Municipal liability, qualified immunity and governmental immunity in Michigan

Under Section 1983, only if the violation was caused by the government's own policy or custom. Under Monell v Department of Social Services, a local government is not liable on a respondeat superior theory just because it employs the officer. The Sixth Circuit recognizes four ways to show a policy or custom, and a city does not get to rely on its officers' good faith as a defense.

Monell holds that local governments are liable under Section 1983 when official policy or custom causes the constitutional violation, but not solely because they employ a wrongdoer. In Thomas v City of Chattanooga, the Sixth Circuit listed four avenues to prove a policy or custom: the municipality's legislative enactments or official agency policies, actions taken by officials with final decision-making authority, a policy of inadequate training or supervision, or a custom of tolerance of or acquiescence in federal rights violations. A custom theory requires a clear and persistent pattern, so one incident is rarely enough. Owen v City of Independence holds that a municipality may not assert the good faith of its officers as a defense to liability, so qualified immunity belongs to individual officers, not to the city. Evidence for these claims often comes from policies, prior complaints, training records, and discipline files, which is why early records requests and discovery matter. State-law claims against a city or county are a separate analysis, because MCL 691.1407(1) makes a governmental agency immune from tort liability when it is exercising a governmental function, subject to statutory exceptions. Which entity employed the officer affects whom to name.

Authority: Monell v Dep't of Social Services, 436 US 658, 691 (1978); Thomas v Chattanooga, 398 F3d 426, 429 (CA 6, 2005); Owen v City of Independence, 445 US 622, 638 (1980); MCL 691.1407(1). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

The city or county that runs the department, along with the individual officers. Federal courts in Michigan have said that municipal agencies of Michigan cities, such as a police department, are not legally distinct entities that can be sued under Section 1983, and the Sixth Circuit has treated the county as the proper party in place of a sheriff's department. The Supreme Court has held that a local government itself is a suable person under Section 1983.

Section 1983 makes liable every person who, under color of state law, subjects a person to the deprivation of constitutional rights, in an action at law, a suit in equity, or another proper proceeding for redress (42 USC 1983). In Monell v New York City Dep't of Social Services, the Supreme Court held that local governing bodies can be sued directly under Section 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where the action alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers (Monell, 436 US at 690). That is why the usual defendant is the city, village or county, and not a division of it.

Whether a department can be sued in its own name is a question of capacity. For a party that is not an individual or a corporation, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure look to the law of the state where the court is located (FRCP 17(b)(3)). A federal judge in the Eastern District of Michigan wrote, in a case brought against the Flint Police Department and several officers, that it is well settled that municipal agencies of cities in the State of Michigan are not legally distinct entities amenable to suit under Section 1983 (Cummings v Flint Police Dep't, 735 F Supp 3d 810 (ED Mich 2024)). The Sixth Circuit reasoned the same way in a Tennessee case: because the police department was not an entity that could be sued, the county was the proper party to answer the complaint (Matthews v Jones, 35 F3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir 1994)). A Michigan sheriff's office raises the same question, and the county is the safer defendant.

In practice, a complaint over police conduct usually names the city or county, each officer who took part (by name if known, and as unknown officers to be identified in discovery if not), and sometimes the chief or sheriff. Suing the city or county does not by itself make it liable. A local government is responsible under Section 1983 only for its own policy or custom, and not just because it employs the officer (Monell, 436 US at 694). Naming the wrong entity can lead to dismissal of that defendant and lost time, so the employer and the governing body should be identified before filing.

Authority: 42 USC 1983; Monell v New York City Dep't of Social Servs, 436 US 658, 690-691, 694 (1978); FRCP 17(b)(3); Cummings v Flint Police Dep't, 735 F Supp 3d 810 (ED Mich 2024); Matthews v Jones, 35 F3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir 1994). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

A single decision can be enough when it is made by an official who has final authority to set the government's policy on that subject. The Supreme Court has held that municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances. A mistake by an ordinary employee, or a departure from policy set by someone else, does not qualify, and a custom claim does need a pattern.

The rule comes from Pembaur v City of Cincinnati. The Supreme Court wrote that municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances, and that where action is directed by those who establish governmental policy, the municipality is equally responsible whether that action is to be taken only once or to be taken repeatedly (Pembaur, 475 US at 480-481). The theory fits the Monell rule that a local government is liable when its own decision or policy causes the violation (Monell, 436 US at 694). A decision by the governing body itself, or by an official with final authority over the subject, is the government's own act.

The limit is who made the decision. Under the Praprotnik plurality, when an official's discretionary decisions are constrained by policies that the official did not make, those policies, and not the subordinate's departures from them, are the act of the municipality (City of St Louis v Praprotnik, 485 US 112, 127 (1988)). A supervisor who bends a rule, or an officer who ignores training, is therefore not a final policymaker just because the supervisor held a position of some authority. The Sixth Circuit lists, as one of four ways to prove a policy or custom, that an official with final decision making authority ratified illegal actions (Hart v City of Grand Rapids, 138 F4th 409 (6th Cir 2025), quoting earlier Sixth Circuit decisions).

A claim built on a custom, or on a failure to train or investigate, is different because those theories rest on notice from prior incidents, and a single incident ordinarily does not supply it. Evidence on a single-decision claim is usually written: the order, the resolution, the email, the directive, and any record showing who had the authority to make it.

Authority: Pembaur v City of Cincinnati, 475 US 469, 480-481 (1986); City of St Louis v Praprotnik, 485 US 112, 127 (1988); Monell v New York City Dep't of Social Servs, 436 US 658, 690-691, 694 (1978); Hart v City of Grand Rapids, 138 F4th 409 (6th Cir 2025). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

It is a question of state law, and the judge decides it, based on the authority that state and local law give the official over the subject involved. Michigan statutes give the sheriff charge and custody of the county jail, and in a Calhoun County case the Sixth Circuit noted that it was undisputed that the sheriff held final policymaking authority over the jail. An official whose choices are limited by policies set by others generally is not the final policymaker.

A Section 1983 claim based on a decision by a policymaker depends on proving that the official had final authority over the subject, and the courts treat the identity of that official as a legal question. The Praprotnik plurality said that the identification of policymaking officials is a question of state law (City of St Louis v Praprotnik, 485 US 112, 124 (1988)). In Jett v Dallas Independent School District, the Court said that identifying the officials whose decisions represent the official policy of the local governmental unit is a legal question for the trial judge to resolve before the case goes to the jury (Jett, 491 US 701, 737 (1989)). Because state law decides who holds final authority, the sources are the statutes, the local charter and the ordinances that distribute power in the particular government, and the question is not settled by the official's title. An official whose discretionary decisions are constrained by policies not of that official's making is not setting final policy on the point (Praprotnik, 485 US at 127).

Michigan law answers the question for a few offices. A Michigan sheriff has by statute the charge and custody of the jails of the county and of the prisoners in them, which the sheriff may keep personally or through a deputy or jailer (MCL 51.75). In Miller v Calhoun County, a Sixth Circuit case about a Michigan county jail, the court noted that there was no dispute that under state law the sheriff enjoyed final policymaking authority over the correctional facility (Miller v Calhoun Cnty, 408 F3d 803, 814 (6th Cir 2005)). That statement reflects what the parties conceded in that case, so it is evidence of how courts treat the office and not a rule for every subject a sheriff touches. For a city, the answer is in the charter and ordinances, which set out whether the council, the mayor or manager, or the chief decides a given matter.

Because the judge decides the question, it can be resolved by motion, and the answer determines whether a single decision can bind the government. Charters, ordinances, board resolutions, job descriptions and organizational charts, which are generally public records, are the usual sources.

Authority: City of St Louis v Praprotnik, 485 US 112, 124, 127 (1988); Jett v Dallas Indep Sch Dist, 491 US 701, 737 (1989); Miller v Calhoun Cnty, 408 F3d 803, 814 (6th Cir 2005); MCL 51.75. Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Yes, but the standard is demanding. Under City of Canton v Harris, inadequate police training supports Section 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of people the police contact. A pattern of similar violations by untrained employees is ordinarily necessary under Connick v Thompson.

City of Canton v Harris held that the inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for Section 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact. Connick v Thompson then explained that a pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ordinarily necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train, because without notice that a course of training is deficient, it is hard to say decisionmakers deliberately chose it. Proof can include prior complaints and lawsuits, internal affairs findings, training records and curricula, use of force reports, and policy documents. Courts also ask whether the training deficiency actually caused the violation. Because these claims depend on records held by the city or county, preservation letters and public records requests sent early can help secure them, and discovery is available once a case is filed.

Authority: City of Canton v Harris, 489 US 378, 388 (1989); Connick v Thompson, 563 US 51 (2011). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Only in narrow cases. Under Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County v Brown, a single hiring decision supports liability only where adequate scrutiny of the applicant's background would lead a reasonable policymaker to conclude that the plainly obvious consequence of hiring was the deprivation of a federally protected right. The hiring decision must also be the moving force behind the injury, and the link between the applicant's background and the violation must be strong.

A hiring claim is a form of municipal liability in which the policy is a decision to hire. The Supreme Court in Bryan County explained that a plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights (Bd of the Cnty Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty v Brown, 520 US 397, 404 (1997)). For a hiring decision, the Court held that only where adequate scrutiny of an applicant's background would lead a reasonable policymaker to conclude that the plainly obvious consequence of the decision to hire the applicant would be the deprivation of a third party's federally protected right can the official's failure to adequately scrutinize the applicant's background constitute deliberate indifference (Bryan County, 520 US at 411).

That test is demanding. The Court added that the connection between the background of the particular applicant and the specific constitutional violation alleged must be strong (Bryan County, 520 US at 412). It is not enough that an applicant had some record, or that a better background check would have turned up something. The record must make the particular kind of injury that occurred a plainly obvious consequence of hiring that person. A claim also asks whether the training and supervision after hiring were adequate, which the Supreme Court has said is satisfied only where the deficiency is closely related to the ultimate injury (City of Canton v Harris, 489 US 378, 391 (1989)).

The evidence is the hiring file. Applications, background investigation reports, psychological screening, prior employer references, and prior discipline or complaints against the officer are public or discoverable records, and a request for them often precedes a case. A hiring theory is usually added to claims based on training or supervision and is rarely the only claim.

Authority: Bd of the Cnty Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty v Brown, 520 US 397, 404, 411-412 (1997); City of Canton v Harris, 489 US 378, 391 (1989); Monell v New York City Dep't of Social Servs, 436 US 658, 690-691, 694 (1978). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Not just because of the title. Under Ashcroft v Iqbal, government officials are not liable for subordinates' unconstitutional conduct on a respondeat superior theory. In the Sixth Circuit, a supervisor must at least have implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.

Iqbal explains that because vicarious liability does not apply to Section 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each official, through the official's own individual actions, violated the Constitution. The Sixth Circuit, in Heyerman v County of Calhoun, a case from Michigan involving a county prosecuting attorney, wrote that Section 1983 liability is not premised solely on respondeat superior or the right to control employees, and that a supervisor is not liable unless the supervisor encouraged the specific misconduct or directly participated in it, or at a minimum implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in it. The court distinguished that individual theory from municipal liability. Evidence that a chief or sheriff knew of earlier similar incidents and did nothing, or ordered or approved the conduct, can matter. Official capacity claims against the sheriff are really claims against the county, with the policy or custom requirement (Kentucky v Graham). Both routes should be compared.

Authority: Ashcroft v Iqbal, 556 US 662, 676 (2009); Heyerman v Calhoun Co, 680 F3d 642, 647 (CA 6, 2012); Kentucky v Graham, 473 US 159, 165-166 (1985). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Sometimes, but one poor investigation is not enough. In the Sixth Circuit, a claim that a city ratified misconduct by failing to investigate generally needs an inadequate investigation in the plaintiff's case and also a clear and persistent pattern of inadequate investigations of comparable complaints. In a 2025 Grand Rapids case, a spreadsheet of nearly 90 force complaints, almost all ending in exoneration, was not enough without some detail showing the complaints were well founded and mishandled.

A city's response after an incident can matter, but the Sixth Circuit holds that a failure to investigate or punish is not by itself a city policy. In Hart v City of Grand Rapids, arising from a 2020 demonstration in Grand Rapids, the court recited the four methods of proving municipal liability: an illegal official policy or legislative enactment, ratification of illegal actions by an official with final decision making authority, a policy of inadequate training or supervision, or a custom of tolerance or acquiescence in federal rights violations (Hart, 138 F4th 409 (6th Cir 2025)). The plaintiffs in Hart relied on ratification through a failure to investigate and punish.

The court applied the standard from Pineda v Hamilton County. To establish Monell liability for ratification based on a failure to investigate, a plaintiff needs to show not only an inadequate investigation in this instance but also a clear and persistent pattern of violations in earlier instances, which means evidence of multiple earlier inadequate investigations concerning comparable claims. An allegation of a single failure to investigate a single plaintiff's claim does not meet the standard (Pineda, 977 F3d 483, 494-495 (6th Cir 2020), as quoted in Hart). Testimony from several witnesses about persistent patterns of failure to correct excessive force, or details of past incidents, can support a ratification claim (Hart).

The plaintiffs in Hart offered a spreadsheet listing every reported excessive force claim against the department over five years, which they said showed that nearly 90 complaints produced only two sustained findings. The court held that the spreadsheet was not enough. Every entry in the allegation column read unreasonable force, and the finding column showed only the outcome, so there was no description of the events or of the investigations. The court said that some information indicating that the department failed to properly investigate, or that dismissed complaints were well founded, could have provided the foothold, and it affirmed summary judgment for the City on the municipal claims.

The lesson for a claim is about proof. Complaint files, internal affairs reports, discipline records and the underlying video or reports for earlier incidents are the evidence that courts look for, and they are generally sought through public records requests before suit and through discovery after.

Authority: Hart v City of Grand Rapids, 138 F4th 409 (6th Cir 2025); Pineda v Hamilton Cnty, 977 F3d 483, 494-495 (6th Cir 2020). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Not necessarily. Qualified immunity protects individual officers, not cities, from damages unless they violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights, and it does not end every case. A court may decide either whether a right was violated or whether it was clearly established first.

Pearson v Callahan describes qualified immunity as protecting officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. It balances accountability against the need to shield officials from harassment and distraction when they act reasonably. Courts may choose which of the two questions to address first. Ashcroft v al-Kidd adds that a right is clearly established when its contours are sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would understand that the conduct violates it. No case directly on point is required, but existing precedent must place the question beyond debate. The doctrine applies to individual defendants in damages cases. A city has no qualified immunity. Many cases survive because officers' accounts are contradicted by video or witnesses, and a court deciding summary judgment must credit the plaintiff's evidence and draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor (Tolan v Cotton). Others end on this defense, so it should be analyzed before filing.

Authority: Pearson v Callahan, 555 US 223, 231, 236 (2009); Ashcroft v al-Kidd, 563 US 731, 741 (2011); Owen v City of Independence, 445 US 622, 638 (1980); Tolan v Cotton, 572 US 650, 651 (2014). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Not always. A qualified immunity dismissal of the officer does not mean that no constitutional violation occurred, so the city may still be liable if its policy or custom caused the violation. But if the officer did not commit a constitutional violation at all, the city cannot be held liable for it, even if a city policy might have authorized excessive force.

Qualified immunity and municipal liability answer different questions. Qualified immunity asks whether an individual officer violated clearly established law. The Sixth Circuit has put the point this way: the dismissal of a claim against an officer asserting qualified immunity in no way logically entails that the plaintiff suffered no constitutional deprivation, nor that a municipality may not be liable for that deprivation (Doe v Sullivan County, 956 F2d 545, 554 (6th Cir 1992), quoted in Hart v City of Grand Rapids, 138 F4th 409 (6th Cir 2025)). A court can hold that the law was not clearly established for the officer and still go on to ask whether the city's policy or custom caused a violation.

The opposite result is different. In City of Los Angeles v Heller, a jury returned a verdict for the officer on claims of arrest without probable cause and excessive force, and the Supreme Court held that if a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police officer, the fact that the departmental regulations might have authorized the use of constitutionally excessive force is quite beside the point (City of Los Angeles v Heller, 475 US 796, 799 (1986) (per curiam)). A municipal claim depends on an underlying constitutional violation. If a jury finds that the force used was reasonable, or that probable cause existed, the claim against the city on that incident generally falls with the claim against the officer, as Heller shows.

In Hart, the Sixth Circuit applied both ideas. It affirmed qualified immunity for two officers and the City's summary judgment on the municipal claim, and it reversed qualified immunity for a third officer, with the City's liability resting on whether the plaintiffs could prove a policy or custom (Hart). The practical effect is that a municipal claim is evaluated on its own proof and should be pleaded even when an officer is likely to assert qualified immunity.

Authority: City of Los Angeles v Heller, 475 US 796, 799 (1986) (per curiam); Doe v Sullivan Cnty, 956 F2d 545, 554 (6th Cir 1992); Hart v City of Grand Rapids, 138 F4th 409 (6th Cir 2025). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

The Sixth Circuit looks first to decisions of the Supreme Court, then to its own decisions and those of other courts within the circuit, and finally to decisions of other circuits. The question is whether defendants had fair warning. The facts need not be identical, but the Supreme Court generally requires a prior case with similar circumstances.

Federal courts in Michigan follow Sixth Circuit practice, which is set out in decisions such as Baker v City of Hamilton and Campbell v City of Springboro: in deciding whether a constitutional right is clearly established, the court looks first to decisions of the Supreme Court, then to decisions of the Sixth Circuit and other courts within the circuit, and finally to decisions of other circuits. In Goodwin v City of Painesville, the court quoted the principle that there need not be a case with the exact same fact pattern, or even fundamentally similar facts, and the question is whether the defendants had fair warning that their actions were unconstitutional. The Supreme Court in al-Kidd warns against framing the right too generally and requires precedent that places the question beyond debate, and in Zorn v Linton (2026) it repeated that courts generally need a case in which an officer acting in similar circumstances was held to have violated the Constitution, with the right defined to a high degree of specificity. Because outcomes depend on which prior case a court finds close enough, the specific conduct, such as Taser use, a police dog, or force on a handcuffed person, should be researched before filing.

Authority: Baker v Hamilton, 471 F3d 601, 606 (CA 6, 2006); Campbell v Springboro, 700 F3d 779, 788 (CA 6, 2012); Goodwin v Painesville, 781 F3d 314, 325 (CA 6, 2015); Ashcroft v al-Kidd, 563 US 731, 741-742 (2011); Zorn v Linton, No. 25-297, 607 US 568, 146 S Ct 926 (2026) (per curiam). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

On legal questions, yes. Under Mitchell v Forsyth, a denial of qualified immunity, to the extent it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable final decision. Under Johnson v Jones, an officer does not get an immediate appeal of an order insofar as it decides whether the pretrial record presents a genuine factual dispute for trial.

Mitchell v Forsyth holds that a district court's denial of a qualified immunity claim, to the extent it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable final decision even though the case is not over. Johnson v Jones limits that rule: a defendant entitled to invoke qualified immunity may not appeal a summary judgment order insofar as that order determines whether the pretrial record sets forth a genuine issue of fact for trial. In practice, an officer who loses on a legal question can appeal to the Sixth Circuit, which can add time before a trial, while an officer who loses because the facts are disputed generally does not get that appeal. In the Sixth Circuit, an officer appealing a qualified immunity denial must be willing to concede the most favorable view of the facts to the plaintiff for purposes of the appeal (Thompson v Grida). This answer describes federal court. In a Michigan state court, appeals from orders denying governmental immunity are governed by the Michigan court rules (see MCR 7.202(6)(a)(v)), and how those rules apply to a federal qualified immunity defense raised in state court should be checked separately. This matters for planning. A qualified immunity appeal is a possible step, it may affect timing, and the record built at the start of the case determines how the appeal is framed.

Authority: Mitchell v Forsyth, 472 US 511, 530 (1985); Johnson v Jones, 515 US 304, 319-320 (1995); Thompson v Grida, 656 F3d 365, 367 (CA 6, 2011); MCR 7.202(6)(a)(v). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Usually not. Michigan's governmental tort liability act makes a governmental agency immune from tort liability when it is engaged in a governmental function, except as the act otherwise provides. That immunity does not control federal Section 1983 claims; the Supreme Court said in Martinez v California that a state immunity statute does not control a Section 1983 claim.

MCL 691.1407(1) says that, except as otherwise provided in the act, a governmental agency is immune from tort liability if it is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function. The act contains exceptions in other sections, such as those for highways (MCL 691.1402), government-owned motor vehicles (MCL 691.1405), public buildings (MCL 691.1406), and proprietary functions (MCL 691.1413), and which ones apply depends on the facts. Law enforcement is generally a governmental function, and the act has no general exception for intentional misconduct by the agency itself, so state-law claims over an officer's conduct are often brought against the individual officer, as the entries on officer immunity explain. State tort claims against a city or county, such as negligence, therefore face this immunity defense. Federal claims are different. In Martinez v California, the Supreme Court said that a state immunity statute does not control a Section 1983 claim, and a footnote there quotes a Seventh Circuit decision that conduct wrongful under Section 1983 cannot be immunized by state law. And Felder v Casey held that a state notice-of-claim rule is pre-empted when applied to a Section 1983 action in state court. This is why civil rights cases against Michigan police are usually built on federal claims, with state-law counts added when an exception or another route applies. The structure of the claims depends on the facts.

Authority: MCL 691.1407(1); Martinez v California, 444 US 277, 284 & n 8 (1980); Felder v Casey, 487 US 131, 138 (1988); MCL 691.1402; MCL 691.1405; MCL 691.1406; MCL 691.1413. Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Only in a narrow case. Under MCL 691.1407(2), an officer or employee is immune from tort liability for injury caused while in the course of employment if the officer was acting within the scope of authority, the agency was engaged in a governmental function, and the conduct was not gross negligence that is the proximate cause of the injury.

MCL 691.1407(2) gives each officer and employee of a governmental agency immunity from tort liability for an injury caused while in the course of employment if all three conditions are met: the officer acted or reasonably believed he or she acted within the scope of authority, the agency was engaged in a governmental function, and the conduct does not amount to gross negligence that is the proximate cause of the injury or damage. The statute applies without regard to whether the conduct was discretionary or ministerial. Subsection (8)(a) defines gross negligence as conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results. A plaintiff therefore has to show a very high degree of carelessness, and that the officer's conduct was the proximate cause. The Michigan Supreme Court reads that phrase to mean the one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause of the injury, not just a cause (Robinson v Detroit). Plain negligence by an officer is not enough. Because this standard is demanding, state negligence claims are not necessarily the right route. Federal claims may offer a different standard, and the two should be compared.

Authority: MCL 691.1407(2), (8)(a); Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 445-446 (2000). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Yes, but the officer may have qualified immunity. Michigan preserves the law of intentional torts as it existed before July 7, 1986, and under Odom v Wayne County a governmental employee sued for an intentional tort has qualified immunity if the acts were within the scope of authority, in good faith, and discretionary rather than ministerial, and the employee must raise it as an affirmative defense. State-law assault, battery, and false imprisonment claims must be filed within 2 years under MCL 600.5805(3).

MCL 691.1407(3) says the immunity provisions for officers and employees do not alter the law of intentional torts as it existed before July 7, 1986. In Odom v Wayne County, the Michigan Supreme Court read that language to keep the common-law test from Ross v Consumers Power. A governmental employee is immune from intentional tort liability only if the employee establishes that the challenged acts were undertaken during the course of employment and within, or reasonably believed to be within, the scope of authority, that they were undertaken in good faith, without malice, and that they were discretionary rather than ministerial. The employee must raise governmental immunity as an affirmative defense. Odom involved false imprisonment and malicious prosecution claims, which are intentional torts. The practical effect is that bad faith or malice, such as lying in a report or using force for punishment, matters under state law. Evidence of motive is therefore central. State-law claims for assault, battery, or false imprisonment must be filed within 2 years under MCL 600.5805(3). Malicious prosecution (subsection (7)) and misconduct claims against a sheriff or deputies (subsection (9)) also carry 2 years, which is shorter than the 3-year period for most federal civil rights claims, so do not wait.

Authority: MCL 691.1407(3); Odom v Wayne Co, 482 Mich 459 (2008); MCL 600.5805(3), (7), (9). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Both are available. Section 1983 authorizes an action at law, a suit in equity, or another proper proceeding for redress, and the Supreme Court held in Monell that local governing bodies can be sued for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where the challenged action implements or executes an officially adopted policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision. A prevailing plaintiff may be awarded a reasonable attorney's fee, but a city is immune from punitive damages.

The text of Section 1983 does not limit relief to damages. It makes the defendant liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress (42 USC 1983). Monell held that local governing bodies can be sued directly for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by the body's officers (Monell, 436 US at 690). A city ordinance, a written police department directive, or a council resolution is therefore the kind of target that supports a lawsuit asking a court to declare the rule unconstitutional or to bar its enforcement. Claims for damages and for an order can be pleaded in the same case.

Damages against a local government have a limit. The Supreme Court held in City of Newport v Fact Concerts that a municipality is immune from punitive damages under Section 1983 (City of Newport v Fact Concerts, Inc, 453 US 247, 271 (1981)). Money recovered from the government itself is therefore compensatory.

In an action to enforce Section 1983, the court may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs (42 USC 1988(b)). A person who prevails in a suit to stop a policy therefore may seek fees even when the relief is an injunction and not money.

Authority: 42 USC 1983; 42 USC 1988(b); Monell v New York City Dep't of Social Servs, 436 US 658, 690-691, 694 (1978); City of Newport v Fact Concerts, Inc, 453 US 247, 271 (1981). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Local governments such as cities, counties and local school boards can be sued under Section 1983, subject to the Monell policy or custom rule. The State and its agencies cannot be sued for damages under Section 1983, because they are not persons under the statute. The Supreme Court held that a local school board is more like a county or city than an arm of the State and cannot claim Eleventh Amendment immunity, though the classification of other entities depends on how Michigan law treats them.

Section 1983 reaches local governments and not the State. Monell held that local government units are persons under the statute and limited that holding to local government units that are not considered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes (Monell, 436 US at 690). In Will v Michigan Department of State Police, the Court held that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are persons under Section 1983 (Will, 491 US 58, 71 (1989)), which is why a claim for damages against the State of Michigan, the Michigan State Police or a state department fails under that statute.

A local school board falls on the local side of that line. In Mt Healthy City School District Board of Education v Doyle, the Court concluded that a local school board such as the petitioner was more like a county or city than it was like an arm of the State, and held that it was not entitled to assert Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court (Mt Healthy, 429 US 274, 280-281 (1977)). The Court explained that the answer depends, at least in part, upon the nature of the entity created by state law (Mt Healthy, 429 US at 280). That makes the question one to be answered entity by entity, and the Mt Healthy holding is not a blanket rule for every body created by state law.

Even where a local board can be sued, the Monell limit still applies. The board is liable for its own policy or custom, such as a board vote, an administrative policy, or a decision by the superintendent or another official with final authority, and not just because it employs the person who acted (Monell, 436 US at 694). State-law tort claims are separate. Michigan's governmental tort liability act includes a school district among the political subdivisions it covers, and a governmental agency is immune from tort liability when engaged in a governmental function unless the act provides an exception (MCL 691.1401(e), 691.1407(1)).

Authority: Monell v New York City Dep't of Social Servs, 436 US 658, 690-691, 694 (1978); Will v Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 US 58, 71 (1989); Mt Healthy City Sch Dist Bd of Educ v Doyle, 429 US 274, 280-281 (1977); MCL 691.1401(e); MCL 691.1407(1). Reviewed Oct. 2026.