Misdemeanor cases in district court in Michigan

Yes, for purposes of the Code of Criminal Procedure. MCL 761.1(f) defines a felony as an offense punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year or one the law expressly designates a felony. In People v Smith, the Michigan Supreme Court held that a Penal Code two-year misdemeanor falls within that definition and counts as a felony under the habitual offender, probation, and consecutive sentencing statutes. A misdemeanor with no punishment prescribed carries at most 90 days, a $500 fine, or both (MCL 750.504).

The label in the Penal Code does not decide this. The Code of Criminal Procedure has its own definitions. Under MCL 761.1(f), a felony is an offense punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year, or one the law expressly designates a felony. Under MCL 761.1(n), a misdemeanor is a violation of a penal law that is not a felony. People v Smith addressed offenses the Penal Code calls misdemeanors but punishes by up to two years, and held that they fall within the Code of Criminal Procedure's definition of felony and may be treated as felonies under its habitual offender, probation, and consecutive sentencing provisions. In People v Washington, the Michigan Supreme Court described Smith that way, explained that a label in one code does not carry over to another, and treated part of Smith's introductory statement about the Penal Code as dictum. A different default applies when a statute makes conduct a misdemeanor but states no punishment: MCL 750.504 sets a maximum of 90 days in jail, a $500 fine, or both. MCL 761.1(m) separately defines a "minor offense" as one with a maximum of 92 days and a $1,000 fine. So read the maximum penalty in the charging statute itself, because it decides which rules apply.

Authority: MCL 761.1; MCL 750.504; People v Smith, 423 Mich 427 (1985); People v Washington, 501 Mich 342 (2018). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Sometimes, but less often than the court rule's wording suggests. MCR 6.610(G)(3) bars using a district court conviction to enhance a later charge or sentence if you were entitled to an appointed lawyer, had none, and did not waive one. But in People v Reichenbach, the Michigan Supreme Court held that an uncounseled misdemeanor that did not result in actual jail time could still enhance a later drunk driving charge. Whether the rule's newer wording about suspended jail sentences changes that is unsettled, so the facts of the old case matter.

MCR 6.610(G)(3) says a district court conviction may not be used to enhance a later charge or sentence if you were entitled to an appointed lawyer under MCR 6.610(D)(2), had none, and did not waive counsel. Under MCR 6.610(D)(3), waiver requires that you were told of the right and waived it in writing or on the record. The rule reads broader than the case law. In People v Reichenbach, the Michigan Supreme Court applied an earlier version of the rule to a prior with a fine or 60 days, which the defendant paid. It held that under the federal and Michigan constitutions the right to appointed trial counsel attaches only on actual imprisonment, that suspended sentences and probation are not actual imprisonment, and that the prior could enhance a later drunk driving charge. The Court of Appeals decision it affirmed, and People v Asquini, held the rule's enhancement bar invalid to the extent it goes beyond the Constitution. A published footnote in People v Clement says a prior with no actual imprisonment may enhance a later charge whether or not you had a lawyer. The open point is the rule's current wording, which reaches cases where jail is possible "even if suspended." Alabama v Shelton held that a suspended jail sentence cannot be imposed without counsel, but it did not decide whether an uncounseled conviction may enhance a later charge. The authorities listed here include no published Michigan decision deciding whether the newer wording revives the bar, so an old prior should not be assumed to be excluded. Get the file and any plea transcript and look for a lawyer, a waiver, and whether jail was imposed.

Authority: MCR 6.610(D)(2), (D)(3) and (G)(3); People v Reichenbach, 459 Mich 109 (1998); Alabama v Shelton, 535 US 654 (2002); Argersinger v Hamlin, 407 US 25 (1972); People v Reichenbach, 224 Mich App 186; 568 NW2d 383 (1997); People v Asquini, 227 Mich App 702; 577 NW2d 142 (1998); People v Clement, 254 Mich App 387; 657 NW2d 172 (2002). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Yes, if you are indigent and the court imposed a sentence of incarceration, even a suspended one. Under MCR 6.625(B), the local appointing authority must appoint a lawyer if you file a request, or ask on the record, within 14 days after sentencing. The court must tell you about this right and the 14-day deadline right after imposing the sentence (MCR 6.610(G)(4)).

MCR 6.625(A) says an appeal from a misdemeanor case is governed by subchapter 7.100. Under MCR 6.625(B), if the court imposed a sentence of incarceration, even if suspended, and you are indigent, the local indigent criminal defense system's appointing authority must appoint a lawyer if you file a request within 14 days after sentencing or make the request on the record. If you ask on the record, the court must tell the appointing authority that same day. Unless a postjudgment motion is pending, the authority must act within 14 days of receiving the request. If indigency was not previously determined, or you ask for a redetermination, MCR 6.625(C) has the court decide it unless the funding unit has given that task to its appointing authority. When a lawyer is appointed, the 21-day appeal period starts on the day of the appointment under subrule (B) but on the day the notice of appointment is filed under subrule (D), so confirm the date with the court. MCR 6.610(G)(4) requires the judge to give you this advice immediately after a jail sentence. A fine-only sentence is a different situation. The 14 days is the deadline to ask for a lawyer, not to appeal. Put the request in writing and keep a copy.

Authority: MCR 6.625(A) to (D); MCR 6.610(G)(4). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Sometimes, but it is up to the court. MCR 6.610(F)(7) allows a written guilty or no contest plea without a personal appearance if the court finds it proper given the circumstances and possible sentences, you acknowledge guilt or no contest and waive your trial rights in writing, and the court is satisfied the waiver is voluntary. MCR 6.610(D)(4) separately lets the court accept a not guilty plea or standing mute without a formal arraignment.

These are two different tools. Under MCR 6.610(D)(4), the court may allow a not guilty plea, or standing mute, without formal arraignment if a written statement is filed, signed by you and any defense lawyer of record, reciting the charge, the maximum sentence, your rights at arraignment, and the plea. The court may require a bond. Under MCR 6.610(F)(7), a written guilty or no contest plea is permissible without a personal appearance and without the usual support for a finding of guilt only if three things are true: the court decides that the circumstances and the range of possible sentences make it proper; you acknowledge guilt or no contest in a writing placed in the district court file and waive in writing the trial rights listed in MCR 6.610(F)(3)(b); and the court is satisfied the waiver is voluntary. Both are options the court may allow, not rights. A written plea is still a plea: you give up the rights to call witnesses, cross-examine, remain silent, and the presumption of innocence, and you may not challenge the plea on appeal for noncompliance with these rules unless you first moved in the trial court to withdraw it (MCR 6.610(F)(8)(a)). Before signing, confirm the maximum penalty and whether jail is possible, and compare the form with the charging document.

Authority: MCR 6.610(D)(4), (F)(3)(b), (F)(7) and (F)(8)(a). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

On request, the prosecutor must give you exculpatory information, police reports and interrogation records, statements by you, a codefendant or an accomplice, search warrant papers, and any plea or immunity agreement for testimony (MCR 6.201). MCR 6.610(E)(1) applies that rule to misdemeanors, except the mandatory disclosure of witnesses, witness statements, expert information, impeachment records, and exhibits in MCR 6.201(A). That part applies only if you elect to request it, and then you must disclose in return (MCR 6.610(E)(2)).

MCR 6.610(E)(1) says MCR 6.201 applies in all misdemeanor proceedings except MCR 6.201(A). So the prosecutor's duty to provide information known to the prosecuting attorney applies on request: any exculpatory information or evidence known to the prosecutor; any police report and interrogation records, except parts about a continuing investigation and certain identifiers that may be redacted; statements by you, a codefendant, or an accomplice; any affidavit, warrant, and return for a search or seizure; and any plea agreement, grant of immunity, or agreement for testimony. MCR 6.201(A) is the mandatory disclosure of witness names and addresses, witness statements, opinion-witness information, criminal records for impeachment, and tangible evidence. In a misdemeanor it applies only if you elect to request it under MCR 6.610(E)(2), and if the prosecutor complies you must then comply too. That is a real choice, because requesting the prosecutor's witness list means giving up the same information about your own witnesses. Unless the court orders otherwise, each side must comply within 21 days of a request, the duty to disclose continues without a new request, and if a party does not comply the court may order disclosure, grant a continuance, or bar undisclosed evidence. Make the request in writing and keep a copy.

Authority: MCR 6.610(E); MCR 6.201. Reviewed Oct. 2026.