Discrimination and disability rights in Michigan

The Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq., bars discrimination in employment, education, public accommodations and public services, and real estate transactions, and bars retaliation for opposing violations or filing a charge. Protected characteristics now include sexual orientation and gender identity or expression, as well as race, color, religion, national origin, age, sex, and marital status.

MCL 37.2202 bars an employer from discriminating because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, height, weight, or marital status. MCL 37.2302 bars denying the full and equal enjoyment of a place of public accommodation or public service for most of those characteristics, but height and weight are not on that list. MCL 37.2502 covers real estate transactions and adds familial status. MCL 37.2402 bars educational institutions from discriminating against students and applicants because of religion, race, color, national origin, sex, sexual orientation, or gender identity or expression; age and marital status are not on that list. MCL 37.2701 prohibits retaliation against a person who opposed a violation or participated in a proceeding under the act. The 2023 amendments, effective February 13, 2024, wrote sexual orientation and gender identity or expression into the statute. Before that, the Michigan Supreme Court held in Rouch World v Department of Civil Rights that discrimination because of sex includes discrimination because of sexual orientation. A person who alleges a violation may sue under MCL 37.2801 for injunctive relief or damages. Disability has its own statute, discussed separately.

Authority: MCL 37.2202(1); MCL 37.2302; MCL 37.2502; MCL 37.2402; MCL 37.2701(a); Rouch World, LLC v Dep't of Civil Rights, 510 Mich 398 (2022). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

A civil action under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act is subject to Michigan's three-year period of limitations. Filing a charge with the Department of Civil Rights does not shorten it where the charge ended without a Department hearing and final order. The Michigan Supreme Court also rejected the continuing violations doctrine in Garg, so acts older than the period can be time-barred.

In Garg v Macomb County Community Mental Health Services, the Michigan Supreme Court applied the three-year limitation period to Civil Rights Act claims and held that the continuing violations doctrine is inconsistent with the statute. The period is stated in MCL 600.5805(2) today. Older opinions cite a different subsection because the statute was renumbered. In Major v Village of Newberry, the Court of Appeals held that a charge with the Department of Civil Rights that ended without a hearing did not alter the three-year period and that the plaintiff's circuit court claim was timely because it was filed within three years of accrual. The court noted that when the Department holds a hearing and issues a final order, the complainant and the respondent have 30 days to appeal to circuit court under MCL 37.2606(1). That subsection also lists refusals to issue charges among the appealable final orders of the Civil Rights Commission, so any order should be read closely for appeal rights. The court also found no authority allowing a federal agency's handling of a Title VII charge to control where the plaintiff could file the Elliott-Larsen claim. Separate federal employment claims carry their own agency deadlines that must be tracked separately. Because older acts can be lost, do not wait to see whether things improve.

Authority: Garg v Macomb Co Community Mental Health Services, 472 Mich 263 (2005); Major v Newberry, 316 Mich App 527, 537-539 (2016); MCL 600.5805(2); MCL 37.2801; MCL 37.2606(1). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

MCL 37.2801 lets you sue for injunctive relief or damages, and it defines damages as damages for injury or loss caused by each violation, including reasonable attorney's fees. The Michigan Supreme Court held in Elezovic v Ford Motor Co that an agent of the employer, such as a supervisor, may be individually liable for workplace sexual harassment.

MCL 37.2801(1) allows a person alleging a violation to bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief or damages, or both, and subsection (3) defines damages as damages for injury or loss caused by each violation of the act, including reasonable attorney's fees. In Elezovic v Ford Motor Co, the Michigan Supreme Court reviewed whether a supervisor engaging in sexual harassment may be sued individually. The Court explained that the statute's definition of employer includes an agent and that the act's remedy provision allows damages to be obtained from individuals as well as employers, and it held that if the individual was an agent of the employer, individual liability may exist. The ELCRA does not mirror federal law on this point. What you can recover, such as lost pay, emotional distress damages, and fees, depends on the claim and the proof. Employers face separate rules about notice and corrective action for harassment, which turn on the facts.

Authority: MCL 37.2801(1), (3); Elezovic v Ford Motor Co, 472 Mich 408 (2005). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

MCL 37.2502 bars persons in real estate transactions from discriminating because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, familial status, or marital status. Subsection (3) also bars a landlord of 5 or more rental units from denying or terminating a tenancy, or treating a tenant differently, based on source of income.

Under MCL 37.2502(1), a person engaging in a real estate transaction, or a real estate broker or salesperson, may not refuse to engage in a transaction, discriminate in terms or conditions, refuse to receive or transmit a bona fide offer, refuse to negotiate, misrepresent that property is unavailable, publish a discriminatory advertisement, or discriminate in brokering or appraising, on the listed bases. Since April 2, 2025, subsection (3) separately provides that a landlord of a rental unit shall not, based on the source of income of an otherwise eligible prospective or current tenant, deny or terminate a tenancy, make distinctions in price, terms, or fees, or otherwise deny the unit. Subsection (4) exempts a landlord who, with related entities, has fewer than 5 rental units in Michigan, and MCL 37.2503 exempts some owner-occupied rentals. Disability is not on the ELCRA list, so disability-based housing claims are checked against the federal Fair Housing Act and Michigan's disability statute. A civil action lies under MCL 37.2801. Written communications, listings, and application records are the key proof, so keep copies of each.

Authority: MCL 37.2502(1), (3), (4); MCL 37.2801; MCL 37.2503(1). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

A landlord cannot simply apply a no-pets rule without considering a request. Federal and Michigan housing laws treat a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices or services as discrimination when the accommodation may be necessary to give a person with a disability equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling. The person asking has to show the request is reasonable and necessary. The statutes do not name animals or say what proof a landlord may ask for, so the facts and the request matter.

The federal Fair Housing Act makes it discrimination to refuse to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford a person with a handicap equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling (42 USC 3604(f)(3)(B)). Michigan's Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act has a parallel rule: a person shall not, in connection with a real estate transaction, refuse to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when the accommodations may be necessary to afford the person with a disability equal opportunity to use and enjoy residential real property (MCL 37.1506a(1)(b)). The Michigan act also bars an owner from discriminating in the terms, conditions or privileges of a rental because of a disability, or because of the use of adaptive devices or aids (MCL 37.1502(1)).

A no-pets policy is a rule or policy of the kind these provisions describe, so a request to make an exception for an animal that a person with a disability needs is analyzed as a request for an accommodation. The text of the two statutes does not mention animals by name, and it does not list what a landlord may ask for to confirm the need, so those points are decided from the facts of the request and the cases.

Courts look at whether the request is reasonable and necessary. The Sixth Circuit, whose decisions bind federal courts in Michigan, has explained that equal opportunity means that disabled individuals are entitled to live in the same residences and communities as non-disabled individuals, insofar as that can be accomplished through a reasonable accommodation or modification, and that the necessity element is a causation inquiry that examines whether the requested accommodation would redress injuries that otherwise would prevent a disabled resident from receiving the same enjoyment from the property as a non-disabled person would receive (Hollis v Chestnut Bend Homeowners Ass'n, 760 F3d 531, 541 (6th Cir 2014)). The ultimate burden to prove both the reasonableness and the necessity of the requested accommodation rests with the plaintiff (Hollis, 760 F3d at 544). The Michigan Court of Appeals has said, in a case under the Michigan act, that the requirement of reasonable accommodation does not entail an obligation to do everything humanly possible to accommodate a disabled person, and that a failure to provide a reasonable accommodation only becomes unlawful discrimination when it impairs a person's use and enjoyment of a dwelling (Bachman v Swan Harbour Ass'n, 252 Mich App 400, 418, 421-422 (2002), quoting other authority).

In practice the request is usually made in writing, to the person who manages the property, with a description of the need, and the response is kept. Lease terms, pet fees and deposits, the animal's behavior, and any notice of denial are part of the record. A person who is denied can sue in Michigan under the disability act, which allows a civil action for injunctive relief or damages, and the damages include reasonable attorneys' fees (MCL 37.1606(1), (3)). Federal fair housing complaint deadlines are different from the Michigan deadlines and are checked separately.

Authority: 42 USC 3604(f)(3)(B); MCL 37.1506a(1)(b); MCL 37.1502(1); MCL 37.1606(1), (3); Hollis v Chestnut Bend Homeowners Ass'n, 760 F3d 531, 541, 544 (6th Cir 2014); Bachman v Swan Harbour Ass'n, 252 Mich App 400, 418, 421-422 (2002). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

The Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act bars an employer from refusing to hire, recruit, or promote, discharging, or otherwise discriminating because of a disability or genetic information that is unrelated to the person's ability to perform the job. MCL 37.1606 allows a civil action for injunctive relief or damages, including reasonable attorneys' fees.

MCL 37.1202(1) prohibits an employer from failing or refusing to hire, recruit, or promote an individual, discharging or otherwise discriminating with respect to compensation or terms and conditions, or limiting, segregating, or classifying an employee, because of a disability or genetic information that is unrelated to the individual's ability to perform the duties of the particular job. It also addresses physical or mental examinations that are not directly related to the job and the use of adaptive devices or aids. MCL 37.1606 authorizes a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief or damages, or both, defines damages to include reasonable attorneys' fees, and reduces lost-wage awards by workers' compensation received for the same injury. Section 606 does not state a filing deadline for the lawsuit. The Sixth Circuit has described the PWDCRA as having a three-year limitations period (Pemberton v Bell's Brewery), and the Michigan Supreme Court applied the three years in MCL 600.5805(2) to Elliott-Larsen claims in Garg. The period still has to be confirmed for your facts. Accommodation claims have a separate notice rule: a written request within 182 days under MCL 37.1210(18).

Authority: MCL 37.1202(1); MCL 37.1606(1), (3), (4); Garg v Macomb Co Community Mental Health Services, 472 Mich 263 (2005); Pemberton v Bell's Brewery, Inc, 150 F4th 751 (CA 6, 2025); MCL 37.1210(18). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Yes. Under MCL 37.1210(18), a person with a disability may allege a failure to accommodate under the employment article only if the person notifies the employer in writing of the need for accommodation within 182 days after the person knew or reasonably should have known that an accommodation was needed.

MCL 37.1210(18) says a person with a disability may allege a violation regarding a failure to accommodate under the employment article only if the person notifies the person, meaning the employer, in writing of the need for accommodation within 182 days after the date the person knew or reasonably should have known that an accommodation was needed. MCL 37.1606(5) repeats the condition, barring a civil action for failure to accommodate unless the person gave the notice required by section 210(18). Subsection (19) of section 210 requires a person to post notices or use other appropriate means to tell employees and job applicants about the requirements of subsection (18), and MCL 37.1606(5) says the notice condition on a lawsuit does not apply if the employer failed to comply with that posting requirement. The safest practice is to put the request in writing, such as an email, date it, describe the limitation and the change you need, and keep a copy. Verbal requests alone can create problems later.

Authority: MCL 37.1210(18), (19); MCL 37.1606(5). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Yes for most businesses open to the public. Title III of the ADA bars discrimination in the full and equal enjoyment of a place of public accommodation, and it includes a failure to remove architectural barriers in existing facilities where removal is readily achievable and a failure to make reasonable modifications to policies. A private person can sue for an injunction, which can include an order to alter the facility. Michigan's disability civil rights act separately lets a person sue for injunctive relief or damages.

Title III of the ADA says that no individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases, or operates one (42 USC 12182(a)). The statute lists the covered private businesses, including restaurants and bars, grocery and clothing stores, shopping centers, banks, gas stations, offices of lawyers and accountants, pharmacies, professional offices of health care providers, hospitals, hotels, gyms and many others (42 USC 12181(7)).

For an entrance, the key rule is the barrier removal provision. Discrimination includes a failure to remove architectural barriers, and communication barriers that are structural in nature, in existing facilities where such removal is readily achievable, and, where removal is not readily achievable, a failure to make the goods and services available through alternative methods if those methods are readily achievable (42 USC 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv), (v)). Readily achievable means easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense, and the factors include the nature and cost of the action and the financial resources of the facility and of the business (42 USC 12181(9)). Services are covered too: discrimination includes a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when necessary to afford goods and services to people with disabilities, unless the business shows the change would fundamentally alter their nature, and a failure to provide auxiliary aids and services unless that would fundamentally alter the service or be an undue burden (42 USC 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii), (iii)).

A private person who is being subjected to discrimination, or has reasonable grounds to believe discrimination is about to occur in violation of the new construction provision, may use the remedies and procedures of 42 USC 2000a-3(a), which provides for a civil action for preventive relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order or other order (42 USC 12188(a)(1)). For barrier violations, injunctive relief includes an order to alter facilities to make them readily accessible and usable to the extent the ADA requires, and where appropriate an auxiliary aid or service, a policy change or alternative methods (42 USC 12188(a)(2)). A person need not engage in a futile gesture if the person has actual notice that the business does not intend to comply (42 USC 12188(a)(1)). The court may allow the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee, including litigation expenses and costs (42 USC 12205). Monetary damages appear in the federal text for actions brought by the Attorney General (42 USC 12188(b)(2)(B)).

Michigan law adds its own claim. The Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act bars a person from denying an individual the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations of a place of public accommodation or public service because of a disability that is unrelated to the individual's ability to use and benefit from them, or because the individual uses adaptive devices or aids (MCL 37.1302(a)). A place of public accommodation includes a business, educational institution, refreshment, entertainment, recreation, health or transportation facility of any kind (MCL 37.1301(a)). A person alleging a violation may bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief or damages, or both, and damages include reasonable attorneys' fees (MCL 37.1606(1), (3)). Photographs of the entrance, measurements, the date, and any written request or complaint to the business are the usual proof.

Authority: 42 USC 12181(7), (9); 42 USC 12182(a), (b)(2)(A)(ii)-(v); 42 USC 12188(a); 42 USC 2000a-3(a); 42 USC 12205; MCL 37.1301(a); MCL 37.1302(a); MCL 37.1606(1), (3). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Yes. Title II of the ADA bars a public entity from excluding a qualified individual with a disability from its services, programs, or activities, or discriminating against the person. In Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v Yeskey, the Supreme Court held that state prisons fall squarely within the statutory definition of public entity.

42 USC 12132 provides that no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of that disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity. Yeskey held that state prisons fall within the definition of public entity, which includes any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government, and that modern prisons provide recreational activities, medical services, and educational and vocational programs that disabled prisoners may be excluded from. The same reasoning reaches other state and local government entities, and Tennessee v Lane, 541 US 509 (2004), upheld Title II as applied to access to the courts. For Michigan, that can include county jails, city services, and public programs. Typical claims concern access to programs, communication, and accommodations in custody. Remedies and deadlines differ from section 1983 claims, and they should be checked for each defendant and claim.

Authority: 42 USC 12132; Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v Yeskey, 524 US 206, 209-210 (1998); Tennessee v Lane, 541 US 509, 531 (2004). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Not on the basis of disability, and not through deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Title II of the ADA covers state prisons and local jails, and a qualified individual includes someone who meets the requirements with reasonable modifications or the removal of barriers. Section 504 reaches programs that receive federal funds. The Eighth Amendment bars deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. A person in custody generally has to use the facility's grievance process before filing suit.

Title II of the ADA provides that no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of that disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity (42 USC 12132). A public entity includes any State or local government and any department, agency or other instrumentality of one, which reaches county jails and the state prison system (42 USC 12131(1)). The Supreme Court held that state prisons fall squarely within that definition (Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v Yeskey, 524 US 206, 210 (1998)). A qualified individual is one who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the services or programs (42 USC 12131(2)). That definition is why requests such as a wheelchair, an accessible cell or shower, or a change to a medication schedule are framed as requests for modification or barrier removal. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act has a similar rule for any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance, including the operations of a department or agency of a State or local government (29 USC 794(a), (b)(1)(A)).

Medical care has its own constitutional standard. The Supreme Court held that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment (Estelle v Gamble, 429 US 97, 104 (1976)). The Court also said that a complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment (Estelle, 429 US at 105), so records that show what was prescribed, what was withheld and what the facility knew are important. As to damages against a State under Title II, the Court held that insofar as Title II creates a private cause of action for damages against the States for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity (United States v Georgia, 546 US 151, 159 (2006)).

Procedure is strict. No action may be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 or any other federal law by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison or other correctional facility until the administrative remedies that are available are exhausted (42 USC 1997e(a)). The Supreme Court has said that a court may not excuse a failure to exhaust, even to take special circumstances into account, but that an inmate need exhaust only remedies that are available (Ross v Blake, 578 US 632; 136 S Ct 1850, 1856, 1858 (2016)). A prisoner also may not bring a federal civil action for mental or emotional injury suffered in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or a sexual act, and attorney's fee awards in prisoner actions are limited (42 USC 1997e(d), (e)). So the grievance, with its date, the reason for the denial, and any answer, should be kept from the start.

Michigan's own disability act has a carve-out. Its definition of public service excludes a state or county correctional facility with respect to actions or decisions regarding an individual serving a sentence of imprisonment (MCL 37.1301(b)). The legislature's published notes to that section add that the same language, as added to the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, was held unconstitutional, so how far the carve-out reaches under the disability act should be checked before it is relied on in either direction. For a person in custody, the federal claims above are the starting point.

Authority: 42 USC 12131(1), (2); 42 USC 12132; 29 USC 794(a), (b)(1)(A); 42 USC 1997e(a), (d), (e); Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v Yeskey, 524 US 206, 210 (1998); Estelle v Gamble, 429 US 97, 104-105 (1976); United States v Georgia, 546 US 151, 159 (2006); Ross v Blake, 578 US 632; 136 S Ct 1850, 1856, 1858 (2016); MCL 37.1301(b). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

You can sue a school that receives federal funds when it knew of the harassment and responded with deliberate indifference. Title IX bars sex discrimination in any education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. For money damages over a teacher's harassment, Gebser v Lago Vista requires that an official with authority to institute corrective measures had actual knowledge and was deliberately indifferent. For peer harassment, Davis v Monroe County requires harassment so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it deprives access to educational opportunities.

20 USC 1681(a) provides that no person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. In Gebser, the Supreme Court held that damages for a teacher's harassment are available only if an official who at a minimum has authority to address the discrimination and institute corrective measures has actual knowledge and fails to respond adequately, which the Court described as deliberate indifference. Davis v Monroe County held that a funding recipient is liable in damages for student-on-student harassment only where it is deliberately indifferent to harassment of which it has actual knowledge that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it deprives the victim of access to educational opportunities or benefits. Title IX borrows the forum state's limitations period for personal injury actions (Ratliff v Ohio State University), which in Michigan is the 3 years in MCL 600.5805(2), while federal law decides when the claim begins to run. 42 USC 1988(b) allows fees to a prevailing party in Title IX actions. What was reported, to whom, and what the school did next are the key facts, so keep your emails and any notice you gave.

Authority: 20 USC 1681(a); Gebser v Lago Vista Indep School Dist, 524 US 274, 290 (1998); Davis v Monroe Co Bd of Ed, 526 US 629, 650 (1999); 42 USC 1988(b); Ratliff v Ohio State Univ, 60 F4th 359 (CA 6, 2023); MCL 600.5805(2). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

A parent can present a complaint about any matter relating to the identification, evaluation or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education, and ask for an impartial due process hearing. The request for a hearing must generally be made within 2 years of when the parent knew or should have known of the problem. Parents can also file a complaint with the State educational agency. A separate Section 504 or ADA claim may require the same process first if it seeks relief the IDEA also provides.

An individualized education program is a right under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. The Act requires procedural safeguards, including an opportunity for any party to present a complaint with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to the child (20 USC 1415(a), (b)(6)(A)). Once a complaint is received, the parents or the school district have an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing, which is conducted by the State educational agency or by the local educational agency as State law provides (20 USC 1415(f)(1)(A)). Before the hearing, the district must convene a resolution meeting with the parents within 15 days of receiving the parents' complaint, unless the parties agree in writing to waive it or to use mediation, and if the complaint is not resolved to the parents' satisfaction within 30 days the hearing may occur (20 USC 1415(f)(1)(B)(i), (ii)).

Timing matters. A parent or agency must request the hearing within 2 years of the date the parent or agency knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the complaint, or, if the State has an explicit time limitation, in the time State law allows, and the time limit does not apply to a parent who was prevented from requesting a hearing by the district's specific misrepresentations that it had resolved the problem or by its withholding of information the Act required it to provide (20 USC 1415(f)(3)(C), (D)). A party aggrieved by the hearing decision has 90 days from the decision to bring a civil action, or the time State law allows (20 USC 1415(i)(2)(B)). A parent who prevails may be awarded reasonable attorneys' fees in the court's discretion (20 USC 1415(i)(3)(B)). The Act also does not affect a parent's right to file a complaint with the State educational agency (20 USC 1415(f)(3)(F)).

While a proceeding is pending, unless the agency and the parents agree otherwise, the child generally remains in the then-current educational placement (20 USC 1415(j)).

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is a separate law. It provides that no otherwise qualified individual with a disability shall, solely by reason of disability, be excluded from, denied the benefits of, or subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance, and a local educational agency or other school system is within the definition of program or activity (29 USC 794(a), (b)(2)(B)). The IDEA says its provisions do not restrict the rights and remedies under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act or other federal laws, except that before a civil action under those laws seeking relief that is also available under the IDEA, the IDEA hearing procedures must be exhausted to the same extent (20 USC 1415(l)). The Supreme Court has explained that exhaustion is not necessary when the gravamen of the plaintiff's suit is something other than the denial of a free appropriate public education, the central thing the IDEA provides, in a case involving a Michigan school district that refused to let a student bring a service dog to class (Fry v Napoleon Community Schools, 580 US 154; 137 S Ct 743 (2017)). In another case involving a Michigan school district, the Court held that the IDEA exhaustion requirement did not bar an ADA suit by a former student seeking compensatory damages, because the IDEA cannot provide that remedy (Perez v Sturgis Public Schools, 598 US 142 (2023)).

Written records drive these cases: the IEP or plan itself, progress reports, emails with the school, attendance and discipline records, and notes of meetings. A written request to the school to carry out a specific part of the plan, with the date, is a useful first step.

Authority: 20 USC 1415(a), (b)(6), (f)(1), (f)(3)(C), (D), (F), (i)(2)(B), (i)(3)(B), (j), (l); 29 USC 794(a), (b)(2)(B); Fry v Napoleon Community Schools, 580 US 154; 137 S Ct 743, 750 (2017); Perez v Sturgis Public Schools, 598 US 142, 147 (2023). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Yes, if the school or agency receives federal financial assistance and the discrimination was intentional. Title VI bars discrimination on the ground of race, color, or national origin under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. Under Alexander v Sandoval, there is no private right of action to enforce disparate-impact regulations, so a private Title VI suit generally has to rest on intentional discrimination.

42 USC 2000d says no person shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. Alexander v Sandoval held that the private right of action to enforce section 601 does not include a private right to enforce the agency regulations that forbid disparate impacts, because those regulations prohibit conduct that the statute itself does not. So a private plaintiff in Michigan should expect to prove intentional discrimination. 42 USC 1988(b) allows fees to a prevailing party in Title VI actions. Michigan's Elliott-Larsen Act is a separate source of claims and carries different elements and a three-year period. Which law applies depends on who the defendant is and where the funding comes from.

Authority: 42 USC 2000d; Alexander v Sandoval, 532 US 275, 285 (2001); 42 USC 1988(b). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

You may file a complaint with HUD within one year after the discriminatory housing practice occurred or ended, or sue in federal or state court within 2 years after it occurred or ended. Time during which an administrative proceeding on the same practice is pending is not counted toward the 2 years. A conciliation agreement or an administrative hearing on a HUD charge can cut off a court case.

Under 42 USC 3610(a)(1)(A), an aggrieved person may file a complaint with the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development not later than one year after an alleged discriminatory housing practice has occurred or terminated. Under 42 USC 3613(a)(1)(A), an aggrieved person may sue in an appropriate federal district court or state court not later than 2 years after the occurrence or termination of the practice, or the breach of a conciliation agreement, whichever occurs last. Section 3613(a)(1)(B) excludes any time during which an administrative proceeding on the complaint was pending, and section 3613(a)(2) says a person may sue whether or not a complaint was filed, but not after consenting to a conciliation agreement, except to enforce it. Section 3613(a)(3) bars a suit once an administrative law judge has begun a hearing on a HUD charge. A court may award actual and punitive damages and injunctive relief, and may allow a prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee and costs. Michigan's Elliott-Larsen Act also covers many housing practices, with a different period that must be checked separately. Preserve the advertisement, messages, applications, and notes of conversations.

Authority: 42 USC 3610(a)(1)(A)(i); 42 USC 3613(a)(1)(A)-(B), (a)(2), (a)(3), (c); MCL 37.2502. Reviewed Oct. 2026.