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Business torts and tortious interference in Michigan

Michigan questions and answers on business torts and tortious interference, with the governing statutes, court rules and cases, by attorney Mitchell S. Bisson.

These are general answers about Michigan law, not advice about your situation. Each answer links to the statute, court rule or case it rests on. Last reviewed October 2026.

By Mitchell S. Bisson, Michigan attorney (P79807). Reviewed October 2026.

Quick answers

The short version

What is tortious interference with a contract or business relationship in Michigan?

Michigan treats interference with a contract and interference with a business relationship or expectancy as distinct claims. For a contract, you must show a contract, its breach, and an unjustified instigation of the breach by the defendant. For a business expectancy, you must show a valid relationship or expectancy, the defendant's knowledge of it, intentional interference causing its termination, and resulting damage.

Do I need a signed contract to sue for tortious interference, or is a hoped-for deal enough in Michigan?

You do not need a contract, but you need more than hope. Interference with a business relationship or expectancy is a separate claim, and the relationship or expectancy need not rest on an enforceable contract. The expectancy must be a reasonable likelihood or probability, not mere wishful thinking. In Cedroni, the Michigan Supreme Court held a disappointed low bidder on a school construction project had no valid expectancy because the board could reject any or all bids.

Is it tortious interference if a competitor hires my employee or wins my customer?

Not by itself. In CMI v Intermet the Court of Appeals held that when the defendant's conduct is not wrongful per se, the plaintiff must demonstrate specific, affirmative acts that corroborate the unlawful purpose of the interference. The plaintiff there showed only that a former employee sought new employment, which was not enough.

Michigan law, reviewed October 2026. General information, not advice about your situation. Select a question for the full answer and the authority behind it.

What is tortious interference with a contract or business relationship in Michigan?

Michigan treats interference with a contract and interference with a business relationship or expectancy as distinct claims. For a contract, you must show a contract, its breach, and an unjustified instigation of the breach by the defendant. For a business expectancy, you must show a valid relationship or expectancy, the defendant's knowledge of it, intentional interference causing its termination, and resulting damage.

Health Call of Detroit v Atrium describes both claims. The contract version requires an existing contract, a breach, and an unjustified instigation of the breach by the defendant, plus damages. The business-expectancy version requires a valid business relationship or expectancy that is not necessarily based on an enforceable contract, the defendant's knowledge, an intentional act inducing or causing a breach or termination, and resulting damage.

The word unjustified matters. Ordinary competition is not itself tortious; the claim targets conduct beyond lawful business rivalry. Courts look at the defendant's conduct and purpose, and when the conduct is not wrongful in itself they want specific proof of an unlawful purpose, which is covered in a separate answer.

These claims often accompany breach of contract, trade secret, or noncompete disputes, and trade secret law may displace some overlapping tort claims. If a competitor or former partner is taking your customers or suppliers, bring the contracts, the dates the relationships ended, and any communications showing what the defendant did.

Authority: Health Call of Detroit v Atrium Home & Health Care Servs, Inc, 268 Mich App 83 (2005). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Do I need a signed contract to sue for tortious interference, or is a hoped-for deal enough in Michigan?

You do not need a contract, but you need more than hope. Interference with a business relationship or expectancy is a separate claim, and the relationship or expectancy need not rest on an enforceable contract. The expectancy must be a reasonable likelihood or probability, not mere wishful thinking. In Cedroni, the Michigan Supreme Court held a disappointed low bidder on a school construction project had no valid expectancy because the board could reject any or all bids.

Michigan treats two claims separately. Interference with a contract needs a contract, a breach, and an unjustified instigation of the breach by the defendant. Interference with a business relationship or expectancy needs a valid business relationship or expectancy that is not necessarily predicated on an enforceable contract, the defendant's knowledge of it, an intentional interference by the defendant inducing or causing a breach or termination of it, and resulting damage (Health Call of Detroit v Atrium Home & Health Care Servs). So a long-running customer relationship or a deal about to close can qualify without a signed contract.

The hurdle is the first element. In Cedroni Assoc v Tomblinson, Harburn Assoc, the Michigan Supreme Court repeated that the expectancy must be a reasonable likelihood or probability, not mere wishful thinking. It held that a contractor with the lowest bid on a school district project had no valid business expectancy. The board could reject any or all bids by statute, and the bid documents said the lowest bidder might not receive the award. The Court added that it was not holding an architect immune for false statements about a bidder; it held that where the final decision is highly discretionary and reposed by law in a public entity, a disappointed low bidder lacks a valid expectancy.

You must also show the interference was improper: a per se wrongful act, or a lawful act done with malice and unjustified in law, to invade the relationship (CMI Int'l v Intermet Int'l).

Useful evidence includes purchase history, written proposals, emails confirming terms, and anything showing the other party was likely to proceed.

Authority: Health Call of Detroit v Atrium Home & Health Care Servs, Inc, 268 Mich App 83 (2005); Cedroni Assoc, Inc v Tomblinson, Harburn Assoc, Architects & Planners, Inc, 492 Mich 40 (2012); CMI Int'l, Inc v Intermet Int'l Corp, 251 Mich App 125 (2002). Reviewed Oct. 27, 2026.

Is it tortious interference if a competitor hires my employee or wins my customer?

Not by itself. In CMI v Intermet the Court of Appeals held that when the defendant's conduct is not wrongful per se, the plaintiff must demonstrate specific, affirmative acts that corroborate the unlawful purpose of the interference. The plaintiff there showed only that a former employee sought new employment, which was not enough.

CMI is a useful reality check for businesses that lose a key employee or customer. The court affirmed summary disposition because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate specific acts showing the employee's purpose was unlawful and offered evidence suggesting only that he wanted a more technical position. It is not enough to point out that a competitor benefited.

What counts as specific, affirmative acts depends on the facts. Evidence to look for includes false statements to the customer, use of confidential information, inducing a breach of a contract the defendant knew about, or conduct that violates a noncompete or confidentiality agreement.

Because trade secret law displaces conflicting tort claims for misappropriation, a claim that really depends on stolen confidential information may need to be pleaded under the trade secrets act, while claims that do not depend on misappropriation may stand on their own. If you are losing people or customers to a competitor, bring the agreements, the timeline of departures, and any communications that show what the competitor said or did.

Authority: CMI Int'l, Inc v Intermet Int'l Corp, 251 Mich App 125, 131-132 (2002); MCL 445.1908. Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Can I sue the other party to my contract, or its manager, for interfering with that contract?

Generally not. A plaintiff who is a party to a contract cannot maintain tortious interference against another party to the same contract (Derderian), and the defendant must be a third party to the contract or relationship (Reed). Corporate agents are not liable for tortious interference with the corporation's contracts unless they acted solely for their own benefit with no benefit to the corporation. A breach claim against the counterparty is the usual route.

Tortious interference is a claim against an outsider. In Derderian v Genesys Health Care Systems, the Court of Appeals stated that a plaintiff who is a party to a contract cannot maintain a cause of action for tortious interference against another party to the contract, and it rejected the claim to the extent it depended on the defendants interfering with plaintiffs' own contract. The plaintiffs also lost on their contracts with other hospitals because they produced no evidence of those contracts. Reed v Michigan Metro Girl Scout Council states the requirement as proof that the defendant was a third party to the contract or business relationship.

The rule reaches the other side's people. Reed states that it is settled that corporate agents are not liable for tortious interference with the corporation's contracts unless they acted solely for their own benefit with no benefit to the corporation. There, the council's executive director allegedly persuaded the council not to sell a camp to the plaintiffs. The court affirmed dismissal because the plaintiffs did not show she acted strictly for her own benefit. Her dislike of the plaintiff came from an earlier transaction in which he had sued the council, so her motives could not be called strictly personal.

What that leaves. If the counterparty breaches, the contract claim runs against the company that signed. An individual who acts for purely personal reasons, or an outsider who induces the breach, is a third party, though you must still prove the elements and improper conduct. Claims against individuals for fraud, conversion or breach of fiduciary duty follow different rules.

Key documents are the contract, any assignments, and the communications showing who did what and why.

Authority: Derderian v Genesys Health Care Sys, 263 Mich App 364 (2004); Reed v Michigan Metro Girl Scout Council, 201 Mich App 10 (1993). Reviewed Oct. 27, 2026.

Can someone be liable for interfering with an at-will contract or a customer who could leave at any time, and can I recover lost profits?

Yes, an at-will relationship can support a claim. The Court of Appeals held in Feaheny that an at-will employment contract is actionable under a tortious interference theory. Because Feaheny was decided before November 1, 1990, a later Court of Appeals panel is not strictly bound by it (MCR 7.215(J)(1)), though it remains a published precedent. In Health Call, it held that a blanket rule limiting recovery to nominal damages whenever an at-will contract ends is not legally sound. You still must prove improper conduct and damages.

Many valuable relationships can end on short notice: an employee, a customer on a month-to-month deal, a client who can walk away. Michigan courts have not treated that as a bar to an interference claim.

In Feaheny v Caldwell, an executive employed at will sued corporate officers. The Court of Appeals held that an at-will employment contract is actionable under a tortious interference theory, because an at-will employee who enjoys the employer's confidence may expect that a third party will not wrongfully undermine the relationship. The third party must intentionally do a per se wrongful act, or a lawful act with malice and unjustified in law, and the court said improper conduct means illegal, unethical or fraudulent conduct. It also agreed with the Restatement that the at-will character is a factor in measuring damages. The executive lost on the facts because the officers acted for the corporation and he did not show a personal motive to harm him. Feaheny was decided before November 1, 1990, so a later Court of Appeals panel is not strictly bound by it under MCR 7.215(J)(1), but as a published decision it still has precedential effect (MCR 7.215(C)(2)).

Damages are the next fight. In Health Call of Detroit v Atrium Home & Health Care Servs, a home nursing agency lost a client's at-will contract after its nurses moved to a competitor, and the trial court limited it to nominal damages. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a blanket rule limiting recovery to nominal damages in all actions related to termination of at-will contracts is not legally sound. Evidence of continuity of care and the client's wish to keep the same nurses could support a finding the contract would have continued, and the amount of lost profits was for the jury.

That is not a promise of recovery. You still need evidence, such as billing history and communications showing how long the relationship would likely have lasted.

Authority: Feaheny v Caldwell, 175 Mich App 291 (1989); Health Call of Detroit v Atrium Home & Health Care Servs, Inc, 268 Mich App 83 (2005); MCR 7.215(J)(1); MCR 7.215(C)(2). Reviewed Oct. 27, 2026.

How long do I have to sue for tortious interference in Michigan, and does it change if the interference was false statements?

Tortious interference with a contract or business relationship carries the 3-year period for injury to persons or property (MCL 600.5805(2); Blazer Foods, Inc v Restaurant Props, Inc, 259 Mich App 241 (2003)). In Wilkerson v Carlo the Court of Appeals applied the 3-year period even though the interference was caused by defamatory statements, but defamation itself has a 1-year period (MCL 600.5805(11)). Wilkerson predates November 1, 1990, so if false statements are involved, treat 1 year as the safer deadline.

In Wilkerson v Carlo, a horse owner and trainer was publicly accused of race fixing and barred from a track. His defamation count was late under the 1-year period for libel and slander, but the Court of Appeals held his amended count for tortious interference with economic relations was governed by the 3-year period for injury to persons or property, now MCL 600.5805(2). The court reasoned that the type of interest harmed controls, that defamation requires no proof of business damage while interference requires actual damage, and that where the same facts support either of two distinct actions, the period for the theory actually pleaded applies. Kollenberg v Ramirez followed Wilkerson for an injurious falsehood claim with pleaded pecuniary loss, and in Redmond v Heller (2020) the Court of Appeals cited Wilkerson in noting that claims resting on the same facts can be distinct causes of action.

Here is the caution. Wilkerson (1980) and Kollenberg (1983) were decided before November 1, 1990, so a later Court of Appeals panel is not strictly bound by them (MCR 7.215(J)(1)). Michigan courts look at the gravamen of a claim by reading it as a whole rather than by its label (Adams v Adams, 276 Mich App 704 (2007)), so a defendant may argue a pleading is defamation in disguise. If your loss comes from false statements, count 1 year from the first statement and treat the longer period as a fallback.

A claim generally accrues when the wrong was done, regardless of when damage results (MCL 600.5827). That points to the date of the interfering act, not the date the lost business showed up. Suing earlier is safer.

Authority: Wilkerson v Carlo, 101 Mich App 629 (1980); Kollenberg v Ramirez, 127 Mich App 345 (1983); Redmond v Heller, 332 Mich App 415 (2020); Adams v Adams, 276 Mich App 704 (2007); MCL 600.5805(2), (11); MCL 600.5827; MCR 7.215(J)(1); Blazer Foods, Inc v Restaurant Props, Inc, 259 Mich App 241 (2003). Reviewed Oct. 27, 2026.

A competitor is telling my customers false things about my business. Is that defamation, tortious interference, or something else?

It can be more than one claim on the same facts. Defamation protects reputation and has a 1-year period. Tortious interference requires a business relationship or expectancy that the statements disrupted, with actual damage. Injurious falsehood, described in Kollenberg, requires a false statement published with intent or reason to know it would harm pecuniary interests, knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard, and resulting pecuniary loss. Which claims fit depends on what was said and what it cost you.

The same false statement can support different claims, each with its own elements.

Defamation protects reputation. Wilkerson v Carlo noted that defamatory statements are those that tend to harm an individual's reputation in the community, that a defamation claim lies even without proof of damage to business relationships, and that accusing someone of a crime is defamatory per se. The period for libel or slander is 1 year (MCL 600.5805(11)).

Tortious interference requires a valid business relationship or expectancy, the defendant's knowledge of it, an intentional interference inducing or causing its breach or termination, and resulting damage (Health Call of Detroit v Atrium Home & Health Care Servs). In Wilkerson, public accusations that led tracks to bar the plaintiff supported an interference claim even though the same allegations could have been pleaded as defamation. The court held that alleging the statements went to the harness racing community at large was not fatal, because that community was small and the tracks that could bar him could reasonably be expected to hear them.

Injurious falsehood is a third theory. Kollenberg v Ramirez set out the Restatement elements: one who publishes a false statement harmful to the interests of another is liable for resulting pecuniary loss if he intends the publication to harm interests of pecuniary value, or recognizes or should recognize it is likely to, and he knows the statement is false or acts in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity. In Kollenberg the 3-year period applied because the plaintiff pleaded special pecuniary damages; general damages for injury to reputation are not recoverable on an injurious falsehood claim.

The deadlines can differ, and the shorter one is the safer one to watch. Collect the exact statements, who heard them, the dates, and the customers or deals you lost afterward.

Authority: Wilkerson v Carlo, 101 Mich App 629 (1980); Health Call of Detroit v Atrium Home & Health Care Servs, Inc, 268 Mich App 83 (2005); Kollenberg v Ramirez, 127 Mich App 345 (1983); MCL 600.5805(11). Reviewed Oct. 27, 2026.

What is a fiduciary duty, and who owes one in a Michigan business dispute?

A fiduciary relationship arises from the reposing of faith, confidence, and trust and the reliance of one person upon the judgment and advice of another, as the Court of Appeals put it in Ulrich v Federal Land Bank. Damages can be recovered when a position of influence has been acquired and abused or when confidence has been reposed and betrayed, as the Court of Appeals said in Prentis Family Foundation.

Fiduciary duties can arise wherever one person places faith, confidence, and trust in another and relies on that person's judgment and advice, but not every business relationship qualifies, and the trust must be reasonable. It is not reasonable if the two sides' interests are adverse or potentially adverse. In Prentis Family Foundation, a law firm representing a cancer institute owed no independent fiduciary duty to the foundation on the other side of the deal, because the firm was the institute's agent and agency agreements do not create rights in third parties.

The practical question is whether you placed trust in someone who controlled money, property, or information on your behalf: a partner managing the books, an officer taking opportunities, an agent holding funds, or a manager making decisions for owners.

Because a breach of fiduciary duty claim often overlaps with breach of contract, member oppression, or conversion, how the claims are framed together matters, as does the deadline, discussed in a separate answer.

Key documents are the agreements that describe each person's role and the records that show how money moved.

Authority: Ulrich v Federal Land Bank, 192 Mich App 194, 196 (1991); Meyer & Anna Prentis Family Foundation, Inc v Barbara Ann Karmanos Cancer Institute, 266 Mich App 39, 44-47 (2005). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

How long do I have to sue for breach of fiduciary duty in Michigan?

In Prentis Family Foundation the Court of Appeals applied the 3-year period for injury to property to a breach of fiduciary duty claim and rejected the 2-year malpractice period. Because courts look at the gravamen of the complaint, a claim built on fraud may fall under the 6-year residual period in MCL 600.5813. Until the facts are sorted out, the safe course is to calendar the shorter period.

Prentis explained that conduct amounting to a breach of fiduciary duty requires a more culpable state of mind than the negligence that underlies malpractice, so the 2-year malpractice period did not apply. The court treated the claim under the general period for injury to property, which is now 3 years under MCL 600.5805(2).

Adams v Adams adds the second layer: courts decide the limitations period by the true nature of the claim, looking past labels. A fiduciary claim that is really a fraud claim may be measured by the 6-year residual period, but a claim that is about mismanagement or a loss of property fits the 3-year period.

Because the answer depends on how the claim is framed and proved, and because a missed deadline can bar the case, the safe course is to treat the earliest plausible deadline as the controlling one. Concealment by the fiduciary can also matter, since MCL 600.5855 allows suit within 2 years after discovery of a fraudulently concealed claim.

If you suspect a partner, officer, or agent has been taking advantage of you, preserve your records and talk to a lawyer soon.

Authority: Meyer & Anna Prentis Family Foundation, Inc v Barbara Ann Karmanos Cancer Institute, 266 Mich App 39, 46-47 (2005); Adams v Adams, 276 Mich App 704, 710-711 (2007); MCL 600.5813; MCL 600.5855. Reviewed Oct. 2026.

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This page provides general information about Michigan law and is not legal advice. Reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Laws change and every case turns on its own facts. Consult a licensed attorney about your specific situation.

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