
Hurt on someone else’s property or by someone’s carelessness? The duty they owed you and what they knew decide the case
I am Mitchell Bisson, a Grand Rapids personal injury lawyer. I have litigated for over 15 years. This page covers the premises side of negligence: what duty a property owner owed you, what the owner knew, how a violated safety law is used, and the rules for ice and snow, attacks, children and waivers. I do not promise outcomes. I explain the rule that applies and what proof it calls for.
The short answer. A negligence claim needs four things proved: duty, breach, causation and damages (Case v Consumers Power Co, 463 Mich 1, 6 (2000)). On another person’s land the duty you were owed turns on whether you were an invitee, a licensee or a trespasser (Stitt v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship, 462 Mich 591, 596 (2000)). The owner is usually answerable for a hazard only if it knew, or should have known, about it, which the cases call actual or constructive notice (Lowrey v LMPS & LMPJ, Inc, 500 Mich 1 (2016)). Your own share of fault lowers your damages, and when it is more than the combined fault of everyone else, noneconomic damages are barred (MCL 600.2959). The general filing period is 3 years (MCL 600.5805(2)). Nothing here predicts how your case will end.
Cases like these usually turn on a short list of questions. Where were you and why? What did the owner know, and when? Did the other side break a safety statute? Was the hazard open and obvious? Did you sign anything? The answers decide which rule governs and how strong the claim is, so I ask them first and I ask them early, while the scene, the video and the witnesses are still there.
The rules at a glance
The table sets out the issues in the order I look at them. Each row has its own rule.
| Issue | The question I ask | Why it matters | Authority |
|---|---|---|---|
| The claim itself | Can each of duty, breach, causation and damages be proved? | In most cases suit must be filed within 3 years of the injury | Case v Consumers Power Co, 463 Mich 1, 6 (2000); MCL 600.5805(2) |
| Control of the place | Who actually controlled the spot where you were hurt? | Liability follows possession and control of the land, not the name on the deed | Kubczak v Chemical Bank & Trust Co, 456 Mich 653, 660 (1998) |
| Your status | Were you there for the owner’s commercial purpose, as a guest, or without permission? | The answer sets the duty: reasonable care, a warning of hidden dangers, or only no willful and wanton injury | Stitt v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship, 462 Mich 591, 596 (2000); Stitt v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship, 462 Mich 591, 604 (2000) |
| An obvious hazard | Would an average person have found it on casual inspection? | Since 2023 that question goes to breach and to your share of fault, and no longer ends the case by itself | Kandil-Elsayed v F & E Oil, Inc, 512 Mich 95 (2023) |
| Notice | How long was the hazard there, and who created it? | The injured person has to produce evidence of actual or constructive notice | Lowrey v LMPS & LMPJ, Inc, 500 Mich 1 (2016) |
| Rental housing | Is it a common area the landlord keeps control of? | The landlord covenants that common areas are fit for their intended use, and the parties may modify the covenant only in a lease with a current term of at least 1 year | MCL 554.139(1)(a), (2), (3); Allison v AEW Capital Mgmt, LLP, 481 Mich 419, 427 (2008) |
| A safety statute | Does the statute protect people like you from this kind of harm? | A violation is a prima facie case of negligence that the other side may try to excuse | Zeni v Anderson, 397 Mich 117, 143 (1976); Klanseck v Anderson Sales & Service, Inc, 426 Mich 78, 86 (1986) |
| An attack by someone else | Did the owner know of a specific situation posing imminent and foreseeable harm to an identifiable person? | The duty is limited to reasonably expediting police involvement | MacDonald v PKT, Inc, 464 Mich 322, 326 (2001); Bailey v Schaaf, 494 Mich 595 (2013) |
| A child on the property | Is there a dangerous artificial condition where children are known to trespass? | The attractive nuisance doctrine can apply | Bragan v Symanzik, 263 Mich App 324, 328 (2004) |
| A signed waiver | Does the release reach only ordinary negligence? | Gross negligence and willful and wanton misconduct cannot be released, and a parent cannot bind a child to a preinjury waiver | Lamp v Reynolds, 249 Mich App 591, 594 (2002); Woodman v Kera LLC, 486 Mich 228, 242 (2010) |
What I have to prove
Every negligence claim has the same four elements: a duty the defendant owed you, a breach of that duty, causation, and damages (Case v Consumers Power Co, 463 Mich 1, 6 (2000)). Fault is shared among the people responsible, and your own share reduces your damages (MCL 600.2958; MCL 600.2959). The general period of limitations is 3 years (MCL 600.5805(2)), with a longer period for a person who was under 18 when the claim accrued (MCL 600.5851(1)).
Who is responsible for the property
The first question is who the defendant is. Premises liability follows control of the land, not just the name on the deed. The Michigan Supreme Court has said that “[p]remises liability is conditioned upon the presence of both possession and control over the land” (Kubczak v Chemical Bank & Trust Co, 456 Mich 653, 660 (1998) (quotation omitted)). In that case a bank held a mortgage on a house during the redemption period, paid the utilities, listed the house on its insurance policy and looked at it from the street. The Court held that these acts did not amount to the actual exercise of dominion and control, so the bank was not a possessor. The lesson for an injured person is that I look at who actually controlled the area where you fell or were hurt. That may be the owner, a tenant, a property manager or an association, and the lease, the management agreement and the maintenance records usually answer it.
Who you were on the property
Where you stood on the property is the first sorting question, and Michigan has three answers. An invitee is a person on premises held open for a commercial purpose (Stitt v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship, 462 Mich 591, 604 (2000)). A social guest is a licensee, owed a warning of hidden dangers the owner knows or has reason to know of when the guest does not. A person without permission is a trespasser, and the owner only has to avoid injuring that person by willful and wanton misconduct (Stitt v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship, 462 Mich 591, 596 (2000)). In 2023 the Michigan Supreme Court kept the three groups, and left for a later case whether one reasonable-care standard should replace them (Kandil-Elsayed v F & E Oil, Inc, 512 Mich 95 (2023)).
The same decision changed how an obvious hazard is treated. The open and obvious nature of a danger is relevant to the defendant’s breach and to the plaintiff’s comparative fault, rather than ending the case by itself (Kandil-Elsayed v F & E Oil, Inc, 512 Mich 95 (2023)). So a hazard that you could see no longer lets an owner argue that it owed no duty. It becomes a fault argument for the jury, and that is a better place for an injured person to be.
What open and obvious means now
The 2023 decision changed where the open and obvious question is decided, not how obviousness is measured. The test asks “whether it is reasonable to expect that an average person with ordinary intelligence would have discovered it upon casual inspection” (Kandil-Elsayed v F & E Oil, Inc, 512 Mich 95 (2023) (quoting Hoffner v Lanctoe, 492 Mich 450, 461 (2012))). The yardstick is an average person, not what you personally noticed. Because the question now sits in the breach analysis, it is usually one for a jury and not for a judge deciding the case on paper.
The Court also overruled the special-aspects doctrine and held that “when a land possessor should anticipate the harm that results from an open and obvious condition, despite its obviousness, the possessor is not relieved of the duty of reasonable care” (Kandil-Elsayed v F & E Oil, Inc, 512 Mich 95 (2023)). That shapes the questions I ask. Should the owner have expected that people would meet the hazard anyway, because it sat in the only walkway or beside the only door? Was it the kind of condition a reasonable owner would have fixed or warned about, even though it could be seen?
The duty itself is not in doubt for a customer. The Court reaffirmed the “duty to exercise reasonable care to protect [them] from an unreasonable risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition of the land” (Kandil-Elsayed v F & E Oil, Inc, 512 Mich 95 (2023) (quoting Williams v Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc, 429 Mich 495, 499 (1988))). The duty has limits. The occupier “is not an insurer of the safety of invitees, and his duty is only to exercise reasonable care for their protection” (Williams, 429 Mich at 500 (quotation omitted)). So the claim is built on what reasonable care called for in your situation and what the owner did or failed to do.
How obviousness affects your share of fault
The same facts that a defendant calls obvious now go to your share of fault. Under MCL 600.2959, the court reduces the damages by the percentage of comparative fault of the injured person. If that percentage is greater than the aggregate fault of the other persons, whether or not they are parties, economic damages are still reduced by your percentage and noneconomic damages are not awarded. In a premises case, where you were looking, the lighting, the weather, what you were carrying and whether another route was open can all bear on both the owner’s breach and your own fault. I gather that evidence from the start, because the percentage a jury assigns can matter as much as the finding that the owner was careless.
Notice: what the owner knew or should have known
A premises claim usually requires proof that the owner had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition. In Lowrey v LMPS & LMPJ, Inc, 500 Mich 1 (2016), the Supreme Court said the plaintiff had to show the owner knew about the hazard, or should have known of it because of its character or the length of time it was there. An owner whose own active negligence, or its employees’, caused the condition is in a different position than one who must be shown to have missed it.
The case also matters for how notice is fought at summary disposition. Under MCR 2.116(C)(10), the Court held that the owner may point out that the plaintiff’s evidence on notice is insufficient. It does not have to prove that it lacked notice. That puts weight on what you can show about how long a spill, patch of ice or loose board was there, and what kind of hazard it was. Video, maintenance and inspection logs, incident reports and witnesses who saw the condition earlier are the usual proof.
Proof that fits a duty and notice case
The proof follows the questions above. For control, I want the lease, the management or maintenance contract, and the names of the people who worked on the property. For notice, I want anything that shows how long the hazard was there: earlier photographs, video from before the injury, inspection and cleaning logs, work orders, earlier complaints and the schedule of who was on duty. Under Lowrey, an owner moving for summary disposition does not have to prove that it lacked notice, so your side of the record has to carry the point. For the condition itself, I want photographs taken from the angle you approached, a note of the weather and lighting that day, and the shoes or equipment you had on. For the harm, I want the medical records that tie the event to the injury. Video can be overwritten quickly, which is why I send a preservation letter right away.
Ice, snow and the landlord’s statutory covenant
The 2023 rule helps a customer who slips on ice outside a business, because the fact that the ice was obvious now goes to breach and comparative fault and not to whether a duty existed (Kandil-Elsayed v F & E Oil, Inc, 512 Mich 95 (2023)). A tenant’s route runs through the landlord’s statutory covenant instead. In every lease or license of residential premises the lessor covenants that the premises and all common areas are fit for the use intended by the parties, and the section is to be liberally construed (MCL 554.139(1)(a), (3)). Common areas are those the lessor keeps control of that two or more tenants share (Allison v AEW Capital Mgmt, LLP, 481 Mich 419, 427 (2008)).
Snow and ice are where tenants meet the limits of that covenant. In Allison, 481 Mich at 429-430, the Court said a lessor’s obligation as to snow and ice in a parking lot would commonly be to make sure the entrance and exit are clear, that vehicles can reach parking spaces, and that tenants have reasonable access to their parked cars, and that any duty would be triggered only under much more exigent circumstances than in that case. In July 2026 the Michigan Supreme Court decided Bowerman v Red Oak Management Co, Docket No. 167718, a case about a hazard in a common area at an apartment complex held out as housing for elderly and disabled tenants. The Court said the question remains whether the common area is fit for the use the parties intended, that an inconvenience of access can matter but does not decide the question, and that it was not overruling Allison. It reversed the Court of Appeals and sent the case back for further proceedings. It is a recent decision, and I have not found later cases applying it, so I read it together with Allison and not in place of it.
A violated safety law
Does breaking a building code or safety statute prove negligence? In Michigan it can raise a presumption. When a court adopts a penal statute as the standard of care, a violation establishes a prima facie case of negligence, and the finder of fact then decides whether the party accused had a legally sufficient excuse (Zeni v Anderson, 397 Mich 117, 143 (1976)). The Supreme Court has described this as a rebuttable presumption (Klanseck v Anderson Sales & Service, Inc, 426 Mich 78, 86 (1986)). Three conditions apply: the violation must be a proximate contributing cause, the statute must be meant to protect against this kind of harm, and the plaintiff must be within the class it protects (Klanseck, 426 Mich at 87).
Attacks in parking lots, stores and apartment complexes
Negligent security claims are hard in Michigan. A merchant has no general duty to anticipate and prevent criminal acts by third parties, to hire security guards or to resort to self-help, and the duty that does arise is limited to reasonably expediting the involvement of the police (MacDonald v PKT, Inc, 464 Mich 322, 326 (2001)). Landlords have the same limited duty once they are put on notice of criminal acts that pose a risk of imminent and foreseeable harm to an identifiable tenant or invitee (Bailey v Schaaf, 494 Mich 595 (2013)). The case therefore usually turns on whether the owner or staff knew of a particular threat, such as a person with a weapon, in time to call for help. I look for 911 calls, security logs, texts to a manager and witness accounts.
Children and negligence
If the child was a guest or a customer, the ordinary visitor rules apply. If the child was a trespasser, Michigan’s attractive nuisance doctrine may apply: a landowner can be liable for harm from a dangerous artificial condition located where children are known to trespass, when children would not likely realize the danger and the owner does not use reasonable care to eliminate it (Bragan v Symanzik, 263 Mich App 324, 328 (2004)). A child’s claim also has a longer filing period under MCL 600.5851(1), but I do not wait, because evidence disappears the same way whatever the child’s age.
Waivers and releases
Defendants often lead with a signed release. A party may contract against liability for harm caused by its ordinary negligence, but may not insulate itself against gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct (Lamp v Reynolds, 249 Mich App 591, 594 (2002)). A parent has no common-law authority to bind a child to a waiver signed before an injury (Woodman v Kera LLC, 486 Mich 228, 242 (2010)). Beyond that, the wording of the release and the facts of the injury decide whether it applies, and I read the document before I tell you whether it matters.
How I handle a negligence case
- Identify the duty. I work out who owned or controlled the place or the activity, and what your status was.
- Lock down the proof. I send preservation requests for video, logs and reports, photograph the scene and keep any shoes, clothing or equipment.
- Prove notice. I look for how long the hazard was there, who created it and who should have seen it.
- Check the defenses. I read any waiver or lease, look at the open and obvious argument and plan for the fault percentages.
- Document the injury. I collect the medical and work records that connect the event to what you lost.
- Negotiate or file. If the claim does not settle on terms worth accepting, I file within the limitations period and prepare it for trial.
Ways a negligence claim may end without a trial
Most claims like these are resolved by negotiation with the owner’s insurer after the injuries and the proof are clear. Others end by dismissal on summary disposition, for example if notice cannot be shown, or by a verdict after a trial. I do not promise outcomes.
What I need from you
Bring photographs of the place and the hazard, the name of the owner or manager, the names of witnesses, your medical records and bills, and anything you signed. Write down exactly where you were, why you were there, what you saw and what you were wearing and carrying. Keep your shoes and clothing as they were. Do not give a recorded statement to the owner’s insurer until you and I have talked, and do not post about the injury online.
Where your Kent County negligence case will be heard
I represent clients in Grand Rapids, Kentwood, Grandville, Wyoming and across Kent County. Under MCL 600.8301(1), the district court has exclusive jurisdiction in civil actions when the amount in controversy does not exceed $25,000.00. Michigan law sets the Kent County district courts by municipality. The 61st District Court serves the city of Grand Rapids, the 59th serves the cities of Grandville and Walker, the 62A serves the city of Wyoming and the 62B serves the city of Kentwood. MCL 600.8128a; MCL 600.8130(1)-(3). The 63rd District Court serves the rest of Kent County, which includes the cities of Rockford, Lowell, Cedar Springs and East Grand Rapids and the surrounding townships. MCL 600.8130(4). Larger claims are filed in the Kent County Circuit Court, which is the 17th Judicial Circuit. MCL 600.518.
Why people hire me for a Michigan negligence matter
You work directly with me, the lawyer handling your case. I tell you where the proof is strong and where it is thin, what the defense will say, and what the rules require. I do not promise outcomes. I build the case the facts support and prepare it for trial, because an insurer deals differently with a claim that is ready to be tried.
My fee depends on the type of case, how complicated it is and how far it is likely to go. I explain the fee at the consultation, before you decide whether to hire me.
Questions I hear from people injured by someone else’s negligence in Michigan
Does the open and obvious doctrine still stop a premises liability claim in Michigan?
Not as a duty bar. In Kandil-Elsayed v F & E Oil (2023), the Michigan Supreme Court overruled Lugo and held that the open and obvious nature of a condition is analyzed under breach and the plaintiff's comparative fault, not duty. It also overruled the special-aspects doctrine, so a possessor who should anticipate harm despite an obvious condition is not relieved of the duty of reasonable care.
If I knew about the ice or hazard before I fell, can I still recover in Michigan?
Possibly. After Kandil-Elsayed, knowing about an obvious hazard is considered under breach and comparative fault rather than as an automatic bar. Under MCL 600.2959, the court reduces damages by your percentage of fault, and if your fault is greater than the combined fault of the others, noneconomic damages are not awarded, although economic damages are still reduced.
Does the defendant have to plead that I was partly at fault, or can it raise my fault for the first time at trial?
Yes. Comparative negligence is an affirmative defense in Michigan. MCR 2.111(F)(3) lists contributory negligence among the affirmative defenses that must be stated in the responsive pleading, with the supporting facts under a separate heading, and under MCR 2.111(F)(2) a defense not asserted is waived. A defendant that left it out can ask for leave to amend, which the court rules say shall be freely given when justice so requires (MCR 2.118(A)(2)).
If more than one person caused my injury, can the defendant blame someone who is not in the lawsuit?
Yes, if that person owed the injured person a legal duty. Under MCL 600.2957(1), the trier of fact allocates fault to each person in direct proportion to percentage of fault, regardless of whether the person is, or could have been, named as a party. Under MCL 600.2956, each defendant’s liability is generally several only, not joint, so a defendant pays only its share, subject to exceptions.
If a bar served the person who hurt me, can I also sue the bar for negligence, or is the dram shop law my only claim?
For a claim that arises from the bar selling or giving alcohol to a minor or visibly intoxicated person, the dram shop statute is the exclusive remedy for money damages against the licensee, MCL 436.1801(9). A separate negligence claim survives only if it arises from other conduct and the common law recognizes it, such as an unsafe parking lot. Mann v Shusteric applied that two-step test.
What should I do first after a fall on someone else’s property in Michigan?
Get medical care and tell your providers exactly how you were hurt. Photograph the spot before it changes, report the fall to the manager or landlord in writing, and get the names of any witnesses. Think carefully before you give a recorded statement to the property’s insurer. If the fall happened on a public street or sidewalk or in a government building, count 120 days forward from the fall right away, because a notice deadline may apply.
How does a Michigan jury decide what percentage of fault each person gets?
In a case involving the fault of more than one person, the court instructs the jury to answer special interrogatories on the plaintiff’s total damages and the percentage of the total fault of all persons. In setting the percentages, the jury considers both the nature of each person’s conduct and the extent of the causal relation between the conduct and the damages claimed. Fault includes acts, omissions, intentional conduct, breach of warranty, breach of a legal duty and conduct giving rise to strict liability, if it is a proximate cause.
Related Michigan pages
- Grand Rapids personal injury lawyer
- Comparative fault
- Premises liability
- Dog bite claims
- Injury settlements, fees and taxes
- Negligence cases: elements, deadlines and how fault is divided
- Michigan legal FAQs
I represent people injured by someone else’s negligence in Kent County and West Michigan. Contact me 24/7 by phone or email. Your Rights, My Fight! Call for a free initial consultation.
Big-Firm Power. Street-Level Grit.
Law Offices of Mitchell S. Bisson, 2828 Kraft Ave SE, Suite 295, Grand Rapids, MI 49512, serving Kent County and West Michigan.
This page provides general information about Michigan law and is not legal advice. Reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Laws change and every case turns on its own facts. Consult a licensed attorney about your specific situation.