These are general answers about Michigan law, not advice about your situation. Each answer links to the statute, court rule or case it rests on. Last reviewed October 2026.
By Mitchell S. Bisson, Michigan attorney (P79807). Reviewed October 2026.
Quick answers
The short version
Not as a separate bad faith claim. The Michigan Court of Appeals has held that an alleged bad faith breach of an insurance contract does not state an independent tort claim, and that punitive damages are generally not recoverable in Michigan. The claim is a contract claim for the benefits owed, plus 12% simple interest under MCL 500.2006 where it applies. Exemplary damages are not awarded for breaching a commercial contract without tortious conduct independent of the breach, and mental distress damages are not available for the breach alone unless the parties contemplated them when they made the contract.
Not on that section alone. MCL 500.2026 lists unfair claim practices, such as refusing to pay without a reasonable investigation, failing to affirm or deny coverage within a reasonable time, and forcing an insured to sue by offering substantially less than is due. The Court of Appeals has held that an insured has no independent cause of action under it, because it addresses a persistent course of conduct that the insurance commissioner polices, and one insured's claim is an isolated incident. The remedy for one claim is a contract suit for the benefits, with 12% interest under MCL 500.2006 where it applies.
It depends on the notice wording. If the policy requires notice immediately or within a reasonable time, the insurer must show actual prejudice to its position from the delay (Koski v Allstate, 1998). If the policy sets a fixed deadline, such as 30 days, the Michigan Supreme Court held in DeFrain v State Farm (2012) that an unambiguous deadline is enforced without proof of prejudice. DeFrain overruled an earlier Court of Appeals decision to the extent it had extended Koski to fixed deadlines. The policy language, and for fire policies MCL 500.2833(1)(l), (q), set the notice rules.
Michigan law, reviewed October 2026. General information, not advice about your situation. Select a question for the full answer and the authority behind it.
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Questions on this page
- Can I sue my insurer for bad faith or collect punitive damages if it delays or wrongly denies my claim in Michigan?
- Can I sue my insurer under the unfair claim practices section of the Michigan Insurance Code for stalling or lowballing my claim?
- My insurer says I gave notice of my claim or of a lawsuit too late. Can it deny coverage for that reason in Michigan?
- I was sued and my liability insurer refuses to defend me, saying the claim is not covered. Is that allowed in Michigan?
- My insurer wrongly refused to defend me and I settled the lawsuit myself. Can I make the insurer pay the settlement?
- Can my insurer cancel my policy or refuse my claim because of a mistake or misstatement on my insurance application?
- My insurer denied my fire claim because of something I did, such as not living in the house. Can the mortgage lender still be paid?
- Can my insurer hold back depreciation and contractor overhead and profit from the first payment on my house claim?
- My property insurer demanded an examination under oath. Do I have to go, and what if I refuse?
- Can I sue the at-fault person's insurance company directly after an accident, or get 12% interest from it?
Can I sue my insurer for bad faith or collect punitive damages if it delays or wrongly denies my claim in Michigan?
Not as a separate bad faith claim. The Michigan Court of Appeals has held that an alleged bad faith breach of an insurance contract does not state an independent tort claim, and that punitive damages are generally not recoverable in Michigan. The claim is a contract claim for the benefits owed, plus 12% simple interest under MCL 500.2006 where it applies. Exemplary damages are not awarded for breaching a commercial contract without tortious conduct independent of the breach, and mental distress damages are not available for the breach alone unless the parties contemplated them when they made the contract.
Many policyholders expect a bad faith lawsuit when an insurer stalls or denies a claim it should pay. Michigan law is narrower. In Casey v Auto-Owners Ins Co, the Court of Appeals stated: "An alleged bad-faith breach of an insurance contract does not state an independent tort claim" (273 Mich App 388, 401 (2007)). The same opinion states: "Punitive damages, which are designed to punish a party for misconduct, are generally not recoverable in Michigan" (273 Mich App at 400). It adds that, in breach of contract cases, exemplary damages are generally not recoverable absent allegation and proof of tortious conduct independent of the breach (273 Mich App at 402).
The Michigan Supreme Court reached a similar result for a disability income policy in Kewin v Massachusetts Mut Life Ins Co. The Court treated the policy as a commercial contract, so recovery for annoyance, vexation and mental distress caused by the breach was generally not allowed "absent evidence that they were within the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was made" (409 Mich 401, 416-417 (1980)). It also held that, absent allegation and proof of tortious conduct existing independent of the breach, exemplary damages may not be awarded in a common-law action for breach of a commercial contract (409 Mich at 420-423). A separate opinion by one justice in Kewin would have allowed emotional distress damages for a simple breach of a disability policy, but that was not the opinion of the Court. The Court of Appeals applied Kewin to an insured's claim that an insurer's bad faith acts caused hardship, anxiety, outrage and inconvenience and held that the claim failed to state a cause of action (Young v Michigan Mut Ins Co, 139 Mich App 600, 606 (1984)).
What the policyholder can recover is the benefit the policy promises, with the damages that arise naturally from the breach or were within the parties' contemplation when the contract was made (Kewin, 409 Mich at 417). When benefits are not paid on a timely basis, MCL 500.2006(4) adds simple interest at 12% per annum from a date 60 days after satisfactory proof of loss was received, in addition to the loss. The Young opinion also noted in a footnote that the Court of Appeals had held an insurer's bad faith refusal to settle a third party's claim against its insured, exposing the insured to excess liability, to be actionable (139 Mich App at 607 n 1), which is a different situation from a first party claim for the policyholder's own loss. Policy language, the facts of the denial and any independent wrongful act, such as fraud, decide whether anything beyond contract damages is in play, so the denial letter, the policy and the claim file should be kept.
Can I sue my insurer under the unfair claim practices section of the Michigan Insurance Code for stalling or lowballing my claim?
Not on that section alone. MCL 500.2026 lists unfair claim practices, such as refusing to pay without a reasonable investigation, failing to affirm or deny coverage within a reasonable time, and forcing an insured to sue by offering substantially less than is due. The Court of Appeals has held that an insured has no independent cause of action under it, because it addresses a persistent course of conduct that the insurance commissioner polices, and one insured's claim is an isolated incident. The remedy for one claim is a contract suit for the benefits, with 12% interest under MCL 500.2006 where it applies.
MCL 500.2026(1) describes a list of unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts in the business of insurance, "other than isolated incidents," that are "a course of conduct indicating a persistent tendency to engage in that type of conduct." The list includes misrepresenting pertinent facts or policy provisions relating to coverages at issue, failing to act reasonably and promptly on communications about claims, refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation based on the available information, failing to affirm or deny coverage within a reasonable time after proof of loss statements have been completed, failing to attempt in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear, compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due by offering substantially less than the amounts due, and failing to promptly provide a reasonable explanation of the basis in the policy for denial of a claim or for a compromise offer (MCL 500.2026(1)(a), (b), (d), (e), (f), (g), (n)).
Those provisions are a useful checklist for a claim file, but they do not by themselves support a lawsuit. In Young v Michigan Mut Ins Co, the Court of Appeals held that "the insured does not have an independent cause of action under MCL 500.2026." The court reasoned that the Supreme Court had noted that isolated incidents do not constitute unfair trade practices under the statute, that an insured's dealings with an insurer are of necessity an isolated incident, and that the section is designed to give the Commissioner of Insurance authority over certain continuing practices of insurance companies (139 Mich App 600, 605-606 (1984)).
The facts the section describes still matter in the claim itself. A late payment can carry 12% simple interest under MCL 500.2006(4), the insurer must specify in writing the materials that make up satisfactory proof of loss within 30 days after receiving a claim unless the claim is settled within the 30 days (MCL 500.2006(3)), and a documented history of delay, unexplained denials or unreasonable lowball offers is evidence in a breach of contract suit and in any complaint to the state insurance regulator. Dates of every call, letter and submission are worth keeping from the first day.
My insurer says I gave notice of my claim or of a lawsuit too late. Can it deny coverage for that reason in Michigan?
It depends on the notice wording. If the policy requires notice immediately or within a reasonable time, the insurer must show actual prejudice to its position from the delay (Koski v Allstate, 1998). If the policy sets a fixed deadline, such as 30 days, the Michigan Supreme Court held in DeFrain v State Farm (2012) that an unambiguous deadline is enforced without proof of prejudice. DeFrain overruled an earlier Court of Appeals decision to the extent it had extended Koski to fixed deadlines. The policy language, and for fire policies MCL 500.2833(1)(l), (q), set the notice rules.
Late notice defenses turn on exactly what the policy says. In Koski v Allstate Ins Co, the Michigan Supreme Court stated that "an insurer who seeks to cut off responsibility on the ground that its insured did not comply with a contract provision requiring notice immediately or within a reasonable time must establish actual prejudice to its position" (456 Mich 439, 444 (1998)). The insured there had a duty to immediately forward legal papers relating to a claim, which the Court called a condition precedent to the insurer's liability, and the insurer was found prejudiced because it received no notice of the suit until after a default had been entered.
Fixed deadlines are treated differently. In DeFrain v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, the Court explained that Koski's holding "imposed a prejudice requirement only on contractual provisions 'requiring notice immediately or within a reasonable time,'" and did not extend it to provisions that require notice within a specified time such as 30 days (491 Mich 359, 375 (2012)). It overruled Bradley "to the extent that Bradley improperly extended Koski" (491 Mich at 375). DeFrain involved a provision requiring the insured to notify the insurer within 30 days of the accident. The reasoning applies to a clear fixed period in other policies, but each policy has to be read for its own words.
For fire policies, MCL 500.2833(1)(l) requires the policy to state the notification requirements when a loss occurs, and MCL 500.2833(1)(q) provides that an action under the policy may be commenced only after compliance with the policy requirements, and that the one year period to sue is tolled from the time the insured notifies the insurer of the loss until the insurer formally denies liability. Notice should go out in writing as soon as a loss or a lawsuit is known, to the address the policy designates, with a copy of any complaint or summons. Delay is the most common way an otherwise covered claim is lost, so the date of the first notice and the proof it was received matter.
I was sued and my liability insurer refuses to defend me, saying the claim is not covered. Is that allowed in Michigan?
Often it is not. Under Michigan law the duty to defend is broader than the duty to pay. An insurer must defend when the allegations against the insured even arguably fall within the policy, even if the lawsuit is groundless or fraudulent, and doubt about whether the complaint alleges a covered liability is resolved in the insured's favor. The insurer cannot stop at the labels in the complaint, and if any one theory of recovery is covered it must defend the suit. If the policy truly does not apply, there is no duty to defend.
The Michigan Supreme Court states the starting point this way: the duty to defend arises only with respect to insurance afforded by the policy, so if the policy does not apply there is no duty to defend, but "the scope of the two duties is not identical; the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify" (American Bumper & Mfg Co v Hartford Fire Ins Co, 452 Mich 440, 450 (1996)). The Court also repeats the rule that "[i]n a case of doubt as to whether or not the complaint against the insured alleges a liability of the insurer under the policy, the doubt must be resolved in the insured's favor" (452 Mich at 452).
The Court of Appeals described the test in detail in Detroit Edison Co v Michigan Mut Ins Co. The duty "depends upon the allegations in the complaint of the third party in his or her action against the insured" (102 Mich App 136, 141-142 (1980)). It is not limited to meritorious suits and may extend to actions that are groundless, false or fraudulent, as long as the allegations against the insured even arguably come within the policy coverage. An insurer must also defend despite theories of liability that are not covered if any theory of recovery falls within the policy, and the duty cannot be limited by the precise language of the pleadings, so the insurer has to look at what the complaint's facts actually describe. In that case an injured worker's complaint against the insured company alleged, among other things, a failure to supervise the work, and the court held that the claim was arguably within the policy coverage and that the insurer had a duty to defend (102 Mich App at 144-145).
In practice the insured should send the complaint and summons to the insurer and to the agent right away, in writing, and request a defense. A denial letter should identify the policy provisions relied on and the facts compared against the allegations. The answer deadline in the lawsuit keeps running while a coverage dispute goes on, so a default or a missed deadline is the risk that matters most.
My insurer wrongly refused to defend me and I settled the lawsuit myself. Can I make the insurer pay the settlement?
Possibly. The Michigan Court of Appeals stated the general rule that an insurer's unjustified refusal to defend makes it bound to pay the amount of any reasonable, good faith settlement the insured makes with the injured person. The insurer still gets a chance to show that the settlement was unreasonable or made in bad faith, that there was no liability, or that the liability was not covered by the policy. In Detroit Edison v Michigan Mutual (1980) the court sent the case back for that showing instead of ordering payment outright.
The question comes up when an insurer denies a defense, the insured settles, and the insured then looks to the insurer for the settlement amount. In Detroit Edison Co v Michigan Mut Ins Co, the Court of Appeals found that the insurer had a duty to defend and then turned to the remedy. It stated: "The general rule is that the insurer's unjustified refusal to defend makes it bound to pay the amount of any reasonable, good faith settlement made by the insured in the action brought against him by the injured party" (102 Mich App 136, 144 (1980)).
The court relied on Elliott v Casualty Ass'n of America, 254 Mich 282 (1931), which it quoted for the principle that when an insurer has wrongfully refused to defend and the insured defends and in good faith makes a settlement, the insured may recover the amount paid unless it is shown that there was in fact no liability or that the amount paid was excessive, and that the settlement is presumptive evidence of liability and of its amount (102 Mich App at 144-145). The insurer in Detroit Edison argued that its refusal was not wrongful because a trial court in a declaratory judgment action had ruled it had no duty to defend. The Court of Appeals answered that an insurer that relies on a lower court ruling takes the risk that the ruling will be reversed on appeal (102 Mich App at 146).
The insured does not get an automatic judgment. Because the settlement came after the circuit court's ruling, the insurer had not had a chance to present evidence, and the court held that before judgment for the amount of the settlement was entered, the insurer should be allowed to attempt to show that the settlement was unreasonable or made in bad faith, or that there was no liability. Because the complaint was ambiguous about whether covered supervisory negligence or uncovered negligence was alleged, the insurer was also allowed to try to show that the insured's liability was not covered by the policy (102 Mich App at 146). The opinion also noted that the way for an insurer to protect itself is to defend the action while giving notice that it does not waive its right to deny its own liability on the policy. An insured who is considering a settlement without the insurer should document the demand for a defense, the refusal, the settlement negotiations and the reasons the amount was reasonable.
Can my insurer cancel my policy or refuse my claim because of a mistake or misstatement on my insurance application?
Possibly, if the misstatement amounts to fraud. The Michigan Supreme Court held in Titan v Hyten (2012) that an insurer may use traditional legal and equitable remedies, including cancellation, rescission and reformation, for fraud in the application, even if the fraud was easily ascertainable and the claimant is a third party. In Bazzi v Sentinel (2018) it held that rescission is not automatic and sent the question of whether it is available back to the trial court's discretion. Fire policies must state that the policy may be void for misrepresentation, fraud or concealment (MCL 500.2833(1)(c)).
A misstatement on an application does not by itself end coverage, but fraud can. The Michigan Supreme Court wrote in Titan Ins Co v Hyten that "an insurer may seek to avoid liability under an insurance policy using traditional legal and equitable remedies including cancellation, rescission, or reformation, on the ground of fraud made in an application for insurance, notwithstanding that the fraud may have been easily ascertainable and the claimant is a third party" (491 Mich 547, 572-573 (2012)). Titan arose from an auto liability policy, and the decision abrogated the earlier easily ascertainable fraud rule, under which an insurer that kept the premium despite reasonably discoverable grounds could be estopped from rescinding.
Six years later the Court addressed the effect on an innocent third party in Bazzi v Sentinel Ins Co. It held "that Titan abrogated the innocent-third-party rule but that the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that Sentinel was automatically entitled to rescission in this instance" (502 Mich 390, 396 (2018)). The Court explained that "[r]escission abrogates a contract and restores the parties to the relative positions that they would have occupied if the contract had never been made" (502 Mich at 409). It treated the policy as void as between the insurer and the fraudulent insured, and it sent the case back so the trial court could decide, in its discretion, whether rescission was available as between the insurer and the injured plaintiff (502 Mich at 412). Equitable relief is weighed on the facts, so the insurer's conduct, the claimant's role and the timing all matter. Titan and Bazzi involved auto insurance under the no-fault act, but their reasoning rests on traditional contract and equitable remedies for fraud.
For property coverage, the Fire Insurance provisions in the Insurance Code require every fire policy to state that "the policy may be void on the basis of misrepresentation, fraud, or concealment" (MCL 500.2833(1)(c)). A policyholder who is told the policy is void should ask for the specific statements the insurer says were false, the application and any recorded application interview, and should compare what was asked with what was answered and with who completed the form. Whether a statement was knowingly false and material is the question, not whether an answer contained any error.
My insurer denied my fire claim because of something I did, such as not living in the house. Can the mortgage lender still be paid?
Often yes. Under a standard mortgage clause the mortgagee has a separate and distinct contract with the insurer, and the mortgagee's interest is not avoided by the acts, representations or omissions of the insured. In Wells Fargo v Null (2014) the Court of Appeals held that the clause gave the mortgagee coverage even though the owner's coverage was lost because he stopped living in the home. The mortgagee must still meet the policy's own conditions, and a land contract seller named on the policy can stand in the same position.
A homeowner's policy often names the lender in a mortgage clause. Michigan courts treat the standard version of that clause as its own contract. In Wells Fargo Bank, NA v Null, the Court of Appeals wrote that "it is well settled that a policy's standard mortgage clause constitutes a separate and distinct contract between a mortgagee and an insurance company for payment on the mortgage," and that under such a clause "the lienholder's interest in the insured's property will not be avoided by any acts, representations, or omissions of the insured" (304 Mich App 508, 524, 527 (2014)). The insured in that case had stopped living in the home, which ended his own coverage, and the court rejected the argument that the clause protects a mortgagee only when coverage is defeated by an exclusion, as opposed to a situation in which there was no coverage for the insured in the first instance. It reasoned that the clause gives the mortgagee "such an independent status as might authorize a recovery on the policy by him even though the mortgagor were precluded" (304 Mich App at 530). The court reversed the insurer's summary disposition and remanded for the trial court to decide whether the mortgagee had complied with the policy's own requirements, including proof of loss.
The Court of Appeals applied the same reasoning to a land contract seller in Singer v American States Ins. It reaffirmed "that a land contract vendor stands in the same position as a mortgagee under a standard mortgage clause of an insurance policy and that a standard mortgage clause may be applied as the mechanism by which a vendor collects benefits in the absence of policy language expressly defining the rights of the parties to a land contract" (245 Mich App 370, 382 (2001)).
The Insurance Code also protects a mortgagee named in a fire policy. Under MCL 500.2833(1)(j), the insurer may cancel the interest of a designated mortgagee only on at least 10 days' written notice. If the insured fails to render proof of loss, the mortgagee, on notice, must render proof of loss within 60 days. If the insurer claims that no liability existed as to the owner, it is subrogated to the mortgagee's rights to the extent of payment of the loss to the mortgagee, without impairing the mortgagee's right to sue, or it may pay off the mortgage debt and take an assignment. A homeowner whose own claim has been denied should still tell the lender at once, because the lender's rights, notice duties and deadlines under the clause run on their own track.
Can my insurer hold back depreciation and contractor overhead and profit from the first payment on my house claim?
Depreciation, often yes. Michigan law lets a fire policy pay only actual cash value until the property is actually repaired or replaced (MCL 500.2827(3)), and the policy in Singer (2001) did exactly that. But the Court of Appeals held in Salesin (1998) that State Farm could not deduct estimated contractor overhead and profit from the actual cash value payment under the policy before it, without holding that those costs must be included in every case. The policy's loss settlement wording controls, so estimates and receipts should be kept for the later claim.
Two questions run together here: what actual cash value means, and when the replacement cost holdback is released. Michigan's statute permits an insurer to issue a policy that reimburses the difference between actual cash value and the amount actually necessary to repair, rebuild or replace the property to a similar condition and appearance, and such a policy "may provide that there shall be no liability on the part of the insurer to pay an amount in excess of the actual cash value of the lost or damaged insured property at the time of the loss or damage, unless the lost or damaged property is actually repaired, rebuilt, or replaced at the same or another contiguous site" (MCL 500.2827(1), (3)). A related section permits a policy that pays the difference between actual value and the amount actually expended to repair, rebuild or replace (MCL 500.2826).
Policies commonly use that structure. The policy in Singer v American States Ins stated that the insurer would pay "no more than the actual cash value of the damage unless: (a) actual repair or replacement is complete; or (b) the cost to repair or replace the damage is both: (i) less than 5% of the amount of insurance in this policy on the building; and (ii) less than $2500" (245 Mich App 370, 382 (2001)). The court in Singer also said that well-settled principles of contract interpretation first look to a contract's plain language, and that if the plain language is clear there can be only one reasonable interpretation (245 Mich App at 382), so the insured should read the loss settlement section closely.
The insurer's method for figuring actual cash value is a separate issue. In Salesin v State Farm Fire & Cas Co, the insurer deducted an estimated 20% for general contractor overhead and profit, along with depreciation, when it paid actual cash value on building claims. The Court of Appeals held that State Farm's policy did not allow that deduction, found the reasoning of Gilderman more persuasive than that of Snellen, and said "[t]here is no logical reason, nor any reason based upon the insurance policy itself or the record below, for deducting estimated contractor's overhead and profit" (229 Mich App 346, 366-369 (1998)). The court did not hold that overhead and profit must be included automatically in every case, and it noted that the estimate of actual cash value is theoretical and not limited by what the insured later spends. The decision rested on that policy, which did not define actual cash value, and on the statute then in effect, so another insurer's differently worded policy may require a different analysis. The insured should request the insurer's estimate in itemized form, ask whether depreciation and overhead and profit were applied, and keep invoices because a later replacement cost claim depends on proof of what was actually spent.
My property insurer demanded an examination under oath. Do I have to go, and what if I refuse?
Usually yes if the policy provides for it. The Court of Appeals has held that an examination under oath requirement in an insurance policy is generally enforceable and is a condition that must be satisfied before the insured may sue. A failure to comply is not automatically a permanent bar: dismissal must be with prejudice if the noncompliance was wilful and without prejudice if it was not, and the insured bears the burden to show there was no deliberate effort to withhold material information or pattern of noncooperation. Fire policies must be complied with before suit (MCL 500.2833(1)(q)).
The examination under oath, often called an EUO, is a sworn question session that many policies allow the insurer to require after a claim. In Thomson v State Farm Ins Co, the Court of Appeals agreed with an earlier decision, Yeo, that such a requirement "is generally enforceable," and explained that when requested, an EUO is a condition that must be satisfied before the insured has the right to bring an action. The insureds in Thomson had failed or refused to submit to the examinations that State Farm repeatedly tried to schedule, and the court held that, under Yeo, their action had to be dismissed (232 Mich App 38, 45-47 (1998)). The statute points the same way for fire policies: MCL 500.2833(1)(q) requires the policy to provide that an action under it may be commenced only after compliance with the policy requirements.
Thomson then softened the consequence. The court held that a failure to appear is not necessarily a complete bar to recovery. It held "that if the noncompliance is wilful, the dismissal must be with prejudice; if the noncompliance is not wilful, the dismissal must be without prejudice," and that "wilful noncompliance" means a failure or refusal to submit to an EUO, or otherwise cooperate in the insurer's investigation, that is part of a deliberate effort to withhold material information or a pattern of noncooperation with the insurer. It placed the burden on the insured in future cases to show there was not a deliberate effort to withhold material information, and it warned that volunteering unsworn recorded statements would not be enough (232 Mich App at 56). The opinion states no separate requirement that the insurer prove prejudice.
In practice, an insured who receives an EUO request should respond in writing, ask what documents are to be brought, schedule a date promptly, and consider having a lawyer attend. Refusing outright, or ignoring repeated requests, is the pattern the case treats most harshly. Questions about records, finances and the loss are common, so the answers should be accurate and consistent with the proof of loss and prior statements.
Can I sue the at-fault person's insurance company directly after an accident, or get 12% interest from it?
Not in the original lawsuit. The Insurance Code says the liability insurer shall not be made or joined as a party defendant in the injured person's original action. Under MCL 500.3006, a liability policy must allow an action in the nature of a writ of garnishment against the insurer only if execution against the insured is returned unsatisfied because of the insured's insolvency or bankruptcy. A third party claimant gets 12% interest under MCL 500.2006(4) only if the insurer's liability is not reasonably in dispute, it refused payment in bad faith, and a court determined the bad faith.
Michigan separates the claim against the person who caused the injury from any claim against that person's insurer. MCL 500.3030 provides that, in the original action brought by the injured person, "the insurer shall not be made or joined as a party defendant, nor, except as otherwise provided by law, shall any reference whatever be made to such insurer or to the question of carrying of such insurance during the course of trial." The suit is brought against the at-fault person, and the insurance is dealt with afterward.
MCL 500.3006 describes what comes after a judgment. Liability policies must contain a provision that the insolvency or bankruptcy of the insured does not release the insurer from payment of damages for injury sustained during the life of the policy, and that if execution against the insured is returned unsatisfied in an action brought by the injured person because of the insured's insolvency or bankruptcy, "an action in the nature of a writ of garnishment may be maintained by the injured person" against the insurer "under the terms of the policy for the amount of the judgment in the said action not exceeding the amount of the policy." The right is therefore tied to a judgment, to the policy's terms and to its limits.
Interest follows different rules for a third party claimant than for the insured. MCL 500.2006(1) requires a person to pay benefits on a timely basis to its insured, a person directly entitled to benefits, or a third party tort claimant, or pay 12% interest on claims not paid on a timely basis. For a third party tort claimant, however, MCL 500.2006(4) allows the interest only "if the liability of the insurer for the claim is not reasonably in dispute, the insurer has refused payment in bad faith, and the bad faith was determined by a court of law," and the interest runs from a date 60 days after satisfactory proof of loss was received by the insurer. Interest is payable on the policy limits when the loss exceeds them. Learning who the at-fault party's insurer is and what its limits are matters early in valuing the claim.
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This page provides general information about Michigan law and is not legal advice. Reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Laws change and every case turns on its own facts. Consult a licensed attorney about your specific situation.