These are general answers about Michigan law, not advice about your situation. Each answer links to the statute, court rule or case it rests on. Last reviewed October 2026.
By Mitchell S. Bisson, Michigan attorney (P79807). Reviewed October 2026.
Quick answers
The short version
The year runs from the date the statement was made, not from the date you found out or the date it hurt you (MCL 600.5805(11), MCL 600.5827). In Mitan v Campbell, the Michigan Supreme Court held that a television station's later broadcast of the statement did not extend the year against the person who first said it. A new, separate statement by the same person is treated differently: the Court of Appeals counts each one as its own claim with its own year.
Not automatically. The one-year period in MCL 600.5805(11) runs from the statement. MCL 600.5855 allows suit within 2 years after discovery if the person liable fraudulently conceals the claim or the identity of the person liable, and in Hope-Jackson v Washington the Court of Appeals applied it to a hidden website author. The trigger is fraudulent concealment, not anonymity as such, so do not rely on it without filing early.
Can I make a website or internet provider reveal who wrote an anonymous post about me?
Sometimes, but Michigan courts do not hand over an identity on request. In Ghanam v Does, the Court of Appeals held that when the anonymous poster may not know about the suit, the plaintiff must first make reasonable efforts to notify them, such as a message on the same forum, and the court must test the complaint under MCR 2.116(C)(8) even without a motion. The complaint has to quote the exact words claimed to be defamatory.
Michigan law, reviewed October 2026. General information, not advice about your situation. Select a question for the full answer and the authority behind it.
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Questions on this page
- When does the one-year clock start on a defamatory statement in Michigan, and does a repost start a new year?
- The person who posted about me is anonymous. Does the one-year defamation deadline wait until I find out who it is?
- Can I make a website or internet provider reveal who wrote an anonymous post about me?
- Can I sue over a harsh online review or social media post, or is it just protected opinion?
- Can I sue the website or platform for a false review that someone else posted about me?
- Is what someone says in a lawsuit, to my employer, or in a job reference protected from a defamation claim?
- If I am a private person, can I recover for hurt feelings and reputation in a defamation case, or only for lost money?
When does the one-year clock start on a defamatory statement in Michigan, and does a repost start a new year?
The year runs from the date the statement was made, not from the date you found out or the date it hurt you (MCL 600.5805(11), MCL 600.5827). In Mitan v Campbell, the Michigan Supreme Court held that a television station's later broadcast of the statement did not extend the year against the person who first said it. A new, separate statement by the same person is treated differently: the Court of Appeals counts each one as its own claim with its own year.
MCL 600.5805(11) sets 1 year for an action charging libel or slander, and MCL 600.5827 says a claim accrues when the wrong was done, regardless of when damage results. In Hawkins v Justin, the Court of Appeals applied that to libel and said the period runs from publication even if the person defamed learns of it later. Older opinions cite the same period under earlier subsection numbers, such as (9) in Mitan; the current text of the section places it at subsection (11).
Mitan involved a statement made to a reporter on February 22, 2000, broadcast on February 25, with suit filed on February 26, 2001, more than a year after the interview but within a year of the broadcast. The Supreme Court held the claim accrued on the day of the interview and that the third party's rebroadcast did not restart the period for the speaker, whether or not the speaker expected it.
That holding is narrow. In Redmond v Heller, the Court of Appeals pointed out that Mitan addressed only a third party's republication, and held that each separate defamatory statement a defendant makes is independently actionable and carries its own year. So repeated posts by the same person can be sued on even if the first one is old, but only for the statements inside the year.
Michigan law is unsettled on whether one post that simply stays online counts as a continuing publication, so count from the first date it appeared. Tolling can matter if the author hid who they were (MCL 600.5855). Save dated screenshots and the URL right away.
The person who posted about me is anonymous. Does the one-year defamation deadline wait until I find out who it is?
Not automatically. The one-year period in MCL 600.5805(11) runs from the statement. MCL 600.5855 allows suit within 2 years after discovery if the person liable fraudulently conceals the claim or the identity of the person liable, and in Hope-Jackson v Washington the Court of Appeals applied it to a hidden website author. The trigger is fraudulent concealment, not anonymity as such, so do not rely on it without filing early.
Michigan counts the one year from the date of the statement (MCL 600.5805(11), MCL 600.5827), so an anonymous poster does not stop the clock by being anonymous.
MCL 600.5855 is the exception. If a person who may be liable fraudulently conceals the existence of the claim or the identity of any person liable for it, the action may be commenced within 2 years after the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the claim or the identity, even though the ordinary period has run.
In Hope-Jackson v Washington, a school superintendent sued a school board member over posts on a website. The arbitrator found the board member had fraudulently concealed that she ran the site and wrote the posts. The Court of Appeals held the arbitrator erred as a matter of law in ruling that tolling did not apply because the plaintiff knew of the posts and a possible claim even though she did not know who wrote them. The text of the statute covers concealment of identity, and the court also rejected the argument that the plaintiff had to sue a placeholder defendant within the year.
Two cautions. First, that case turned on the arbitrator's finding of active concealment, and the member had been held in contempt for false statements about her role; a poster who simply uses a screen name has not necessarily concealed anything fraudulently. Second, the poster can be expected to dispute concealment. Where a deadline is close, filing a complaint naming the poster as a Doe and then seeking the identity avoids relying on tolling at all.
Can I make a website or internet provider reveal who wrote an anonymous post about me?
Sometimes, but Michigan courts do not hand over an identity on request. In Ghanam v Does, the Court of Appeals held that when the anonymous poster may not know about the suit, the plaintiff must first make reasonable efforts to notify them, such as a message on the same forum, and the court must test the complaint under MCR 2.116(C)(8) even without a motion. The complaint has to quote the exact words claimed to be defamatory.
Anonymous speech has First Amendment protection, but the Court of Appeals in Ghanam v Does said the right to speak anonymously is not absolute, because the First Amendment protects the right to speak rather than the right to avoid the consequences of one's statements.
Two published decisions set the Michigan approach. In Thomas M Cooley Law School v Doe 1, the court held that the ordinary rules, a protective order under MCR 2.302(C) and summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), adequately protect a defendant who knows about and is taking part in the lawsuit. A defamation complaint must plead the exact language claimed to be defamatory, which lets a court decide on the pleadings whether a statement can be defamatory at all.
Ghanam addressed a defendant who may not know about the case. The court required two things before identity discovery: reasonable efforts to notify the poster, at a minimum a post on the same message board where possible, and a court review of the complaint under MCR 2.116(C)(8), done even if no one has moved. The court said it would have preferred a stricter test requiring evidence on each element, but felt bound by Cooley, and it invited the Legislature or the Supreme Court to revisit the question. On the facts, the posts were rhetorical hyperbole and not defamatory, and the complaint had not quoted them.
In practice, expect a motion fight before any subpoena produces a name. Whether the statement is provably false matters before the identity does. Both cases involved internet posts, and Ghanam's plaintiff was a public official; both decisions remain good law.
Can I sue over a harsh online review or social media post, or is it just protected opinion?
A statement can support a defamation claim only if it asserts something that can be proved false. Rhetorical hyperbole and pure opinion are protected, and the Court of Appeals has said readers tend to discount anonymous comments on online forums. A post that accuses you of a crime or specific misconduct, stated as fact, can still be actionable, so the exact words and context decide it.
Under Ghanam v Does, to be defamatory a statement must assert facts that are provable as false. Strong language does not change that: terms like crook, steal or criminal activities are read in context to see whether a reasonable reader would take them as exaggeration meant to express disapproval. The court added that opinion can imply a fact, and the question is whether a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the statement implies a defamatory meaning, citing Smith v Anonymous Joint Enterprise.
Context cuts both ways. Ghanam noted that courts have generally treated internet message boards as places for opinion, and that anonymity is a cue to discount what is said. But in Hope-Jackson v Washington, the Court of Appeals noted that an arbitrator could treat a website that presented itself as a watchdog, and whose posts urged readers to contact authorities, as saying more than opinion, and in Redmond v Heller the court treated Facebook accusations of criminal sexual conduct as defamation per se.
A one-star review that says service was rude or the food was bad is opinion. A review that says the owner stole deposits, or that a contractor never held a license, states something checkable. Truth is the central defense for those, so keep proof of what really happened.
A defamation complaint has to plead the exact words, under Cooley and Ghanam, so a screenshot with the date and URL is the starting point. A damages claim also depends on whether you are a private person or a public figure.
Can I sue the website or platform for a false review that someone else posted about me?
Generally not for what a user wrote. 47 USC 230(c)(1) says a provider or user of an interactive computer service is not to be treated as the publisher or speaker of information provided by another, and 230(e)(3) bars inconsistent state-law claims. The Sixth Circuit, in Jones v Dirty World, held a website loses that protection only when it is responsible for what makes the content unlawful. The person who wrote the post is not protected by this statute.
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 47 USC 230(c)(1), provides that no provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider. Subsection (e)(3) adds that no cause of action may be brought and no liability imposed under state law that is inconsistent with the section. The statute protects the website and also the person who merely shares someone else's post. It does not protect the author, who is an information content provider.
The exception that matters is for a service that is itself responsible, in whole or in part, for creating or developing the content (47 USC 230(f)(3)). In Jones v Dirty World Entertainment Recordings, the Sixth Circuit adopted a material contribution test: a website is responsible only if it contributes materially to what makes the content unlawful, not merely by hosting, selecting, or encouraging submissions. It vacated a judgment for the plaintiff against a gossip site that posted user submissions with its operator's brief comments. In Nemet Chevrolet v Consumeraffairs.com, the Fourth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a dealership's claims over customer reviews because the plaintiff's allegations that the site shaped the reviews were conclusory.
The Sixth Circuit's published decisions bind federal courts in Michigan; Michigan state courts treat them as persuasive. Section 230 has listed exceptions, including federal criminal law and intellectual property, and its limits are still litigated. Jones itself noted that the immunity does not necessarily leave a person without a remedy against anonymous posters, and that the plaintiff there had not tried to subpoena the authors' identities. The claim against the author remains.
Is what someone says in a lawsuit, to my employer, or in a job reference protected from a defamation claim?
Sometimes. Statements by judges, attorneys and witnesses in a judicial proceeding are absolutely privileged if relevant to the issue, even if false, and the Court of Appeals applied that to a settlement letter sent after suit began (Oesterle v Wallace). Other good-faith statements on a proper occasion carry a qualified privilege that you overcome only by showing knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard (Prysak v R L Polk). MCL 423.452 gives employers good-faith immunity for job-performance references.
Michigan recognizes two kinds of privilege. An absolute privilege means no defamation damages remedy at all, because of the occasion. In Oesterle v Wallace, the Court of Appeals described it as limited to narrowly defined areas, including statements by judges, attorneys and witnesses during judicial proceedings that are relevant, material or pertinent to the issue, and held a settlement letter written after probate litigation began was covered. It contrasted Timmis v Bennett, where a letter sent before any case was filed was not.
A qualified privilege covers a good-faith statement on a proper occasion, such as an employer protecting a legitimate interest. Prysak v R L Polk Co lists the elements as good faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement limited in scope to that purpose, a proper occasion, and publication in a proper manner to proper parties. A plaintiff overcomes it only by showing actual malice, meaning knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth, and general allegations of malice are not enough.
MCL 423.452 adds a statute for references. An employer may disclose to the employee or a prospective employer, on request, job performance information documented in the personnel file. A good-faith disclosure is immune from civil liability, with good faith presumed unless a preponderance of the evidence shows the employer knew the information was false or misleading, disclosed it with reckless disregard for the truth, or disclosed it contrary to a statute. The immunity is tied to documented performance information, so it does not cover everything a former supervisor might say.
MCL 600.2911(3) separately limits damages for fair and true reports of public proceedings and records.
If I am a private person, can I recover for hurt feelings and reputation in a defamation case, or only for lost money?
It depends on the speaker's fault and the kind of statement. For a private individual who proves only negligence, MCL 600.2911(7) limits recovery to economic damages, including attorney fees. In Glazer v Lamkin, the Court of Appeals reasoned that a private plaintiff who proves actual malice may recover actual damages for reputation and feelings under MCL 600.2911(2)(a). Burden v Elias Bros held that the per se categories in subsection (1) are not subject to those limits, but Lakin v Rund later narrowed which crime accusations count.
MCL 600.2911(7) bars a libel or slander action about a private individual unless the falsehood concerns that person and was published negligently, and limits recovery under that provision to economic damages including attorney fees. MCL 600.2911(2)(a) separately allows actual damages in respect to property, business, trade, profession, occupation, or feelings.
In Glazer v Lamkin, a trial court read subsection (7) as limiting every private plaintiff to economic damages. The Court of Appeals disagreed and read the two subsections together: negligent publication requires proof of economic damages and does not support recovery for hurt feelings, but a private plaintiff who proves actual malice may recover actual damages to reputation or feelings under (2)(a). That reasoning was not the ground the court affirmed on; it affirmed because the plaintiffs had no evidence the defendant made the statements.
Words imputing lack of chastity or a crime are actionable in themselves under MCL 600.2911(1). In Burden v Elias Bros Big Boy Restaurants, the Court of Appeals held those two per se actions are not subject to the damages restrictions in subsections (2)(a) and (7), and that general damages are presumed, at least nominal and substantial where the publication was malicious. In Lakin v Rund, the court treated Burden's broad statement that any accusation of a crime is per se as dictum and held that only crimes involving moral turpitude or an infamous punishment qualify; a false accusation of simple battery did not. The Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, and the Chief Justice, joined by Justice Zahra, wrote separately to agree with that rule. Lakin did not discuss subsections (2)(a) or (7).
Exemplary or punitive damages in a libel case also require a retraction notice before suing (MCL 600.2911(2)(b)).
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This page provides general information about Michigan law and is not legal advice. Reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Laws change and every case turns on its own facts. Consult a licensed attorney about your specific situation.