Malicious prosecution, fabricated evidence and Heck v. Humphrey in Michigan

In the Sixth Circuit, a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim requires that the defendant made, influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute, that there was no probable cause for the prosecution, that you suffered a deprivation of liberty apart from the initial seizure, and that the case was resolved in your favor. The Sixth Circuit does not require malice.

Sykes v Anderson sets out the Sixth Circuit framework. The plaintiff must show that the defendant made, influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute, that there was no probable cause for the criminal prosecution, that as a consequence of a legal proceeding the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty apart from the initial seizure, and that the criminal proceeding was resolved in the plaintiff's favor. The court said it has never required a plaintiff to prove malice for a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim. Thompson v Clark then clarified the favorable termination element, which I cover in my favorable termination answer. A key practical question is who participated. Officers who provided false information, left out key facts, or pushed a charge can be involved even though a prosecutor signed the complaint. Continued detention after the charge was filed can supply the liberty deprivation. Michigan state-law malicious prosecution has different elements and a shorter deadline.

Authority: Sykes v Anderson, 625 F3d 294, 308-309 (CA 6, 2010); Thompson v Clark, 596 US 36 (2022). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Not for the federal Fourth Amendment claim. In Thompson v Clark, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff need only show that the criminal prosecution ended without a conviction, not that it ended with some affirmative indication of innocence. Michigan's state-law version asks whether the proceeding terminated in your favor.

Before Thompson v Clark, some courts, including the Second Circuit in the case under review, required a plaintiff to show that the dismissal affirmatively indicated innocence. The Supreme Court rejected that rule for the Fourth Amendment claim under Section 1983 and held that a plaintiff need only show that the prosecution ended without a conviction. Looking to the common-law tort as of 1871, the Court treated the favorable termination element as satisfied by that showing. That helps people whose cases were dismissed without explanation, for instance after a prosecutor decided not to proceed. It does not remove the other elements, such as lack of probable cause and a deprivation of liberty. For the Michigan common-law claim, the Michigan Supreme Court lists termination in the plaintiff's favor as an element, and how Michigan courts apply it to a particular kind of dismissal needs separate review. A plea or conviction on any charge can raise separate problems, including the Heck rule.

Authority: Thompson v Clark, 596 US 36 (2022); Matthews v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 456 Mich 365 (1998). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Yes, potentially. In Chiaverini v City of Napoleon, a case that came up from the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court held that probable cause for one charge does not categorically defeat a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim about another, baseless charge. Each charge is evaluated on its own.

Chiaverini v City of Napoleon involved a jewelry store owner charged with three crimes, including a felony. The Sixth Circuit had held that probable cause for the two misdemeanors defeated the claim about the felony. The Supreme Court disagreed. It explained that a pretrial detention is an unreasonable seizure unless it rests on probable cause, and that a detention that starts or continues because of an invalid charge violates the Fourth Amendment even if a valid charge was filed alongside it. That means an unsupported charge does not escape review because it was filed alongside a valid one. The case does not mean every extra charge creates a claim. You still must show the invalid charge lacked probable cause and that it caused a detention or other seizure. The Court left the specific causation standard for remand. For a Michigan case with stacked charges, the question is which charges drove the bond, the detention, and the length of the case.

Authority: Chiaverini v City of Napoleon, 602 US 556 (2024). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Michigan malicious prosecution requires that a criminal prosecution was initiated, that it terminated in your favor, that the defendant lacked probable cause, and that the action was undertaken with malice or a purpose other than bringing an offender to justice. The limitation period is 2 years under MCL 600.5805(7).

The Michigan Supreme Court states the elements in Matthews v Blue Cross and Blue Shield: the defendant initiated a criminal prosecution, the proceedings terminated in the plaintiff's favor, the defendant lacked probable cause, and the action was undertaken with malice or for a purpose other than bringing the offender to justice. Probable cause is a question of law for the court. Matthews also says a prosecutor's independent exercise of discretion in starting and maintaining a prosecution is a complete defense, and the Court of Appeals repeated that in Peterson Novelties. The defense does not apply when the defendant knowingly gave the prosecutor false information that the prosecutor relied on, so these claims often turn on whether the defendant, rather than the prosecutor, drove the case. MCL 600.5805(7) sets a 2-year period, compared with the 3-year period for a Section 1983 claim. Because favorable termination is an element, the date your criminal case ended matters. Courts applying Michigan law have generally counted the 2 years from the day the criminal case ended in your favor, not from the day you were charged, but the Michigan Supreme Court has not decided that question for criminal cases. Count from the earliest date a court could use, and talk to a lawyer well before 2 years pass from the charge or arrest. Officers sued individually for this intentional tort can raise governmental immunity under Odom v Wayne County, and the Odom case itself involved false imprisonment and malicious prosecution claims. A federal claim does not require malice, so the two claims can differ on proof.

Authority: Matthews v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 456 Mich 365 (1998); Peterson Novelties, Inc v Berkley, 259 Mich App 1, 17-18 (2003); MCL 600.5805(7); Parisi v Michigan Townships Ass'n, 123 Mich App 512 (1983); Wolfe v Perry, 412 F3d 707, 715 (CA 6, 2005); Odom v Wayne Co, 482 Mich 459 (2008). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Possibly. A fabrication-of-evidence claim under Section 1983 alleges the defendant knowingly fabricated evidence and there is a reasonable likelihood the false evidence could have affected the outcome. The Sixth Circuit has also held that fabricating evidence is a pretrial, nontestimonial act that does not receive absolute immunity.

In Mills v Barnard, the Sixth Circuit stated the basis of a fabrication claim as an allegation that the defendant knowingly fabricated evidence against the plaintiff and there is a reasonable likelihood that the false evidence could have affected the judgment of the jury. In that case the alleged fabrication was a forensic report. In Gregory v City of Louisville, the court held that fabricating evidence is a pretrial, nontestimonial act that does not merit absolute immunity, so an officer or examiner does not get absolute immunity for false reports created before trial. These claims need proof of knowledge, not mere error, so the details matter. Examples include a report that conflicts with video, an invented witness statement, or lab results that differ from raw data. Qualified immunity and the limitations period still apply, and a conviction can raise the Heck problem. Early records requests and preservation letters are important.

Authority: Mills v Barnard, 869 F3d 473 (CA 6, 2017); Gregory v Louisville, 444 F3d 725 (CA 6, 2006). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Under McDonough v Smith, the limitations period for a fabricated-evidence claim under Section 1983 does not begin until the criminal proceedings against you terminate in your favor. In Michigan the length of the period is the 3 years in MCL 600.5805(2).

McDonough v Smith held that the statute of limitations for a fabricated-evidence claim does not begin to run until the criminal proceedings have terminated in the plaintiff's favor. The Court reasoned from the malicious prosecution analogy and from the concern about collateral attacks on a pending prosecution or conviction. Federal law decides when the claim accrues, and state law supplies the length, which in Michigan is the general 3-year period for injury to a person or property. That is different from a false arrest claim, whose clock begins when you are held pursuant to legal process under Wallace v Kato. The difference means one incident can produce claims with different start dates. The first date that matters for a fabrication claim is the date the case ended in your favor, for example by acquittal, dismissal, or reversal, and the deadline should be counted from that date with a calendar margin. Because courts can disagree about what counts as a favorable end, waiting until the last month is risky.

Authority: McDonough v Smith, 588 US 109 (2019); MCL 600.5805(2); Wallace v Kato, 549 US 384, 397 (2007); Wallace v Kato, 549 US 384, 387 (2007). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Maybe not yet. Under Heck v Humphrey, if a Section 1983 claim for damages would necessarily imply the invalidity of your conviction or sentence, you must show the conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal habeas writ. Whether your claim does depends on what it alleges and what the conviction required.

Heck v Humphrey holds that in order to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a Section 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make that determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. When a person seeks damages, the court asks whether a judgment for the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction. If so, the claim is barred until that has been shown. If not, the suit may go ahead. Whether a claim conflicts with a conviction depends on what the claim alleges and what the conviction required, so they have to be compared closely. A suit seeking only prospective relief, such as an injunction against future enforcement of a law, is not barred by Heck, the Supreme Court held in Olivier v City of Brandon (2026), which left open the rule for a person still in custody on the conviction. This is one reason appeals and post-conviction motions can matter to a later civil case. The Michigan limitations clock can keep running, so timing needs attention.

Authority: Heck v Humphrey, 512 US 477, 486-487 (1994); Olivier v City of Brandon, 607 US ___ (2026) (No. 24-993, decided Mar. 20, 2026). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Generally no. Heck concerns convictions and sentences that have not been invalidated. If your case ended in a dismissal or acquittal, there is no conviction for the claim to contradict, which is the situation Thompson v Clark addresses for malicious prosecution. Other defenses, including probable cause, qualified immunity, and deadlines, can still apply.

The Heck rule is tied to a conviction or sentence. It bars a damages claim that has a relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated. When criminal charges ended without a conviction, there is nothing for a judgment in your civil case to call into question in that way. For a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim, Thompson v Clark holds that the plaintiff need only show that the prosecution ended without a conviction. A plea to a different charge, a conviction on one count, or a diversion or deferral arrangement can complicate the analysis, so the final disposition order and the plea record have to be read. Even where Heck does not apply, the clock for different claims runs from different events, such as legal process for false arrest under Wallace v Kato or favorable termination for fabricated evidence under McDonough. Ask the court for the certified disposition and keep a copy.

Authority: Heck v Humphrey, 512 US 477, 486-487 (1994); Thompson v Clark, 596 US 36 (2022). Reviewed Oct. 2026.