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Murder, manslaughter and homicide charges in Michigan

These are general answers about Michigan law, not advice about your situation. Each answer links to the statute, court rule or case it rests on. Last reviewed October 2026.

By Mitchell S. Bisson, Michigan attorney (P79807). Reviewed October 2026.

Quick answers

The short version

What is the difference between first-degree murder, second-degree murder and manslaughter in Michigan?

The difference is the mental state. First-degree murder is a killing that is premeditated and deliberate, or one committed during a listed felony or against a peace officer or corrections officer. Second-degree murder is every other murder: a killing with malice but without planning. Manslaughter is a killing without malice. First-degree carries mandatory life without parole for people who were 21 or older at the time of the offense (younger defendants get an individualized sentencing hearing); second-degree carries life or any term of years; manslaughter carries up to 15 years.

What do "premeditated" and "deliberate" mean? How fast can a decision to kill count as first-degree murder?

Premeditation means thinking about the killing beforehand. Deliberation means measuring and evaluating the major facets of the choice. There has to be enough time between the intent to kill and the act for a reasonable person to take a second look, but Michigan law sets no minimum number of seconds or minutes. Jurors may infer both from the circumstances.

What is felony murder in Michigan, and do I have to intend to kill for it?

Felony murder is a murder committed during, or in an attempt to commit, a listed felony such as robbery, home invasion, carjacking or arson. Michigan does not treat the intent to commit the felony as enough. The prosecutor must still prove malice: an intent to kill, an intent to cause great bodily harm, or a knowing, wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that death or great bodily harm would result.

Michigan law, reviewed October 2026. General information, not advice about your situation. Select a question for the full answer and the authority behind it.

What is the difference between first-degree murder, second-degree murder and manslaughter in Michigan?

The difference is the mental state. First-degree murder is a killing that is premeditated and deliberate, or one committed during a listed felony or against a peace officer or corrections officer. Second-degree murder is every other murder: a killing with malice but without planning. Manslaughter is a killing without malice. First-degree carries mandatory life without parole for people who were 21 or older at the time of the offense (younger defendants get an individualized sentencing hearing); second-degree carries life or any term of years; manslaughter carries up to 15 years.

Michigan treats murder as a killing done with malice and without justification or excuse. MCL 750.316(1) defines first-degree murder in three ways: (a) murder by poison, lying in wait, or any other willful, deliberate and premeditated killing; (b) murder committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, one of a list of felonies (including arson, first, second or third degree criminal sexual conduct, robbery, carjacking, home invasion, kidnapping, and larceny of any kind); and (c) murder of a peace officer or corrections officer who is lawfully performing his or her duties, where the defendant knows the person is an officer. MCL 750.317 says all other kinds of murder are second-degree. Manslaughter, MCL 750.321, is not defined in the statute; it is the common-law crime of killing without malice.

Malice is what separates murder from manslaughter. The Michigan Supreme Court has described malice as the intent to kill, the intent to cause great bodily harm, or the intent to do an act in wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that its natural tendency is to cause death or great bodily harm (People v Goecke, 457 Mich 442 (1998), quoting People v Aaron, 409 Mich 672, 728 (1980)). A killing with that state of mind is murder; a killing in the heat of passion after adequate provocation, or through gross negligence or an intent to injure without malice, is manslaughter (People v Mendoza, 468 Mich 527, 534-535, 540 (2003); People v Holtschlag, 471 Mich 1 (2004)). Manslaughter is treated as a lesser included offense of murder, and a jury is instructed on it only when a rational view of the evidence supports it.

The prosecutor often charges "open murder," which leaves the degree to the jury. Under MCL 750.318, the jury that finds a defendant guilty of murder decides in its verdict whether it is murder of the first or second degree. The penalty difference is large. First-degree murder is life without parole (mandatory for a person who was 21 or older at the time; people under 21 receive individualized sentencing under MCL 769.25 and 769.25a, People v Parks, 510 Mich 225 (2022), and People v Taylor (Mich Apr. 10, 2025)), second-degree is life or any term of years, and manslaughter is a felony with a 15-year maximum.

Authority: MCL 750.316(1); MCL 750.317; MCL 750.318; MCL 750.321; People v Goecke, 457 Mich 442 (1998); People v Mendoza, 468 Mich 527, 534-535, 540 (2003); People v Holtschlag, 471 Mich 1 (2004); People v Parks, 510 Mich 225, 268 (2022); People v Taylor (Mich Apr. 10, 2025) (Docket Nos. 166428 and 166654); M Crim JI 16.1, 16.5, 16.8, 16.10. Reviewed Oct. 2026.

What do "premeditated" and "deliberate" mean? How fast can a decision to kill count as first-degree murder?

Premeditation means thinking about the killing beforehand. Deliberation means measuring and evaluating the major facets of the choice. There has to be enough time between the intent to kill and the act for a reasonable person to take a second look, but Michigan law sets no minimum number of seconds or minutes. Jurors may infer both from the circumstances.

To convict of first-degree premeditated murder under MCL 750.316(1)(a), the prosecutor must prove an intentional killing that was premeditated and deliberate. The Michigan Supreme Court uses the older definitions: to premeditate is to think about beforehand, and to deliberate is to measure and evaluate the major facets of a choice or problem. The two are separate elements, although the same facts can tend to show both, and they are usually proved from circumstances rather than an admission (People v Oros, 502 Mich 229, 239-244 (2018)).

Time matters, but not in a fixed amount. Premeditation and deliberation can be shown by an interval between the first homicidal thought and the act long enough that a reasonable person could take a "second look." The Court has said the minimum time cannot be measured exactly and that it is for the jury to decide whether enough time passed. Evidence such as a struggle or manual strangulation has been treated as giving that opportunity. The number or brutality of wounds, standing alone, has not been treated as enough. In Oros the Court found the evidence sufficient because of the escalation from one assault, to getting a knife, to the final attack, not because of the wound count.

The jury instruction now tracks this language. M Crim JI 16.1 tells jurors the killing must have been thought out beforehand and that the defendant considered the pros and cons and chose his or her actions, with real and substantial reflection "for long enough to give a reasonable person a chance to think twice about the intent to kill." It adds that the killing cannot be the result of a sudden impulse without thought or reflection. M Crim JI 16.1 was amended in June 2026. Because the question is so fact-bound, it is a common ground for arguing a downgrade to second-degree murder or, where provocation is shown, to manslaughter.

Authority: MCL 750.316(1)(a); People v Oros, 502 Mich 229, 239-244 (2018); M Crim JI 16.1 and 16.2. Reviewed Oct. 2026.

What is felony murder in Michigan, and do I have to intend to kill for it?

Felony murder is a murder committed during, or in an attempt to commit, a listed felony such as robbery, home invasion, carjacking or arson. Michigan does not treat the intent to commit the felony as enough. The prosecutor must still prove malice: an intent to kill, an intent to cause great bodily harm, or a knowing, wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that death or great bodily harm would result.

MCL 750.316(1)(b) makes it first-degree murder to commit murder in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, one of the listed felonies: arson, criminal sexual conduct in the first, second or third degree, first-degree child abuse, a major controlled substance offense, robbery, carjacking, breaking and entering of a dwelling, home invasion in the first or second degree, larceny of any kind, extortion, kidnapping, first or second degree vulnerable adult abuse, torture, aggravated stalking, and unlawful imprisonment. The sentence is life without parole for a person who was 21 or older at the time; people under 21 receive individualized sentencing under MCL 769.25 and 769.25a.

Older law presumed malice from the felony itself. People v Aaron, 409 Mich 672 (1980), ended that rule. Under current law the felony only raises second-degree murder to first-degree murder. In People v Reichard, 505 Mich 81 (2020), the Michigan Supreme Court said that, unlike at common law, malice has to be separately shown, and that MCL 750.316(1)(b) operates to elevate a second-degree murder to first-degree murder if it was committed during one of the listed felonies. The model instruction, M Crim JI 16.4 (amended June 2026), lists the three states of mind the prosecutor can prove: intent to kill, intent to do great bodily harm, or knowingly creating a very high risk of death or great bodily harm knowing that death or such harm would be the likely result.

Two practical points follow. First, when two or more people are tried together, M Crim JI 16.26 requires jurors to decide each person's state of mind separately, and agreeing to commit the felony is not enough. Second, a successful defense to the underlying felony, such as duress, removes the felony-murder aggravator but can leave second-degree murder in the case if the evidence supports it (Reichard).

Authority: MCL 750.316(1)(b); People v Reichard, 505 Mich 81 (2020); People v Aaron, 409 Mich 672, 728 (1980); M Crim JI 16.4 and 16.26. Reviewed Oct. 2026.

What do prosecutors have to prove for second-degree murder, and is a plan required?

No plan is required. Second-degree murder requires a death caused by the defendant's act, malice, and no justification or excuse. Malice can be an intent to kill, an intent to do great bodily harm, or an act done in wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that death or great bodily harm would result. The sentence is life or any term of years.

Second-degree murder is the default form of murder in Michigan: MCL 750.317 says all murder that is not first-degree is second-degree, punishable by life or any term of years in the judge's discretion. The Michigan Supreme Court lists the elements as (1) a death, (2) caused by an act of the defendant, (3) with malice, and (4) without justification or excuse (People v Goecke, 457 Mich 442 (1998)).

The third form of malice is sometimes called depraved-heart murder. It covers a person who does not want anyone dead but acts with wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of the behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm. Goecke described this as a general-intent mental state, so the person need not intend the harmful result, and voluntary intoxication is not a defense to second-degree murder (citing People v Langworthy, 416 Mich 630, 651 (1982)). Goecke left open whether the defendant must have been subjectively aware of the risk, because the evidence in those cases met either standard. M Crim JI 16.5, amended in June 2026 in response to People v Spears, 346 Mich App 494 (2023), now lists the three states of mind in the instruction given to jurors, with a use note that second-degree murder is not a specific-intent crime.

Second-degree murder is the lesser offense jurors are usually given when first-degree murder is charged and premeditation is disputed. It is also the offense that remains when a felony-murder aggravator fails. Prosecutors charge it where they contend the person knew death or great bodily harm was the likely result of the act, and Goecke itself arose in part from fatal driving cases. A defense that the person acted in self-defense or in the heat of passion can reduce or defeat the charge.

Authority: MCL 750.317; People v Goecke, 457 Mich 442 (1998); M Crim JI 16.5 and use note. Reviewed Oct. 2026.

When can a murder charge be reduced to voluntary manslaughter because of anger or provocation?

When the defendant killed in the heat of passion caused by something that would make a reasonable person act rashly, and acted before a reasonable time had passed to calm down. Provocation does not excuse the killing. It negates malice, which is what makes the offense manslaughter instead of murder. Whether the facts qualify is usually decided by the jury.

Michigan defines voluntary manslaughter as a killing, even an intentional one, committed under the influence of passion or in the heat of blood produced by adequate or reasonable provocation, before a reasonable time has passed for the blood to cool and reason to return (People v Mendoza, 468 Mich 527 (2003), quoting Maher v People, 10 Mich 212, 219 (1862)). Mendoza describes (468 Mich at 534-535) three things to show: the defendant killed in the heat of passion, the passion was caused by adequate provocation, and there was no lapse of time during which a reasonable person could control his or her passions. Provocation is not itself an element of voluntary manslaughter; it is the circumstance that negates the malice that murder requires.

M Crim JI 16.9 turns that into plain language for the jury. The defendant's thinking must have been disturbed by emotional excitement to the point that a reasonable person might have acted on impulse, from passion instead of judgment, and the excitement must have been the result of something that would cause a reasonable person to act rashly. The killing itself must result from that excitement, and the defendant must have acted before a reasonable time passed to calm down. The law does not say what is enough or how much time is needed; those are for the jury.

Voluntary manslaughter is a necessarily included lesser offense of murder, so on a murder charge the court gives the instruction when a rational view of the evidence supports it (Mendoza). It carries a maximum of 15 years or a fine of up to $7,500, or both (MCL 750.321), compared with life or life without parole for murder. Self-defense, if it applies, results in acquittal rather than a lesser conviction (M Crim JI 7.15(1)).

Authority: MCL 750.321; People v Mendoza, 468 Mich 527, 534-535, 540 (2003); M Crim JI 16.8 and 16.9; M Crim JI 7.15(1). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

What is involuntary manslaughter, and when does an accidental death become a crime?

Involuntary manslaughter is an unintended killing without malice that is not justified or excused. In Michigan it generally requires either gross negligence or an act done with intent to injure. A separate statute makes it manslaughter when a firearm is intentionally pointed at someone without malice and discharges, causing death.

The Michigan Supreme Court has called involuntary manslaughter a catch-all offense: every unintentional killing is involuntary manslaughter if it is not murder, not voluntary manslaughter, and not justified or excused (People v Holtschlag, 471 Mich 1 (2004), quoting People v Datema, 448 Mich 585 (1995)). The line between it and murder is malice. If a death was caused with malice, it is murder; if it was caused with a lesser state of mind of gross negligence or intent to injure, it is not murder but involuntary manslaughter.

M Crim JI 16.10 gives two routes. One is gross negligence. M Crim JI 16.18 defines it as more than carelessness: the defendant knew of a danger to another, could have avoided injuring the other by using ordinary care, and failed to use ordinary care when it must have been apparent to a reasonable person that serious injury was likely. The other is an act with intent to injure, such as an assault and battery that causes a death. Holtschlag also held that committing a felony does not by itself prevent a manslaughter conviction, because after Aaron felony evidence no longer establishes malice by itself.

Firearm cases have their own provision. MCL 750.329(1) provides that a person who wounds, maims or injures another by discharging a firearm that is pointed or aimed intentionally but without malice at another person is guilty of manslaughter if the injuries result in death; M Crim JI 16.11 states the elements, and the statute does not apply to a peace officer performing his or her duties. In all manslaughter cases the prosecutor must also prove causation, and M Crim JI 16.15 tells jurors that it is not enough that the defendant's act made death possible; the death must be the natural or necessary result of the act. The maximum is 15 years under MCL 750.321, and a firearm used in a felony can add a separate felony-firearm count (MCL 750.227b).

Authority: MCL 750.321; MCL 750.329; People v Holtschlag, 471 Mich 1 (2004); M Crim JI 16.10, 16.11, 16.15, 16.18; MCL 750.227b. Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Can I be charged with murder if someone else did the killing?

Yes. Under MCL 767.39 a person who helps in committing a crime is punished as if he or she directly committed it. For murder, the prosecutor must prove that the crime was committed, that the person did something to assist, and that the person intended the crime, knew the other person intended it, or the crime was a natural and probable consequence of the crime the person intended to help. The assistance must be something the person actually did before or during the crime.

Michigan has abolished the old distinction between a principal and an accessory. MCL 767.39 provides that every person concerned in the commission of an offense, whether the person directly commits it or procures, counsels, aids or abets, may be prosecuted and punished as if he or she directly committed it. M Crim JI 8.1 sets out the elements: the crime was actually committed, by the defendant or someone else; before or during the crime the defendant did something to assist; and, at that time, the defendant intended the crime, knew the other person intended it, or the crime was a natural and probable consequence of the crime the defendant intended.

The third element is the one most litigated in murder cases. People v Robinson, 475 Mich 1, 15 (2006), held that a defendant is criminally liable for the offenses he or she specifically intends to aid or abet or knows about, and also for crimes that are the natural and probable consequences of the offense he or she intends to aid or abet. On those facts the Court reinstated a second-degree murder conviction for a defendant who took part in an assault that ended in a death. In Robinson, a defendant who intended to aid an assault could be liable for second-degree murder when death was a natural and probable consequence of that assault.

The limits are the assistance and intent elements. The instruction requires that the defendant did something to assist in the commission of the crime and, at that time, had one of the three states of mind described above. For felony murder with more than one defendant, M Crim JI 16.26 directs jurors to decide separately whether each defendant intended to kill, intended great bodily harm, or created a very high risk of death or great bodily harm knowing it was the probable result; an agreement to commit the felony is not enough. M Crim JI 16.15, on causation, notes that it is not used in aiding and abetting cases.

Authority: MCL 767.39; People v Robinson, 475 Mich 1, 15 (2006); M Crim JI 8.1; M Crim JI 16.26. Reviewed Oct. 2026.

What sentences do first-degree murder, second-degree murder and manslaughter carry in Michigan, and can I get parole?

For an adult 21 or older, first-degree murder is mandatory life without parole. Second-degree murder is life or any term of years; a parolable life sentence makes the person eligible for parole consideration after 15 years for crimes committed on or after October 1, 1992. Manslaughter is up to 15 years. A felony-firearm count adds a consecutive two-year term for a first offense. People who were under 21 at the time of a first-degree murder are not subject to the mandatory sentence (People v Parks; People v Taylor).

First-degree murder. MCL 750.316(1) provides for imprisonment for life without eligibility for parole, "except as provided in" MCL 769.25 and 769.25a, which govern people who were under 18 when the offense occurred. The Michigan Supreme Court has also extended those protections to people who were 18, 19 or 20 at the time, so the mandatory sentence now applies in full only to people who were at least 21 when the offense was committed. See People v Parks, 510 Mich 225 (2022), and People v Taylor (Mich Apr. 10, 2025) (Nos. 166428, 166654). A person sentenced to life for first-degree murder is not eligible for parole (MCL 791.234(6)(a)).

Second-degree murder and manslaughter. MCL 750.317 allows life imprisonment or any term of years at the judge's discretion. For a life sentence other than one described in MCL 791.234(6), a prisoner is subject to the parole board's jurisdiction after serving 10 calendar years for a crime committed before October 1, 1992, or 15 calendar years for a crime committed on or after that date (MCL 791.234(7)(a)). For a term of years, the judge sets the minimum and maximum; the Michigan sentencing guidelines are advisory, but the judge must calculate and consult them and the sentence is reviewed for reasonableness (People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358 (2015)). Manslaughter is a felony with a 15-year maximum or a fine of up to $7,500, or both (MCL 750.321).

Gun add-on. MCL 750.227b imposes a term of 2 years for a first conviction for carrying or possessing a firearm while committing or attempting to commit a felony, 5 years for a second, and 10 years for a third or later. The term is served consecutively with and before the sentence for the felony, cannot be suspended, and carries no parole or probation during the mandatory term. Statutory exceptions apply for sections 223, 227, 227a and 230. All of these figures are fixed by statute, and the actual outcome depends on the guidelines, the facts, and any plea agreement.

Authority: MCL 750.316(1); MCL 750.317; MCL 750.321; MCL 750.227b; MCL 791.234(6), (7)(a); People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358 (2015); People v Parks, 510 Mich 225, 268 (2022); People v Taylor (Mich Apr. 10, 2025) (Docket Nos. 166428 and 166654). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

I was 18, 19 or 20 when the offense happened. Does first-degree murder still mean mandatory life without parole?

No. In People v Parks (2022) the Michigan Supreme Court held mandatory life without parole unconstitutional for 18-year-olds convicted of first-degree murder, and in People v Taylor (Apr. 10, 2025) it extended that rule to 19- and 20-year-olds. These defendants receive the individualized sentencing process of MCL 769.25. Life without parole is possible only if the prosecutor seeks it and wins a hearing; otherwise a term of years is required.

MCL 750.316 still reads as a mandatory life without parole statute, but the Michigan Supreme Court has held that applying it to younger adults violates the state constitutional ban on cruel or unusual punishment, Const 1963, art 1, s 16. In People v Parks, 510 Mich 225 (2022), the Court held that mandatorily subjecting 18-year-olds convicted of first-degree murder to life without parole is unconstitutionally cruel. Parks and other 18-year-old defendants are entitled to the full protections of MCL 769.25 instead of the automatic scheme in MCL 750.316(1). In People v Taylor (Apr. 10, 2025), decided 5 to 2, the Court extended Parks to people who were 19 or 20 at the time of the offense, and said such a defendant must receive the same individualized sentencing procedure as a juvenile. The Court stated that life without parole could still be an appropriate punishment under rare circumstances.

The process under MCL 769.25 is as follows. The prosecutor must file a motion within 21 days after conviction if he or she wants a life-without-parole sentence (MCL 769.25(3)). The court holds a hearing, considers the Miller factors and any other relevant criteria, and states on the record the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. In People v Taylor, 510 Mich 112, 119-120 (2022), the Michigan Supreme Court held that for juveniles there is a rebuttable presumption against life without parole, which the prosecutor must overcome by clear and convincing evidence; Parks stated the same protections apply to 18-year-olds, and the 2025 Taylor decision stated they apply to 19- and 20-year-olds. If no motion is filed or the prosecutor does not meet that burden, the court sentences to a term of years with a minimum of not less than 25 and not more than 40 years and a maximum of not less than 60 years (MCL 769.25(9)).

The line stops at 21. The 2025 Taylor opinion left in place the holding of People v Hall, 396 Mich 650 (1976), that a mandatory life-without-parole sentence is permitted for a defendant who was at least 21 at the time of the offense, while describing Hall's continued viability as questionable. In People v Langston (Mich July 28, 2026), the Court again left Hall undisturbed as to defendants who were at least 21, because the question whether mandatory life without parole for felony murder is unconstitutional in all its applications was not before it.

Authority: MCL 769.25(2), (3), (6), (9); People v Parks, 510 Mich 225, 245, 268 (2022); People v Taylor (Mich Apr. 10, 2025) (Docket Nos. 166428 and 166654); People v Taylor, 510 Mich 112, 119-120 (2022); People v Langston, No. 163968 (Mich. July 28, 2026). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

My child was under 18 when the offense happened. Can a juvenile get life without parole for murder in Michigan?

Only after a hearing, and only if the prosecutor asks for it. Under Miller v Alabama a mandatory life-without-parole sentence for a person under 18 is unconstitutional, and MCL 769.25 sets the Michigan procedure. A judge, not a jury, decides. There is a presumption against life without parole that the prosecutor must overcome by clear and convincing evidence. If that fails, the sentence is a term of years.

In Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012), the United States Supreme Court held that mandatory life without parole for a person under 18 at the time of a homicide violates the Eighth Amendment. Michigan responded with MCL 769.25, which applies to a person under 18 convicted of first-degree murder and certain other offenses. The prosecutor may file a motion to seek life without parole, and must do so within 21 days after conviction (MCL 769.25(2), (3)). The defendant files a response within 14 days. The court then holds a hearing as part of sentencing and must consider the Miller factors, and may consider any other relevant criteria, including the person's record while incarcerated. The judge must specify the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the reasons on the record, and victims may make oral impact statements (MCL 769.25(6)-(8)).

The Michigan Supreme Court has addressed the process in two decisions. In People v Skinner, 502 Mich 89 (2018), it held that the decision belongs to the judge and not a jury, that the judge need not make an explicit finding that the juvenile is incorrigible, and that the sentence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. In People v Taylor, 510 Mich 112, 119-120 (2022), it held that there is a rebuttable presumption against juvenile life without parole, that the prosecutor bears the burden of overcoming it by clear and convincing evidence, and that if the burden is not met the court must impose a term of years. The Court treated Skinner's statement that there is no presumption as non-binding dictum.

If the prosecutor does not file a motion, or the burden is not met, MCL 769.25(9) requires a sentence with a maximum of not less than 60 years and a minimum of not less than 25 and not more than 40 years, and MCL 769.25(10) gives credit for time served but no good-time or disciplinary credits. When a person is sentenced to a term of years under MCL 769.25 or 769.25a, the court must consider youth as a mitigating factor (People v Boykin, 510 Mich 171 (2022)).

Authority: MCL 769.25; Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012); People v Skinner, 502 Mich 89 (2018); People v Taylor, 510 Mich 112, 119-120 (2022); People v Boykin, 510 Mich 171 (2022). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

I (or someone I know) got life without parole years ago for a murder committed young. Can the sentence be revisited?

Often yes. Montgomery v Louisiana made Miller retroactive, and MCL 769.25a sets the process for people who were under 18. In People v Poole (Apr. 1, 2025) the Michigan Supreme Court held that Parks, covering 18-year-olds, applies retroactively to cases on collateral review, and People v Taylor (Apr. 10, 2025) applied the same to 19- and 20-year-olds. Older felony-murder convictions have their own rule under People v Langston (July 28, 2026).

For people who were under 18, Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 US 190 (2016), held that Miller applies retroactively. MCL 769.25a covers cases that were final on or before June 24, 2012. Within 30 days after the supreme court's retroactivity decision became final, the prosecutor was to give the chief circuit judge a list of defendants to be resentenced, and within 180 days was to file motions in cases where life without parole would be sought (MCL 769.25a(4)(a), (b)); the hearing follows MCL 769.25, and without a motion the court imposes a maximum of 60 years and a minimum of not less than 25 and not more than 40 years (MCL 769.25a(4)(c)). Cases with 20 or more years served are heard first (MCL 769.25a(5)). Time served is credited, but no good-time or similar credits apply (MCL 769.25a(6)).

For 18-, 19- and 20-year-olds, the key decisions are recent. People v Poole (Mich Apr. 1, 2025, No. 166813), decided unanimously (Thomas, J., not participating), held that Parks announced a substantive rule that applies retroactively to cases in which the direct-review period expired before Parks was decided. The Court affirmed the vacatur of the defendant's mandatory sentence and sent the case back for resentencing under MCL 769.25a, not MCL 769.25, because the case was no longer on direct review. People v Taylor (Apr. 10, 2025) held its extension to 19- and 20-year-olds retroactive on collateral review as well, stating there is no logical justification for treating the groups differently.

A further decision concerns old felony-murder convictions. In People v Langston (July 28, 2026), the Court held that mandatory life without parole for a felony-murder conviction obtained before People v Aaron (1980) is cruel or unusual punishment if the jury was not instructed on malice as Aaron defined it, unless the prosecutor proves beyond a reasonable doubt, from the trial evidence, that a properly instructed jury would have found malice. If the prosecutor cannot, the remedy is to strike the no-parole portion, not to overturn the conviction. Langston and Eads arose on motions for relief from judgment, a post-appeal procedure under MCR 6.500 et seq. that has its own procedural limits.

Authority: MCL 769.25a(4), (5), (6); Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 US 190 (2016); People v Poole (Mich Apr. 1, 2025) (No. 166813); People v Taylor (Mich Apr. 10, 2025) (Docket Nos. 166428 and 166654); People v Langston, No. 163968 (Mich. July 28, 2026). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

If a young person is convicted of second-degree murder, can the judge impose a very long sentence or parolable life?

Not as freely as with an adult. In People v Stovall (2022) the Michigan Supreme Court held that parolable life for a juvenile convicted of second-degree murder is cruel or unusual punishment under the Michigan Constitution. In People v Eads (July 30, 2026), decided 6 to 1, it held that a 50-to-75-year sentence for second-degree murder committed by someone under 21 is also unconstitutional, and that the holding applies retroactively on collateral review.

Second-degree murder carries life or any term of years under MCL 750.317, but the Michigan Supreme Court has limited that range for young defendants. In People v Stovall, 510 Mich 301, 307-308 (2022), decided 4 to 3, the Court held that imposing a life sentence with the possibility of parole on a juvenile convicted of second-degree murder is cruel or unusual punishment in violation of Const 1963, art 1, s 16. It rejected the Eighth Amendment version of the claim and rested the decision on Michigan's broader constitutional text.

Stovall left open whether a lengthy term of years instead of parolable life would be allowed. People v Eads (July 30, 2026, Docket No. 168205) answered part of that question. By a 6 to 1 vote the Court held that Stovall's reasoning applies equivalently to a minimum of 50 years and a maximum of 75 years imposed on a youth convicted of second-degree murder, and that the sentence is grossly disproportionate under art 1, s 16. The opinion uses "youth" to mean a person under 21 at the time of the crime, and it states that its holding applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. The Court declined to draw a precise line for what counts as a de facto life sentence, so the permissible range below 50 to 75 years has not been settled.

These cases concern sentences, not guilt; the underlying murder conviction is unchanged. Each case turns on the person's age at the time, the sentence imposed, and how the case reached the court.

Authority: MCL 750.317; People v Stovall, 510 Mich 301, 307-308 (2022); People v Eads (Mich July 30, 2026) (Docket No. 168205). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Is there a statute of limitations on murder in Michigan?

No. Under MCL 767.24(1), an indictment for murder, conspiracy to commit murder, or solicitation to commit murder may be found and filed at any time. Manslaughter is different: for offenses committed on or after April 2, 2025, MCL 767.24(6) generally allows 10 years, with a longer window when the offender is unknown at first and identified later; earlier offenses fall under the 6-year period in MCL 767.24(10).

MCL 767.24(1)(a) lists murder, conspiracy to commit murder, solicitation to commit murder, and first-degree criminal sexual conduct among the crimes for which an indictment "may be found and filed at any time." That covers both first-degree and second-degree murder. A decades-old killing can be charged if the prosecutor has the evidence.

The statute treats other homicide-related offenses differently. For offenses committed on or after April 2, 2025, MCL 767.24(6) provides that an indictment for kidnapping, extortion, assault with intent to commit murder, attempted murder, manslaughter, armed robbery, or first-degree home invasion may be found and filed within 10 years after the offense is committed. That 2024 amendment (2024 PA 268, effective April 2, 2025) does not apply to an offense committed before that date (MCL 767.24(13)); an earlier manslaughter offense falls under the 6-year period in MCL 767.24(10). If the offense is reported to a police agency within 1 year and the person who committed it is unknown, an indictment may be found and filed within 10 years after the person is identified. The statute names this provision Brandon D'Annunzio's law and defines "identified" as the person's legal name being known.

The statute has separate periods for other offenses and, in some cases, extensions when an offender is identified later, so the period for any related charge depends on the exact subsection and the date of the offense.

Authority: MCL 767.24(1)(a), (6), (10), (13); 2024 PA 268 (eff. Apr. 2, 2025). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Can I get a bond on a murder charge in Michigan?

Not as of right. The Michigan Constitution allows bail to be denied to a person indicted for, or arraigned on a warrant charging, murder when the proof is evident or the presumption great. If bail is denied, trial must begin within 90 days or the court must schedule a bail hearing and set bail unless the defense caused the delay.

Michigan's Constitution generally makes all persons bailable before conviction by sufficient sureties, with listed exceptions. Const 1963, art 1, s 15(b) allows bail to be denied to a person indicted for, or arraigned on a warrant charging, murder or treason when the proof is evident or the presumption great. MCL 765.5 is the statutory counterpart: no person charged with treason or murder shall be admitted to bail if the proof of his or her guilt is evident or the presumption great. Because the standard turns on the strength of the evidence, a bail hearing can focus on what the prosecution can show at that stage.

Two features of the constitutional rule matter. First, the denial applies only when the proof is evident or the presumption great; it is not automatic on the charge. Second, if a person is denied bail, the trial must commence within 90 days after the date bail is denied. If trial does not begin within 90 days and the delay is not attributable to the defense, the court must immediately schedule a bail hearing and set the amount of bail.

A person charged with a lesser offense, including manslaughter, is not subject to this denial rule and is generally bailable, although other provisions of Section 15 allow bail to be denied for some repeat violent offenders and for certain violent felonies committed while on bail, probation or parole.

Authority: Const 1963, art 1, s 15; MCL 765.5. Reviewed Oct. 2026.

A person died after using drugs I supplied. Can that be charged as a homicide?

Michigan has a specific felony for it. Under MCL 750.317a, a person who delivers a schedule 1 or 2 controlled substance, other than marijuana, in violation of MCL 333.7401 that is consumed by that person or anyone else and causes a death is guilty of a felony punishable by life or any term of years. The Michigan Supreme Court has held it requires only the general intent to deliver, not an intent that anyone die.

MCL 750.317a, effective January 1, 2006, provides that a person who delivers a schedule 1 or 2 controlled substance, other than marijuana, to another person in violation of section 7401 of the public health code (MCL 333.7401), that is consumed by that person or any other person and that causes the death of that person or other person is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for life or any term of years. The statute sits next to the murder statutes in the penal code, but it is a separate offense.

The Michigan Supreme Court has explained the offense in two decisions. In People v Plunkett, 485 Mich 50, 60 (2010), the Court held that MCL 750.317a is a general-intent crime and does not require the intent that death occur from the controlled substance; the intent required is the same as for delivery under MCL 333.7401(2)(a). It also described the statute as punishing a person's role in placing the controlled substance in the stream of commerce, even when the person is not directly linked to the resulting death. In People v McBurrows, 504 Mich 308 (2019), the Court held that MCL 750.317a creates a crime distinct from MCL 333.7401 with its own elements: (1) delivery to another person, (2) of a schedule 1 or 2 controlled substance, excluding marijuana, (3) with intent to deliver a controlled substance as proscribed by MCL 333.7401, (4) consumption of the controlled substance by a person, and (5) death that results from the consumption. Because death is an element, it must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Causation therefore stays in dispute in these cases. McBurrows did not set out a specific causation test, and the model instruction on causation in homicide cases, M Crim JI 16.15, tells jurors that it is not enough that the defendant's act made death possible; the death must be the natural or necessary result of the act. Other charges are separate questions with their own elements. MCL 750.316(1)(b) lists a "major controlled substance offense" as a felony-murder predicate, defined in MCL 750.316(4)(c) by reference to violations of MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i)-(iii) and 333.7403(2)(a)(i)-(iii) and conspiracy to commit them.

Authority: MCL 750.317a; People v Plunkett, 485 Mich 50, 60 (2010); People v McBurrows, 504 Mich 308 (2019); MCL 750.316(1)(b), (4)(c); M Crim JI 16.15. Reviewed Oct. 2026.

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This page provides general information about Michigan law and is not legal advice. Reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Laws change and every case turns on its own facts. Consult a licensed attorney about your specific situation.

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