Criminal court process: what happens after a charge, from arrest and bond to pleas and sentencing
- Grand Rapids assault lawyer
- Grand Rapids weapons charges lawyer
- Grand Rapids domestic violence lawyer
- Grand Rapids criminal defense lawyer
- Michigan civil rights questions
- Michigan appeals questions
Questions about a Michigan matter?
Contact me 24/7 by text on WhatsApp. Your Rights, My Fight! Call for a free initial consultation.
Law Offices of Mitchell S. Bisson 2828 Kraft Ave SE, Suite 295 Grand Rapids, MI 49512 (616) 213-3327 | MBisson@BissonLegal.com
This page provides general information about Michigan law and is not legal advice. Reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Laws change and every case turns on its own facts. Consult a licensed attorney about your specific situation.