Jail and prison claims and the PLRA in Michigan

For a pretrial detainee, the Sixth Circuit now applies the subjective standard from Farmer v Brennan: the official must have known of the serious medical risk and disregarded it. The full court so held in Poynter v Shirley (2026), discarding the looser test it adopted in Brawner v Scott County. For a sentenced prisoner, the Eighth Amendment standard in Estelle v Gamble is deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

Estelle v Gamble holds that deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners violates the Eighth Amendment, whether it is shown by prison doctors or by guards who deny or delay care or interfere with prescribed treatment. For people held in a jail before trial, the Fourteenth Amendment governs. From 2021 to 2026, Brawner v Scott County let a detainee proceed without proving the official was subjectively aware of the risk, reasoning from Kingsley v Hendrickson. In Poynter v Shirley (September 2026), the full Sixth Circuit discarded that approach and held that the subjective standard of Farmer v Brennan controls claims by detainees who have not been convicted. Mere negligence is still not enough. Proof usually involves jail medical records, the intake screening, sick call requests, grievance forms, video, and medical opinion testimony about what treatment was needed. Delay in treatment, ignored requests, and failure to follow a doctor's orders are typical themes. Claims against a county or a private medical contractor also require proof of a policy or custom. Preserve every written request you made, and note the dates.

Authority: Poynter v Shirley, No. 25-5188, 2026 WL 2641092 (CA 6, Sept. 8, 2026) (en banc); Brawner v Scott Co, 14 F4th 585 (CA 6, 2021); Estelle v Gamble, 429 US 97, 104 (1976); Kingsley v Hendrickson, 576 US 389 (2015); Farmer v Brennan, 511 US 825, 837 (1994). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Possibly. In West v Atkins, the Supreme Court held that a physician employed by the state to provide medical services to state prison inmates acted under color of state law for purposes of Section 1983. The Sixth Circuit has applied the same reasoning to private companies that provide medical care to county jail inmates, so the state action question is usually met, but you must still prove the underlying violation, and a claim against the company itself needs a policy or custom.

West v Atkins involved a doctor who provided orthopedic services to a state prisoner under a contract. The Court held that the doctor's treatment of the inmate was state action fairly attributable to the State, so he acted under color of state law. The Sixth Circuit has held that private corporations performing the traditional state function of providing medical services to inmates act under color of state law, including at county jails (Rouster v County of Saginaw; Shadrick v Hopkins County). That is why a medical provider under contract with a jail is a common Section 1983 defendant. Being a state actor does not make the provider liable. A plaintiff still has to show deliberate indifference, which in the Sixth Circuit means the subjective standard of Farmer v Brennan for convicted prisoners and, as the full court held in Poynter v Shirley, for pretrial detainees, and in a suit against the company itself, a policy or custom behind the care, because a private corporation is not liable on a respondeat superior theory. Documentation such as intake forms, medication administration records, and sick call slips is central. Michigan medical negligence claims carry their own procedural requirements, so federal and state theories are worth evaluating together.

Authority: West v Atkins, 487 US 42, 54, 57 (1988); Poynter v Shirley, No. 25-5188, 2026 WL 2641092 (CA 6, Sept. 8, 2026) (en banc); Rouster v Cnty of Saginaw, 749 F3d 437, 453 (CA 6, 2014); Shadrick v Hopkins Co, 805 F3d 724, 736 (CA 6, 2015); Farmer v Brennan, 511 US 825, 837 (1994). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Generally not for medical care or treatment. The immunity statute says it does not grant immunity to a governmental agency or its employees for providing medical care or treatment to a patient, except for a patient in a hospital owned or operated by the departments of community health or corrections, and certain search and rescue or tactical operation medical assistants. Whether a particular setting counts depends on the facts.

MCL 691.1407(4) provides that the governmental tort liability act does not grant immunity to a governmental agency, or to an employee or agent of one, with respect to providing medical care or treatment to a patient, with stated exceptions. The exceptions cover a patient in a hospital owned or operated by the department of community health or the department of corrections, and care provided by an uncompensated search and rescue operation medical assistant or tactical operation medical assistant. The same section gives broad immunity for governmental functions generally and for officers unless conduct is gross negligence that is the proximate cause of the injury. So whether a claim involving medical care in a jail or a state facility avoids immunity depends on the setting, who provided care, and what was done. In Briggs v Oakland County, the Court of Appeals applied the exception to a claim over care at a county jail clinic, while noting that deputies who are not medical professionals may argue they were not providing medical care or treatment. The statute has to be read with the specific facts and the cases that apply it. A medical negligence claim also carries separate Michigan procedural requirements, which should be checked at the start.

Authority: MCL 691.1407(4); Briggs v Oakland Co, 276 Mich App 369, 371-372 & n 3 (2007). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Generally yes, if you are in custody when you file. The Prison Litigation Reform Act bars a prisoner from suing over prison conditions under Section 1983 until available administrative remedies are exhausted. Compliance with the facility's grievance procedures, including its deadlines, is what the PLRA requires. The failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense that the defendant must raise.

42 USC 1997e(a) says no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under Section 1983 by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted. The statute defines prisoner to include a person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of a crime, so it reaches people in a county jail awaiting trial as well as Michigan Department of Corrections prisoners. In the Sixth Circuit, whether the requirement applies depends on whether the person was a prisoner when the suit was filed (Cox v Mayer), so someone released before filing may be treated differently. In Jones v Bock, the Supreme Court held that failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, and that compliance with prison grievance procedures is what the PLRA requires to properly exhaust. Woodford v Ngo explains that proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules. So the facility's own grievance steps, forms, and time limits control. The Department of Corrections and each county jail have their own written grievance rules, and the current version should be read for the dates. File early and keep copies of everything.

Authority: 42 USC 1997e(a), (h); Jones v Bock, 549 US 199, 216, 218 (2007); Woodford v Ngo, 548 US 81, 90 (2006); Cox v Mayer, 332 F3d 422, 425 (CA 6, 2003). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

A prisoner need exhaust only remedies that are actually available. Under Ross v Blake, a remedy is not available if it operates as a dead end, is too opaque for an ordinary prisoner to use, or officials thwart it through misrepresentation or intimidation. Under Perttu v Richards, a jury decides disputed facts about exhaustion that are intertwined with the merits of a jury-triable claim.

In Ross v Blake, the Supreme Court held that courts may not create an unwritten special-circumstances exception to PLRA exhaustion, but that the statute only requires exhaustion of remedies that are available. The Court identified situations in which a remedy is unavailable: where the process operates as a simple dead end, where it is so opaque that no ordinary prisoner can use it, or where administrators thwart the process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation. In Perttu v Richards, a case that came out of the Sixth Circuit, the Court held that when exhaustion facts are intertwined with the merits of a claim that carries a jury right, such as a claim about retaliation for grievances, a jury must resolve the disputed facts. Proof matters here. Useful proof includes copies of what you submitted, the dates, the names of staff you asked, and any written rejection. Without proof, this defense is hard to overcome, so keep a record from the start.

Authority: Ross v Blake, 578 US 632 (2016); Perttu v Richards, 605 US 460 (2025). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Generally yes, for a person who is in custody when the suit is filed. Under 42 USC 1997e(e), a prisoner generally cannot recover compensatory damages for mental or emotional injury suffered in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or a sexual act, although in the Sixth Circuit other relief, such as nominal damages and injunctive or declaratory relief, can still proceed. Section 1997e(d) also limits attorney fees, including an hourly rate cap and a 25 percent cap on the part of a judgment applied to fees.

Two parts of the PLRA matter for recovery. Subsection (e) says no federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual act. The Sixth Circuit has held that a case may still proceed on relief other than compensatory damages for mental or emotional injury, such as nominal damages and injunctive or declaratory relief (Small v Brock). Subsection (d) says fees under 42 USC 1988 can be awarded only to the extent the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation, and the amount is proportionately related to the court-ordered relief or was incurred in enforcing it. An hourly rate cannot exceed 150 percent of the hourly rate set for court-appointed counsel, and a portion of the judgment, not to exceed 25 percent, is applied to the fee award. The statute lets a prisoner agree to pay a larger fee from the prisoner's own money. These limits are written for prisoners, meaning people incarcerated or detained (subsection (h)), so whether they apply can depend on whether you were still in custody when the suit was filed. They shape which cases make sense and how a fee arrangement is structured. The fee arrangement is explained at the consultation, before you decide whether to hire a lawyer.

Authority: 42 USC 1997e(d), (e), (h); Small v Brock, 963 F3d 539, 543 (CA 6, 2020). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

For a prisoner or detainee covered by the PLRA, yes in the Sixth Circuit. In Brown v Morgan, the court held that because the PLRA bars suit until available remedies are exhausted, the statute of limitations is tolled for the period during which available state remedies are being exhausted. If you are not in custody, an internal complaint generally does not pause the deadline. Because tolling can be contested, the safer course is to treat the Michigan 3-year period as the working deadline and not wait.

Brown v Morgan involved a pro se prisoner whose suit was dismissed as time-barred. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the PLRA's language requires exhaustion as a mandatory threshold, so prisoners are prevented from suing for the time required to exhaust available remedies, and the limitations period was tolled during that time. The court remanded for the district court to determine the tolling period. Brown arose from Kentucky's one-year period, but the Sixth Circuit applied the same rule to a Michigan prisoner in Surles v Andison, and the borrowed Michigan period is 3 years under MCL 600.5805(2) for Section 1983 claims (Wallace v Kato). Precisely how long the tolling lasts depends on when the exhaustion process started and ended, which is why you should keep every grievance date and response. Because tolling arguments take time and can be contested, the safer course is to plan around the full deadline as if no tolling applied.

Authority: Brown v Morgan, 209 F3d 595, 596 (CA 6, 2000); MCL 600.5805(2); Surles v Andison, 678 F3d 452, 458 (CA 6, 2012); Wallace v Kato, 549 US 384, 387 (2007). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Possibly. The Sixth Circuit held in Maben v Thelen that an inmate has a right to file non-frivolous grievances against prison officials on his own behalf, whether written or oral. Retaliation for that protected conduct can support a First Amendment claim under the three-element test.

In Maben v Thelen, a prisoner who complained orally about the adequacy of his food claimed he was punished for it. The Sixth Circuit refused to treat a complaint about one of the major requirements of life as frivolous or de minimis and held that an inmate has a right to file non-frivolous grievances against prison officials, whether written or oral. A plaintiff then uses the Thaddeus-X elements: protected conduct, an adverse action that would deter a person of ordinary firmness, and a causal link. Typical adverse actions include discipline, transfers, loss of privileges, or threats. Dates matter because timing is evidence of motive. Because the PLRA requires exhaustion, the retaliation itself should usually be grieved, so whether and how that was done needs checking.

Authority: Maben v Thelen, 887 F3d 252, 265 (CA 6, 2018); Thaddeus-X v Blatter, 175 F3d 378, 394 (CA 6, 1999) (en banc). Reviewed Oct. 2026.