Sex offender registration (SORA) in Michigan

A person convicted of a "listed offense" who lives, works or studies in Michigan has to register. A listed offense is any Tier I, Tier II or Tier III offense named in MCL 28.722. A conviction that has been set aside under Michigan's set-aside law does not count. Out-of-state registrants who move to Michigan are covered too.

The Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA), MCL 28.721 et seq., requires registration by people who are domiciled in Michigan, temporarily reside here, or work (paid or unpaid) or study here and who were convicted of a listed offense after October 1, 1995 (MCL 28.723(1)(a)). The act also reaches people from another state who must register under a comparable law there (MCL 28.723(1)(d)), and a nonresident convicted in Michigan of a listed offense on or after July 1, 2011 must still register, although the continued reporting requirements do not apply while the person remains a nonresident (MCL 28.723(3)). Registration happens before sentencing; under MCL 28.724(5) the court may not impose sentence until it is satisfied the registration was forwarded to the Michigan State Police.

"Convicted" is defined in MCL 28.722(a). It covers a judgment of conviction or probation order in any court with jurisdiction over criminal offenses, including a tribal or military court. It does not cover a conviction that was later set aside under MCL 780.621 to 780.624 or otherwise expunged. Youthful trainee status counts only for assignments made before October 1, 2004, and a person who successfully completes a youthful trainee term is not "convicted." Certain juvenile dispositions also count, but only if the juvenile was 14 or older, the offense is a Tier III offense, and the disposition is open to the public.

"Listed offense" means a Tier I, Tier II or Tier III offense (MCL 28.722(i)). Each tier is a list in the statute: criminal sexual conduct in its several degrees, certain child-related offenses, kidnapping and unlawful imprisonment of a minor, and similar crimes, along with attempts, conspiracies, and "substantially similar" offenses from the federal system, another state, a tribe or the military. The tier depends on the statute violated and, for many offenses, on the victim's age. Because the lists are detailed, the exact charge and subsection matter, and a plea to a differently worded count can change whether and how long a person registers.

Authority: MCL 28.723(1), (3); MCL 28.722(a), (i); MCL 28.724(5). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Michigan sorts registrants by offense of conviction, not by individual risk. Tier I is the lowest, Tier II is middle, and Tier III is the highest. Tier III includes first-degree criminal sexual conduct and third-degree criminal sexual conduct. Tier II includes second-degree criminal sexual conduct with a victim 13 to 17. Tier I includes fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct with an adult victim and several lesser offenses.

The tiers are written into MCL 28.722(r) to (v). Tier III offenses include criminal sexual conduct in the first degree (MCL 750.520b), third degree (750.520d) and assault with intent to commit CSC involving penetration (750.520g(1)), with a close-in-age exception for some consensual cases involving a 13- to 15-year-old; second-degree CSC (750.520c) and assault with intent to commit CSC without penetration (750.520g(2)) against a child under 13; fourth-degree CSC (750.520e) against a child under 13 when the defendant was 17 or older; kidnapping of a minor (750.349) and enticing away a child under 14 (750.350); and gross indecency (750.338, 750.338a, 750.338b) against a child under 13.

Tier II offenses include second-degree CSC (750.520c) and fourth-degree CSC (750.520e) when the victim was 13 to 17, second-degree CSC against an adult victim, accosting or soliciting a child for immoral purposes (750.145a), child sexually abusive activity and materials (750.145c(2) and (3)), using the internet or a computer to commit certain child offenses (750.145d(1)(a)), except offenses arising from MCL 750.157c, gross indecency against a victim 13 to 17, accosting or soliciting where the victim is a minor (750.448) and pandering (750.455). Tier I offenses include fourth-degree CSC and assault with intent to commit CSC (520g(2)) against an adult, possession of child sexually abusive material (750.145c(4)), certain indecent exposure and surveillance offenses involving a minor (750.335a(2)(b) and 750.539j), unlawful imprisonment of a minor (750.349b), and a catch-all for any other offense that by its nature is a sexual offense against a minor and is not listed in a higher tier (MCL 28.722(r)(viii)).

Two features matter in practice. First, a person convicted of a second listed offense moves up: a Tier I offender convicted of another Tier I offense becomes Tier II, and a Tier II offender convicted of another Tier I or II offense becomes Tier III (MCL 28.722(s)(i), (u)(i)). Second, the tier fixes the registration period (15 years, 25 years or life) and the number of check-ins per year, which is why the exact subsection of the charge is worth reading closely before any plea.

Authority: MCL 28.722(q) to (v); MCL 28.725(11) to (13); MCL 28.725a(3). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Tier I registrants stay on for 15 years, Tier II for 25 years, and Tier III for life. Time spent in prison, jail or civil commitment does not count toward the clock. Only a successful court petition, a set-aside of the conviction, or a few other narrow routes shorten or end it.

The registration period is set by MCL 28.725(11) to (13). A Tier I offender complies for 15 years, a Tier II offender for 25 years, and a Tier III offender for life, "except as otherwise provided" in that section and in MCL 28.728c (the petition section). Under MCL 28.725(14), the periods exclude any time spent incarcerated for a crime and any period of civil commitment, so a person who serves a prison term has the clock paused during that term.

The starting point is not always obvious. For people who were convicted of a listed offense before SORA required registration but who are later convicted of any felony on or after July 1, 2011 (the "recapture" provision, MCL 28.723(1)(e)), time not spent incarcerated or committed counts toward the period, and if that time already equals or exceeds the period, the person has satisfied the requirement (MCL 28.725(15)). The Michigan Supreme Court held in People v Ellis (Mich July 22, 2026) that applying the recapture provision is cruel or unusual punishment under Const 1963, art 1, § 16 as applied to the defendant and similarly situated individuals subsequently convicted of a felony that is nonsexual.

Two routes end registration early. A registration must be discontinued if the underlying conviction has been set aside under the set-aside statute or otherwise expunged, and the person is also removed from the public website (MCL 28.725(16)). And MCL 28.728c lets some registrants ask the court to end registration. Those petition rules are narrow (MCL 28.728c).

Authority: MCL 28.725(11) to (16); People v Ellis, No. 166766 (Mich. July 22, 2026). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

In-person check-ins happen once a year for Tier I, twice a year for Tier II, and four times a year for Tier III, in months tied to the person's birth month. Between check-ins, most changes have to be reported within 3 business days: a new address, job, school enrollment, name, vehicle or phone number, and, for people required to register after July 1, 2011, email addresses and internet identifiers. An absence of more than 7 days is reported within 3 business days, a move to another state in person not more than 3 business days before it, and a move or trip of more than 7 days abroad not later than 21 days before.

Periodic verification is governed by MCL 28.725a(3). A Tier I registrant reports once a year in the birth month, a Tier II registrant twice a year, and a Tier III registrant four times a year on the schedule in the statute. The report is due no earlier than the first and no later than the last day of the required month (MCL 28.725a(4)). At each report the registrant reviews the registration information for accuracy, the officer verifies residence and photograph, and a signed receipt is given (MCL 28.725a(5)). An annual $50 registration fee generally applies, with a cumulative cap and exceptions stated in the statute (MCL 28.725a(6)).

Between check-ins, MCL 28.725(1) requires a report in person, or in another manner the State Police prescribe, within 3 business days of a change of residence or domicile, a change or end of employment, enrollment or end of enrollment at a college or trade school, or a name change. MCL 28.725(2) requires a report, in the manner the department prescribes, within 3 business days of a change in vehicle information, telephone numbers, or (for people required to register after July 1, 2011) email addresses and internet identifiers, and of an intent to stay away from the residence for more than 7 days. A move to another state must be reported in person not more than 3 business days before the move (MCL 28.725(7)), and a move to another country, or travel there for more than 7 days, must be reported in person not later than 21 days before (MCL 28.725(8)).

A willful failure to report on time can be charged as a felony (MCL 28.729(1)).

Authority: MCL 28.725(1), (2), (7), (8); MCL 28.725a(3) to (6); MCL 28.724a; MCL 28.729(1). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

The public website lists a registrant's name and aliases, date of birth, home and work addresses, school, vehicle information, photo, physical description, a summary of the listed convictions, and the text of the statute violated. It no longer shows the registrant's tier. Some registrants are kept off the public site: certain juvenile cases, out-of-state juvenile adjudications, and people registered solely for a single lower-level Tier I offense.

The State Police maintain a public internet website separate from the law enforcement database (MCL 28.728(2)). Under MCL 28.728(2), it shows each registrant's legal name and aliases, date of birth, residence address (or the city, village or township for someone without one), employer addresses, school address, vehicle plate number and description, a brief summary of listed convictions, a physical description, the photograph, the text of the law defining the offense, and registration status.

MCL 28.728(3) lists what must not appear: the victim's identity, Social Security number, arrests that did not result in conviction, travel or immigration document numbers, the driver license number, and the tier classification. Removing the tier from the website was one of the 2021 changes. The 2021 SORA is 2020 PA 295, effective March 24, 2021.

MCL 28.728(4) excludes three groups from the public website: a person registered solely because of juvenile dispositions entered under MCL 712A.18 in cases that were not designated for trial as an adult; a person registered solely because of a juvenile order or adjudication from another state or country; and a person registered solely because of a single Tier I conviction, except convictions for certain child sexually abusive material, indecent exposure, unlawful imprisonment of a minor, or surveillance offenses that the statute names. Disclosing nonpublic registration information in violation of the act is a 93-day misdemeanor and carries a civil cause of action (MCL 28.730(4), (5)).

Authority: MCL 28.728(2) to (4); MCL 28.730(1), (4), (5). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

A willful violation of SORA is a felony. With no prior SORA conviction, the maximum is 4 years in prison or a $2,000 fine, or both. With one prior it is up to 7 years, and with two or more priors it is up to 10 years. Willfully failing to complete a verification check-in is a 2-year misdemeanor, and willfully failing to pay the fee is a 90-day misdemeanor. Probation or parole is revoked for a willful violation.

MCL 28.729(1) makes a willful violation of SORA a felony punishable by up to 4 years or a $2,000 fine, or both, for a person with no prior conviction for violating the act; up to 7 years or $5,000, or both, with one prior; and up to 10 years or $10,000, or both, with two or more priors. The felony in MCL 28.729(1) applies to a person who "willfully violates this act." Before 2021, the verification misdemeanor in subsection (2) had no willfulness element (People v McFall, 309 Mich App 377, 385 (2015)); the current subsection (2) applies to a person who willfully fails to comply with MCL 28.725a.

Several parts of the act are treated separately. Willful failure to comply with the periodic verification rules in MCL 28.725a (other than the fee) is a misdemeanor punishable by up to 2 years or a $2,000 fine, or both (MCL 28.729(2)). Willful failure to sign the registration and notice is a misdemeanor with a 93-day maximum (MCL 28.729(3)). Willful refusal or failure to pay the registration fee within 90 days of reporting is a misdemeanor with a 90-day maximum (MCL 28.729(4)). A court must revoke probation, and the parole board must rescind parole, for a willful violation (MCL 28.729(5), (7)).

Venue can be the judicial district of the last registered address, the actual address, or the place of arrest (MCL 28.729(8)). Issues that arise in these cases include whether the conduct was willful, whether the registrant was given the notice that MCL 28.725a requires, whether the correct version of the act applies to an offense committed before 2011 (People v Betts, 507 Mich 527 (2021)), and whether the underlying registration requirement is lawful.

Authority: MCL 28.729; MCL 28.725a(9); MCL 28.728a; People v McFall, 309 Mich App 377, 385 (2015); People v Betts, 507 Mich 527 (2021). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Only a few groups can petition. A Tier I registrant can ask after 10 years if there are no later felonies, supervision was completed, and treatment was completed or waived. A person registered on a juvenile Tier III disposition can ask after 25 years. Close-in-age consensual cases and juveniles under 14 can ask, and the court must grant those petitions when the statutory findings are made. Adult Tier II and Tier III registrants outside those categories have no petition route.

MCL 28.728c is the only route to judicial review of registration requirements (MCL 28.728c(4)); it does not limit appeals from the conviction or sentence. A petition goes to the court of conviction, is made under oath, and a copy goes to the prosecutor at least 30 days before the hearing. The victim, if known, gets notice and may speak. No new petition may be filed once a petition has been denied after a hearing (MCL 28.728c(4) to (10)).

There are four categories. A Tier I registrant may petition after 10 years from the later of conviction or release from confinement, if there has been no felony or listed offense since that date, probation or parole was completed without revocation, and a certified sex offender treatment program was completed (the court may waive treatment if it was not required) (MCL 28.728c(1), (12)). A registrant on a juvenile Tier III disposition open to the public may petition after 25 years on similar conditions (MCL 28.728c(2), (13)). For both, the court weighs the factors in subsection (11), including age and maturity, the nature and severity of the offense, prior history, likelihood of reoffending and any victim statement, and may not grant the petition if the individual is a continuing threat to the public.

The court must grant a petition, rather than may, when it finds the offense was a consensual act and the victim was 13 to 15 with the petitioner not more than 4 years older, or the conviction was for certain statutes and the victim was 16 or older and not under the petitioner's custodial authority (MCL 28.728c(3), (14)); or when the petitioner was adjudicated as a juvenile and was under 14 at the time of the offense, or was registered before July 1, 2011 for an offense that no longer requires registration (MCL 28.728c(15)). Outside those categories, an adult Tier II or Tier III registrant has no petition route in MCL 28.728c. If the court grants the petition, the department removes the registration (MCL 28.728d).

Authority: MCL 28.728c; MCL 28.728d. Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Yes, in a few situations. For some offenses, the tier drops or registration is not required if the court finds the victim consented, was 13 to 15, and the defendant was not more than 4 years older. If a person is already registered in that situation, the court must grant a petition to end registration. The exceptions are narrow and depend on the exact statute of conviction.

The 2021 SORA contains close-in-age exceptions in two places. In the definitions, the Tier III provision covering first-degree CSC (MCL 750.520b), third-degree CSC (MCL 750.520d) and assault with intent to commit CSC involving penetration (MCL 750.520g(1)) does not apply if the court determines the victim consented, was at least 13 but under 16, and the individual is not more than 4 years older (MCL 28.722(v)(iv)). Similar exceptions apply to the Tier II listings for MCL 750.158 (sodomy) and MCL 750.338, 750.338a and 750.338b (gross indecency) against a minor: the offense is not a Tier II offense when the victim consented and was 13 to 15 and the individual was not more than 4 years older, or when the victim was 16 or 17, consented, and was not under the individual's custodial authority (MCL 28.722(t)(v), (vi)).

Second, a registrant can petition under MCL 28.728c(14) and the court "shall grant" the petition if it finds the conviction resulted from a consensual sexual act and either (a) the victim was 13 to 15 and the petitioner was not more than 4 years older, (b) the conviction was under MCL 750.158, 750.338, 750.338a or 750.338b with a victim 13 to 15 and an age gap of no more than 4 years, or (c) the conviction was under one of those statutes or MCL 750.520c(1)(i) and the victim was 16 or older and not under the petitioner's custodial authority.

"Custodial authority" has a long statutory definition in MCL 28.722(b) and includes household members, relatives to the fourth degree, teachers and school staff, and certain corrections or detention-facility employees. The consent finding is made by the court, not assumed, so the record made at plea or sentencing can matter.

Authority: MCL 28.722(t)(v), (vi); (v)(iv); (b); MCL 28.728c(3), (14). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Only some juvenile cases do. A juvenile disposition counts as a conviction under SORA only if the person was 14 or older, the offense is a Tier III offense, and the disposition is open to the public, which juvenile dispositions in cases governed by the January 1, 2021 rule are not (MCL 712A.28(3)); a case tried as an adult is treated as a conviction. Juvenile registrants are kept off the public website unless the case was designated for trial as an adult. Under the Holmes Youthful Trainee Act, successful completion means the person is not convicted for SORA purposes.

SORA defines "convicted" to include a disposition entered under MCL 712A.18 that is open to the general public under MCL 712A.28, but only if the juvenile was 14 or older at the time of the offense and the offense would classify the individual as a Tier III offender. The same limits apply to a juvenile adjudication from another state or country (MCL 28.722(a)(iii), (iv)). A younger juvenile, or an older juvenile adjudicated on a Tier I or Tier II offense, falls outside this definition of "convicted."

A juvenile registrant whose disposition was not designated for trial in the same manner as an adult under MCL 712A.2d is left off the public website (MCL 28.728(4)(a)). A registrant on a juvenile Tier III disposition may ask the court to end registration after 25 years (MCL 28.728c(2), (13)). Under the wording of MCL 28.728c(15)(a), a petitioner who was adjudicated as a juvenile and was under 14 at the time of the offense is entitled to a grant.

On youthful trainee status, SORA treats it as a conviction only for assignments made before October 1, 2004. A person assigned to and successfully completing a youthful trainee term under MCL 762.11 to 762.15 is not convicted for SORA purposes (MCL 28.722(a)(ii)). A willful SORA violation by a person assigned to youthful trainee status results in revocation of that status (MCL 28.729(6)). Since January 1, 2021, juvenile case records are not open to the general public (MCL 712A.28(3)). Under the wording of MCL 28.722(a)(iii), which counts a juvenile disposition as a conviction only if it is open to the general public, a juvenile disposition in a case governed by that rule is therefore not a conviction for SORA purposes. A case designated for trial as an adult or waived to adult court produces a conviction under MCL 28.722(a)(i).

Authority: MCL 28.722(a)(ii) to (iv); MCL 28.728(4)(a), (b); MCL 28.728c(2), (13), (15); MCL 28.729(6); MCL 712A.28(3). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Sometimes. If a conviction is set aside under Michigan's set-aside law, SORA registration for that conviction must be discontinued and the person removed from the website. But the set-aside law bars most serious sex offenses, including life-maximum felonies like first-degree criminal sexual conduct, and criminal sexual conduct in the second and third degrees. Fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct is barred only for convictions on or after January 12, 2015.

Under MCL 28.725(16), if a registrant presents an order showing the conviction was set aside under 1965 PA 213 (MCL 780.621 to 780.624) or otherwise expunged, the registration "must be discontinued" and the State Police must remove the person from the law enforcement database and the public website. The definition of "convicted" in MCL 28.722(a)(i) likewise excludes a conviction that was set aside.

Whether a particular sex offense can be set aside is a separate question. MCL 780.621c(1) bars setting aside a felony with a maximum penalty of life (which includes first-degree CSC, MCL 750.520b); violations or attempts of MCL 750.145c, 750.145d, 750.520c, 750.520d and 750.520g; and violations or attempts of MCL 750.520e if the conviction occurred on or after January 12, 2015. A person convicted of fourth-degree CSC before January 12, 2015 may petition if there has been no other conviction beyond a limited number of minor offenses (MCL 780.621(1)(d)). Other listed offenses are not on the bar list, so eligibility turns on the general set-aside rules, such as the limits on the number of felonies and assaultive crimes and the waiting periods.

A set-aside application has its own requirements and discretionary standards (MCL 780.621 et seq.).

Authority: MCL 28.725(16); MCL 28.722(a)(i); MCL 780.621c(1); MCL 780.621(1)(d). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Often yes. A person who must register as a sex or child offender under another state's comparable law has to register in Michigan, and a person convicted in another state of an offense substantially similar to a Michigan listed offense is placed in a tier based on the Michigan equivalent. Registration is due within 3 business days of becoming domiciled, working or studying here.

MCL 28.723(1)(d) requires registration by an individual from another state who is required to register or otherwise be identified as a sex or child offender or predator under a comparable statute of that state, if the person is domiciled, temporarily residing, working or studying in Michigan. MCL 28.724(6) requires registration with the local law enforcement agency, sheriff's department or State Police within 3 business days of becoming domiciled, temporarily residing, working, or being a student here. Separately, the tier definitions include an offense "substantially similar" to a listed Michigan offense under federal law, the law of any state or country, or tribal or military law (for example MCL 28.722(v)(ix)), which is how an out-of-state conviction is assigned a tier.

A Michigan resident planning to leave must report in person not more than 3 business days before moving to another state (MCL 28.725(7)) and not later than 21 days before moving to, or traveling for more than 7 days to, another country (MCL 28.725(8)). A nonresident who works in Michigan has a narrower duty to report employment changes (MCL 28.725(3)).

For a conviction that occurred in another state, a Michigan resident can file the discontinuation petition in the circuit court of the county of residence, but only for an order allowing discontinuation of registration under the Michigan act (MCL 28.728c(4)). Whether a particular out-of-state offense is "substantially similar" to a Michigan tier offense can be contested and turns on the elements of the foreign statute.

Authority: MCL 28.723(1)(d), (3); MCL 28.724(6); MCL 28.725(3), (7), (8); MCL 28.722(r)(xi), (t)(xiii), (v)(ix); MCL 28.728c(4). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

In People v Betts (2021), the Michigan Supreme Court held that applying the 2011 version of SORA to people whose offenses predated the 2011 amendments violated the federal and state ex post facto clauses, because the law's overall effect was punishment. It relied in part on the Sixth Circuit's 2016 ruling in Does #1-5 v Snyder. Betts does not decide the constitutionality of the current 2021 SORA.

The Sixth Circuit held in Does #1-5 v Snyder, 834 F3d 696 (CA 6, 2016), that retroactive application of the 2006 and 2011 SORA amendments, including the school-zone restrictions, tier classification without individualized assessment, and burdensome in-person reporting, violated the federal Ex Post Facto Clause. In People v Betts, 507 Mich 527; 968 NW2d 497 (2021), the Michigan Supreme Court reached the same result under both the federal and Michigan constitutions. It considered the 2011 SORA as a whole, found its aggregate effects punitive despite the Legislature's likely civil intent, and refused to cure the problem by severing provisions or reviving an earlier version.

The holding is limited to registrants whose registration-triggering offense predated the 2011 amendments. Betts did not affect the prospective application of the 2011 SORA to people whose offenses came after 2011, and it did not decide whether later amendments are unconstitutional if applied retroactively. Betts's own failure-to-register conviction was vacated, and the Court rejected the argument that the 2021 amendments could be applied backward to sustain it, because the amendments redefine the conduct that is criminal.

The Legislature rewrote SORA in 2020 PA 295, effective March 24, 2021, repealing the student safety zones, removing the requirement to report vehicle, email, internet-identifier and telephone information in person after the fact, and taking tier classification off the public website. Later cases such as Lymon, Kardasz and Shaver address what Betts means for the current act and for old failure-to-register convictions.

Authority: People v Betts, 507 Mich 527 (2021); Does #1-5 v Snyder, 834 F3d 696 (CA 6, 2016); MCL 28.733 to 28.736 (repealed). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

The Michigan Supreme Court has held that it is unconstitutional in two situations. In People v Lymon (2024), the Court held that applying the 2021 SORA to a person whose offense had no sexual component, there unlawful imprisonment of a minor, is cruel or unusual punishment. In People v Ellis (2026), it held the same for the "recapture" provision when the new conviction is a nonsexual felony.

Under Const 1963, art 1, § 16, Michigan prohibits cruel or unusual punishment, and the Michigan Supreme Court has held that SORA registration imposed for a nonsexual crime is such a punishment. In People v Lymon, 515 Mich 145; 29 NW3d 58 (2024), the defendant held his family at gunpoint and was convicted of torture, unlawful imprisonment and other offenses; the unlawful imprisonment convictions involving minors made him a Tier I registrant. The Court held that imposing the 2021 SORA on a person whose offense lacked a sexual component was cruel or unusual punishment, and it affirmed the Court of Appeals' order removing him from the registry.

In People v Ellis (Mich July 22, 2026, Docket No. 166766), the defendant had a 1983 attempted rape conviction that predated SORA and was later convicted of attempted unarmed robbery in 2021. Under the recapture provision in MCL 28.723(1)(e), a person with an earlier unregistered listed offense who is convicted of any other felony on or after July 1, 2011 must register. The unanimous Court held that requiring registration on that basis for a nonsexual felony is cruel or unusual punishment as applied to the defendant and similarly situated people, and remanded for removal of the registration requirement from the judgment of sentence.

Both decisions are limited to nonsexual offenses. In Kardasz (December 19, 2025), the Court held that the 2021 SORA is punishment but is not cruel or unusual as applied to a defendant convicted of first-degree CSC. Which of these decisions applies depends on the exact conviction and on the provision that triggered registration.

Authority: People v Lymon, 515 Mich 145 (2024); People v Ellis, No. 166766 (Mich. July 22, 2026); People v Kardasz, No. 165008 (Mich. Dec. 19, 2025); MCL 28.723(1)(e). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

In People v Kardasz (December 2025), the Michigan Supreme Court held that the 2021 SORA is punishment, but that it is not cruel or unusual, either on its face or as applied to a defendant convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. Lifetime Tier III registration was upheld in that case. The Court noted that the burden of reporting may increase over time for Tier III registrants who have lived offense-free for decades, and that an as-applied challenge would be expected to rest on individualized evidence.

The Court in People v Kardasz, No. 165008 (Mich. Dec. 19, 2025), applied the five-factor test used in Betts and Lymon and concluded that the 2021 SORA (2020 PA 295) is punishment: it resembles parole and shaming, imposes significant affirmative restraints, advances retribution because tiering rests on the crime of conviction rather than individualized risk, and is excessive in several respects, including the tiers, long or lifetime reporting with no petition for removal in Tier III, and an over-inclusive website. Justice Zahra, concurring in part and dissenting in part, would hold that the act is not punishment. Justice Bernstein, concurring in part and dissenting in part, dissented from Part III(B) because he would assume without deciding that the act is punishment.

The Court then held the 2021 SORA is not cruel or unusual under Const 1963, art 1, § 16. On the facial challenge, it is not grossly disproportionate in all instances. On the as-applied challenge, lifetime Tier III registration for first-degree CSC was not grossly disproportionate to the offense, and the defendant had presented no evidence of his individual risk of reoffending. The Court noted that SORA does not account for individualized risk and may work against rehabilitation, which favored the defendant on one factor but did not carry the day.

The Court's as-applied analysis relied in part on the absence of evidence about the defendant's own risk of reoffending, and Kardasz involved a sexual offense. Lymon and Ellis involved nonsexual offenses.

Authority: People v Kardasz, No. 165008 (Mich Dec. 19, 2025); People v Lymon, 515 Mich 145 (2024); People v Betts, 507 Mich 527 (2021). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

It may. In People v Shaver (May 29, 2026), the Michigan Supreme Court held that Betts applies retroactively on collateral review, under both federal and state law. A person convicted of failing to comply with the 2011 SORA, where the underlying sex offense predated the 2011 amendments, may have a basis to seek relief from that conviction through a motion under MCR subchapter 6.500.

In People v Shaver, No. 167736 (Mich. May 29, 2026), the defendant had been sentenced as a juvenile in 2004 for third-degree CSC and was convicted in 2015 of failing to comply with the 2011 SORA (second offense, MCL 28.729(1)(b)) because his registered address was wrong for 19 days. After Betts, he moved under MCR subchapter 6.500 to vacate the 2015 conviction. The trial court granted the motion; the Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded to the trial court.

The Court held that Betts announced a new rule but a substantive one: it forbids a class of punishment, conviction for violating the 2011 SORA, for a class of defendants, those whose registrable offenses predated 2011. Substantive rules apply retroactively on collateral review. The Court rejected the Court of Appeals' reasoning that the defendant would have had to register an address under any version of SORA, because Betts addressed the 2011 act as a whole. The Court also said there was no need to reach the state-law test, because the Michigan Constitution may not provide less protection than the federal Constitution.

Shaver involved a failure-to-register conviction under the 2011 act for a person whose qualifying offense predated 2011. Betts itself did not reach convictions for offenses committed after 2011. The remand was for further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion.

Authority: People v Shaver, No. 167736 (Mich. May 29, 2026); People v Betts, 507 Mich 527 (2021); MCL 28.729(1). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Under the current statute, yes. The 1,000-foot student safety zones that barred registrants from living, working or loitering near schools were repealed by 2020 PA 295, effective March 24, 2021. SORA no longer contains a school-zone residency rule. Probation or parole conditions and other laws can still limit where a particular person lives.

MCL 28.733 to 28.736, the student safety zone sections added in 2005, were repealed by 2020 PA 295 effective March 24, 2021. Before the repeal, registrants could not reside, work or loiter within 1,000 feet of school property, with limited exceptions. The Sixth Circuit in Does #1-5 v Snyder, 834 F3d 696 (CA 6, 2016), and the Michigan Supreme Court in People v Betts, 507 Mich 527 (2021), both described these zones as a punitive feature of the old law. In Betts, the Court noted that exclusion zones might effectively banish a registrant from living in a community and might eliminate access to housing and employment.

After the repeal, SORA itself does not contain a distance rule. That does not mean no restriction can apply. Probation and parole orders can include conditions on where a person may live or go, and other laws may apply to specific conduct or locations. A registrant's current residence also has to be reported and verified at every check-in, and an incorrect registered address can lead to a charge under MCL 28.729 when the failure is willful (MCL 28.725 and 28.725a).

In Betts, the Court held that applying the 2011 version of SORA, including its student safety zone provisions, to people whose offenses predated the 2011 amendments violated the ex post facto clauses.

Authority: MCL 28.733 to 28.736 (repealed); People v Betts, 507 Mich 527 (2021); Does #1-5 v Snyder, 834 F3d 696 (CA 6, 2016). Reviewed Oct. 2026.