Whether the government can punish or silence your speech depends on the role it was playing when it acted
I am Mitchell Bisson, a Grand Rapids civil rights lawyer. I have litigated for over 15 years. This page covers First Amendment claims against Michigan governments when the harm is not an arrest: a public job lost over speech or politics, a blocked Facebook page, a public meeting, a protest permit, a hostile crowd, a school dress code and a flagpole. I represent the person whose speech was restricted. I tell you where the law favors the government, and I do not promise outcomes.
The short answer. The first question is which role the government was playing: employer, hiring authority, owner of a public forum, regulator of streets and parks, school or speaker. A government employee is protected when speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern unless the employer has an adequate justification. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006). A patronage dismissal is permitted only when the hiring authority can show that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the job. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980). An official’s social media page is state action only when the official had actual authority to speak for the government and purported to use it. Lindke v. Freed, 601 U.S. 187, 198 (2024). Where the government itself is the speaker, the Free Speech Clause does not apply. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009). Nothing here predicts how a case will end.
The federal route for most of these claims is 42 U.S.C. 1983, and Michigan adds statutes of its own for whistleblowers and for public meetings. The table is how I sort a new call.
Start with the role: the question a court asks for each kind of dispute
| Situation | The question the court asks | Authority |
|---|---|---|
| Employee disciplined for speech | Did the employee speak as a citizen on a matter of public concern, and did the government lack an adequate justification? | Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) |
| Employee fired for party or candidate support | Can the hiring authority show party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the job? | Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980); McCloud v. Testa, 97 F.3d 1536, 1557 (6th Cir. 1996) |
| Official blocks you or deletes comments | Did the official have actual authority to speak for the State and purport to use it? | Lindke v. Freed, 601 U.S. 187, 198 (2024) |
| Public comment limited or removal from a meeting | Is the rule reasonable and viewpoint neutral, and was there a breach of the peace actually committed at the meeting? | Youkhanna v. City of Sterling Heights, 934 F.3d 508 (6th Cir. 2019); MCL 15.263(5), (6) |
| Permit, fee or route restriction | Is the rule content neutral, narrowly tailored and open to ample alternatives, with limited official discretion? | Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133 (1992) |
| Police order a peaceful speaker to leave | Did officers silence the speaker instead of controlling the hostile crowd? | Bible Believers v. Wayne County, 805 F.3d 228, 243 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc) |
| Student disciplined for a shirt or a post | Does a vulgar, drug or school-sponsored speech exception apply, and if not, was substantial disruption reasonably expected? | Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969); B.A. v. Tri County Area Schools, 156 F.4th 782 (6th Cir. 2025) |
| City refuses a flag or display | Is the city speaking for itself, or has it opened a forum for private speech? | Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009); Shurtleff v. City of Boston, 596 U.S. 243 (2022) |
Public employees: citizen speech, the balance and the reason for the discipline
The Supreme Court balances the employee’s interest, as a citizen, in commenting on matters of public concern against the State’s interest, as an employer, in the efficiency of its public services. Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006), restated it as two questions: whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern, and, if so, whether the government had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the public.
I work through the elements in order because each can end the case. The first is whether the speech was part of the job. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006), holds that statements made pursuant to official duties are not citizen speech. A report the employee is paid to prepare, or that travels up the chain of command as assigned work, is the speech that rule leaves unprotected. In Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228 (2014), the Court held that truthful sworn testimony outside the scope of ordinary job duties is citizen speech, and that the critical question is whether the speech is itself ordinarily within the scope of the employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns them. So I ask who assigned the report and to whom it went.
The second is public concern. An employee who speaks as an employee on matters only of personal interest generally cannot take a personnel decision to court as a First Amendment case. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983). Misuse of public money, safety or the conduct of public officials is more likely to qualify than a complaint about the employee’s own pay. The same line applies to a lawsuit or formal petition filed on a matter of purely private concern. Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 398 (2011). The third is causation: the employee must show the protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor, and the employer may then show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision anyway. Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). The dates, the reasons given and the treatment of comparable employees decide that element.
The Whistleblowers’ Protection Act and its 90-day deadline
Michigan has a statute that does not depend on the First Amendment. It treats the state and its political subdivisions as employers, and it defines a public body to include a county, city, township, village, school district and a law enforcement agency. MCL 15.361(b), (d). An employer may not discharge, threaten or otherwise discriminate against an employee regarding compensation, terms, conditions, location or privileges of employment because the employee reports or is about to report a violation or suspected violation of law to a public body, unless the employee knows the report is false, or because a public body requested the employee to participate in an investigation, hearing, inquiry or court action. MCL 15.362.
The deadline is the first thing I check. A civil action must be brought within 90 days after the occurrence of the alleged violation, in the circuit court for the county where the violation occurred, where the complainant resides, or where the defendant resides or has its principal place of business. MCL 15.363(1), (2). A court may order reinstatement, back wages, restored fringe benefits and seniority, actual damages or a combination, and may allow costs including reasonable attorney fees if it considers that appropriate. MCL 15.364. A section 1983 claim for the same firing runs on a longer period, three years under MCL 600.5805(2), and that gap is why I want a call before the 90 days pass.
Political patronage: when a government job can depend on party or candidate
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 355 (1976), recognized that the cost of the practice of patronage is the restraint it places on freedoms of belief and association. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980), explained the exception: the question is not whether the label policymaker or confidential fits a position, but whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved. The government carries that burden, and a job title does not carry it.
For Michigan, the Sixth Circuit organized the cases. McCloud v. Testa, 97 F.3d 1536, 1557 (6th Cir. 1996), sets out four categories of positions within the exception, such as positions named in law to which discretionary authority over a policy of political concern is granted. The claim turns on what the job actually involves, so I collect the job description, the statute, charter or ordinance creating the position, the real duties, statements by the decision maker and the timing around an election or a change in administration.
Official social media pages: when blocking you is state action
Lindke v. Freed, 601 U.S. 187 (2024), came from Michigan. The city manager of Port Huron deleted a resident’s critical comments from his public Facebook page and blocked him. The Supreme Court held that a public official’s social media activity is state action under section 1983 only if the official possessed actual authority to speak on the State’s behalf and purported to exercise that authority when speaking on social media. It vacated the Sixth Circuit’s judgment to the extent its test differed and sent the case back. Lindke v. Freed, 601 U.S. 187, 204 (2024). A page used for personal posts is not state action just because its owner holds a government job. Lindke v. Freed, 601 U.S. 187, 196-197 (2024).
When someone calls me about being blocked, I ask whether a statute, charter, ordinance or job description gave the official authority to speak for the government on the subject of the post, and whether the posts spoke for the government, such as meeting notices or service announcements. I need screenshots of the page, the comments and the date of the block. The city is a separate defendant only if its own policy or custom is involved.
Public meetings: what Michigan law and the First Amendment each allow
The Open Meetings Act requires that meetings of a public body be open and that all persons be permitted to attend. The right to attend includes the right to tape-record, videotape, broadcast live and telecast live, without prior approval, but a body may adopt reasonable rules to minimize disruption. MCL 15.263(1). A person need not register or give a name to attend, must be permitted to address a meeting under rules the body establishes and records, and may be excluded only for a breach of the peace actually committed at the meeting. MCL 15.263(4)-(6).
The First Amendment adds limits on what the rules say. In Youkhanna v. City of Sterling Heights, 934 F.3d 508 (6th Cir. 2019), the Sixth Circuit treated a Sterling Heights council public comment period as a limited public forum, where reasonable content restrictions are allowed but viewpoint discrimination is not. A rule requiring comments to be relevant to the agenda item was reasonable and viewpoint neutral, and audience members shouting over council members was a breach of the peace actually committed at the meeting, so removing the audience fit the statutory exception.
The act has its own remedies. A decision of a public body is presumed to have been adopted in compliance with the act, and any person may sue in circuit court to challenge one made in violation of it. MCL 15.270(1), (2). The suit must be brought within 60 days after the approved minutes are made available, or 30 days for decisions on contracts, bids, assessments, bond procedures or borrowing proposals. MCL 15.270(3). A body that is not complying can be sued to compel compliance or stop noncompliance, with no security required for a preliminary injunction, and a person who obtains relief recovers court costs and actual attorney fees. MCL 15.271(1), (2), (4). A claim for damages for being silenced is a First Amendment claim under section 1983. I need the written rules, the video and the minutes.
Protests, permits and hostile crowds
A city may regulate the time, place or manner of speech in a public forum if the restrictions are justified without reference to content, are narrowly tailored to a significant governmental interest and leave open ample alternative channels. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). The permit process has its own limit: the First Amendment prohibits vesting unbridled discretion in a government official. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133 (1992). A fee tied to the expected cost of policing the crowd’s reaction is invalid, because speech cannot be financially burdened, any more than it can be punished or banned, simply because it might offend a hostile mob. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134-135 (1992). In Saieg v. City of Dearborn, 641 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2011), the court found a ban on pedestrian leafleting in an area around the Arab International Festival in Dearborn content neutral but not narrowly tailored. For a denied permit or fee, I need the ordinance, the application, the written denial and the permits granted to other groups, because the comparison shows whether the discretion was real.
The festival produced a second decision, about the police response. In Bible Believers v. Wayne County, 805 F.3d 228, 243 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc), the en banc Sixth Circuit held that the Wayne County Sheriff’s Office violated evangelists’ First Amendment rights in 2012 when it ordered them to leave, because it effectuated a heckler’s veto by cutting off protected speech in response to a hostile crowd’s reaction. The rule protects a peaceful speaker whose message is constitutionally protected. It does not protect a speaker’s own conduct, such as blocking a roadway or threatening someone, so the video, the recorded orders and the steps taken to control the crowd decide the claim.
Students: shirts, posts and the limits of school authority
Students and teachers do not shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). In B.A. v. Tri County Area Schools, 156 F.4th 782 (6th Cir. 2025), a case from Howard City, Michigan, the Sixth Circuit summarized the framework: a school can generally punish speech that causes a substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities, and on school grounds it may also prohibit indecent, lewd and vulgar speech, speech that promotes illegal drug use and speech others may reasonably perceive as bearing the school’s imprimatur. The court held, 2 to 1, that a school could reasonably understand Let’s Go Brandon on a sweatshirt to be vulgar. Judge Bush dissented, the Sixth Circuit denied rehearing en banc on December 26, 2025, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 5, 2026. Off campus the analysis changes, because a school, in relation to off-campus speech, will rarely stand in loco parentis. Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L., 594 U.S. 180 (2021).
Flags and displays on public property
The Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation of private speech but does not regulate government speech. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009). In Shurtleff v. City of Boston, 596 U.S. 243 (2022), the Supreme Court held that Boston’s lack of meaningful involvement in selecting flags made the flag raisings private speech, so refusing a religious group’s flag violated the Free Speech Clause. In Gordon v. City of Hamtramck, No. 25-1917 (6th Cir. Aug. 21, 2026), the Sixth Circuit held that after Hamtramck limited its flagpoles to a closed list of flags, they were a forum for government speech, and it affirmed summary judgment for the city. That decision is recent, and I check for later history before relying on it.
How I handle a First Amendment claim against a government
- Name the role. I identify whether the government acted as employer, hiring authority, forum owner, regulator, school or speaker, because that sets the test.
- Fix the dates. I calendar the 90-day, 60-day and three-year periods that might apply before anything else.
- Preserve and request records. I send preservation letters for video, emails, texts and social media, and request the policy, ordinance, permit file or meeting rules that were applied.
- Pick defendants and claims. I name officials and the entity only where the records support it, and prepare early for qualified immunity, public concern and forum motions.
What I need from you
Bring every paper and message about the event: the notice, the policy you were told you violated, emails and texts, the permit application and denial, screenshots, and meeting video or minutes. Write down the date, the words you used, who decided and what reason you were given. Tell me whether you filed a complaint, grievance or report and what happened. Do not delete posts, and do not sign a resignation, severance or release until we have talked.
Where your Kent County First Amendment claim will be heard
I represent clients in Grand Rapids, Kentwood, Grandville, Wyoming and across Kent County. A section 1983 claim arising in Kent County can be filed in the Kent County Circuit Court, which is the 17th Judicial Circuit. MCL 600.518. A claim that arises under federal law may also be filed in a federal district court. Federal venue lies in a district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same state, or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred. 28 U.S.C. 1391(b)(1)-(2). I decide with you where to file after I review the defendants, the claims and the deadlines.
Why people hire me for a First Amendment claim
You work directly with me, the lawyer handling your case. I tell you which test the government will say applies and where the law is against you. Fees depend on the claim, its complexity and whether the case is likely to go to trial. I explain my fee arrangement at the consultation, before you decide whether to hire me.
Questions I hear about First Amendment claims against Michigan governments
What do I have to prove to win a Section 1983 civil rights claim in Michigan?
A Section 1983 claim has two core parts. You show that a right secured by the Constitution or federal law was violated, and you show the violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Section 1983 is the vehicle, not the right itself, so the claim is built on a specific right such as the Fourth Amendment.
How long do I have to file a Section 1983 lawsuit in Michigan?
Three years in Michigan. Section 1983 borrows the state’s personal injury limitation period, and Michigan’s general period for injury to a person or property is 3 years under MCL 600.5805(2). State-law claims against the same officers can be shorter, such as 2 years for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, or sheriff misconduct.
Who pays my lawyer if I win a Section 1983 civil rights case?
Under 42 USC 1988(b), a court in its discretion may award a prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs in actions to enforce Section 1983 and several other civil rights statutes. The amount depends on the results obtained, and a prevailing party needs a court-ordered change in the parties’ legal relationship. A preliminary injunction followed by a case that becomes moot before a final ruling does not qualify.
What does Michigan’s Whistleblowers’ Protection Act protect, and what can I recover?
MCL 15.362 prohibits an employer from discharging, threatening, or otherwise discriminating against an employee regarding compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employment because the employee reports or is about to report a violation or suspected violation of a law, regulation, or rule to a public body, unless the employee knows the report is false. The employee’s motive for reporting is not relevant to whether the employee engaged in protected activity, according to Whitman v City of Burton.
How does a court decide which Michigan official is a city’s or county’s final policymaker?
It is a question of state law, and the judge decides it, based on the authority that state and local law give the official over the subject involved. Michigan statutes give the sheriff charge and custody of the county jail, and in a Calhoun County case the Sixth Circuit noted that it was undisputed that the sheriff held final policymaking authority over the jail. An official whose choices are limited by policies set by others generally is not the final policymaker.
Can a single decision by a city or county official make the government liable, or does a pattern always have to be shown?
A single decision can be enough when it is made by an official who has final authority to set the government’s policy on that subject. The Supreme Court has held that municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances. A mistake by an ordinary employee, or a departure from policy set by someone else, does not qualify, and a custom claim does need a pattern.
Can I ask a court to stop a Michigan city or county policy or ordinance, or only to award money damages?
Both are available. Section 1983 authorizes an action at law, a suit in equity, or another proper proceeding for redress, and the Supreme Court held in Monell that local governing bodies can be sued for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where the challenged action implements or executes an officially adopted policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision. A prevailing plaintiff may be awarded a reasonable attorney’s fee, but a city is immune from punitive damages.
Can I sue a Michigan school district or other local board under Section 1983, or are they treated like the State?
Local governments such as cities, counties and local school boards can be sued under Section 1983, subject to the Monell policy or custom rule. The State and its agencies cannot be sued for damages under Section 1983, because they are not persons under the statute. The Supreme Court held that a local school board is more like a county or city than an arm of the State and cannot claim Eleventh Amendment immunity, though the classification of other entities depends on how Michigan law treats them.
Related Michigan pages
- Michigan civil rights attorney
- Unlawful searches and First Amendment retaliation
- Police misconduct
- Section 1983 claims
- Defamation
I represent people whose First Amendment rights were violated by Michigan governments. Contact me 24/7 by phone or email. Your Rights, My Fight! Call for a free initial consultation.
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Law Offices of Mitchell S. Bisson, 2828 Kraft Ave SE, Suite 295, Grand Rapids, MI 49512, serving Kent County and West Michigan.
This page provides general information about Michigan law and is not legal advice. Reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Laws change and every case turns on its own facts. Consult a licensed attorney about your specific situation.