Criminal sexual conduct (CSC) charges in Michigan

First-degree criminal sexual conduct requires sexual penetration plus at least one aggravating circumstance listed in the statute, such as a victim under 13, a weapon, personal injury combined with force or coercion, or penetration during another felony. The statute defines sexual penetration to include sexual intercourse and the other acts it lists, and any intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person's body or of any object into the genital or anal openings of another person's body. Emission of semen is not required. The offense is punishable by life or any term of years.

A person is guilty of first-degree criminal sexual conduct if he or she engages in sexual penetration with another person and at least one of the listed circumstances exists (MCL 750.520b(1)). The circumstances include the following: the other person is under 13; the other person is at least 13 but under 16 and the actor is a member of the same household, is related by blood or affinity to the fourth degree, is in a position of authority over the victim and used it to coerce the victim to submit, or holds one of the school or child care roles the statute describes; the penetration occurs under circumstances involving the commission of any other felony; the actor is aided or abetted by another person and either knows or has reason to know the victim is mentally incapable, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless or uses force or coercion; the actor is armed with a weapon or an article used or fashioned to lead the victim to reasonably believe it is a weapon; the actor causes personal injury and uses force or coercion; the actor causes personal injury and knows or has reason to know the victim is mentally incapable, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless; or the victim is mentally incapable, mentally disabled, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless and the actor is a relative to the fourth degree or is in a position of authority and used it to coerce (MCL 750.520b(1)(a) to (h)).

The statute defines sexual penetration as sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person's body or of any object into the genital or anal openings of another person's body, but emission of semen is not required (MCL 750.520a(r)). The model jury instruction follows the same structure. The prosecutor must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, first, a sexual act of the kind the statute describes, where any entry, no matter how slight, is enough and it does not matter whether the act was completed or whether semen was ejaculated, and second, one or more of the aggravating circumstances, each of which has its own instruction (M Crim JI 20.1).

Every element is for the prosecutor to prove, so identity, whether any penetration occurred, and whether the aggravating circumstance existed can each be contested. The instruction's use notes state that when more than one specific act is claimed, the jury's verdict on each alleged act must be unanimous, but when a single act is charged with several aggravating circumstances, the jurors need not agree on which one was proved as long as all agree that at least one was proved beyond a reasonable doubt (M Crim JI 20.1, use notes). First-degree criminal sexual conduct is a felony punishable by imprisonment for life or any term of years, with a minimum of at least 25 years when the actor is 17 or older and the victim is under 13, and the court may order the term served consecutively to a term for another offense arising from the same transaction (MCL 750.520b(2)(a), (b), (3)).

Authority: MCL 750.520b(1), (2)(a), (b), (3); MCL 750.520a(r); M Crim JI 20.1. Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Yes. The statute provides that the testimony of a victim need not be corroborated in prosecutions for first-degree through fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct and assault with intent to commit it, and the Court of Appeals has said a complainant's testimony can, by itself, be enough to support a conviction. The prosecutor must still convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, and credibility is for the jury to decide.

MCL 750.520h provides that the testimony of a victim need not be corroborated in prosecutions under sections 520b to 520g, which covers the four degrees of criminal sexual conduct and assault with intent to commit it. The Michigan Supreme Court quoted that provision in People v Szalma, 487 Mich 708, 720 (2010). The Court of Appeals has stated that a complainant's testimony can, by itself, be sufficient to support a conviction of criminal sexual conduct (People v Brantley, 296 Mich App 546, 551 (2012), abrogated on other grounds by People v Comer, 500 Mich 278 (2017)). The model jury instruction says that, to prove the charge, it is not necessary that there be evidence other than the testimony of the complainant if that testimony proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Its use note describes it as a permissive instruction that is especially appropriate where the defense has argued lack of corroboration (M Crim JI 20.25).

The rule removes a requirement of corroboration. It does not lower the burden of proof. The jury still decides whether the complainant is believed. The Michigan Supreme Court has held that, absent exceptional circumstances, issues of witness credibility are for the jury, and the trial court may not substitute its own view of credibility for the jury's determination (People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 642 (1998)). A defense in these cases therefore commonly turns on cross-examination, inconsistencies in the complainant's accounts, the timing of the report, and the other evidence in the case, which the jury weighs.

If the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction on a charged offense, the court must direct a verdict of acquittal on the defendant's motion, which may be made after the prosecutor rests or after the close of all the evidence (MCR 6.419(A)).

Authority: MCL 750.520h; People v Szalma, 487 Mich 708, 720 (2010); People v Brantley, 296 Mich App 546, 551 (2012), abrogated on other grounds by People v Comer, 500 Mich 278 (2017); M Crim JI 20.25; People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 642 (1998); MCR 6.419(A). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Michigan's rape shield statute bars evidence of a complainant's specific sexual conduct, opinion evidence of it, and reputation evidence of it, unless the judge finds the evidence material and not outweighed by prejudice and it falls in one of two categories: past sexual conduct with the defendant, or conduct showing the source of semen, pregnancy, or disease. The Michigan Supreme Court has also recognized limited situations where the Constitution requires admission, such as prior false accusations, and requires an in camera hearing when the offer of proof is sufficient.

MCL 750.520j(1) provides that evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual conduct, opinion evidence of it, and reputation evidence of it shall not be admitted in prosecutions under sections 520b to 520g unless and only to the extent that the judge finds that the proposed evidence is material to a fact at issue and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative value. The statute lists two kinds of proposed evidence: the victim's past sexual conduct with the actor, and specific instances of sexual activity showing the source or origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease.

The statute sets a procedure. A defendant who proposes to offer that evidence must, within 10 days after the arraignment on the information, file a written motion and offer of proof. The court may order an in camera hearing to determine whether the evidence is admissible, and the judge may order one during trial if new information is discovered that may make the evidence admissible (MCL 750.520j(2)). The Michigan Supreme Court upheld the statute against a confrontation challenge in People v Arenda, 416 Mich 1 (1982). The United States Supreme Court has stated that the notice-and-hearing requirement "serves legitimate state interests in protecting against surprise, harassment, and undue delay," and it rejected a per se rule that precluding evidence for failure to comply violates the Sixth Amendment (Michigan v Lucas, 500 US 145, 153 (1991)).

The Michigan Supreme Court addressed the constitutional limit in People v Hackett, 421 Mich 338 (1984). The statute generally excludes evidence of a complainant's prior sexual conduct with others, and sexual reputation, when offered to prove consent or for general impeachment. In certain limited situations, however, admission may be required to preserve the defendant's right to confrontation, and the Court gave the example that the defendant should be permitted to show that the complainant has made false accusations of rape in the past (Hackett, 421 Mich at 347-348). The defendant must first make an offer of proof showing the relevance of the evidence for that purpose. If the offer of proof is sufficient as to the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation, as distinct from use of sexual conduct as evidence of character or for impeachment, the trial court shall order an in camera evidentiary hearing to decide admissibility (Hackett, 421 Mich at 349-350). In People v Butler, 513 Mich 24 (2024), the Court assumed without deciding that the Hackett procedure applied and held that the Court of Appeals erred by analyzing the admissibility of evidence of a prior accusation the defendant said was false without first ordering the in camera evidentiary hearing Hackett requires.

Authority: MCL 750.520j(1), (2); People v Arenda, 416 Mich 1 (1982); Michigan v Lucas, 500 US 145, 153 (1991); People v Hackett, 421 Mich 338, 347-350 (1984); People v Butler, 513 Mich 24 (2024). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

A first-degree conviction carries mandatory lifetime electronic monitoring in addition to the other penalty, except where the sentence is life without parole, whatever the ages of the people involved. A second-degree conviction carries it only when the actor is 17 or older and the victim is under 13. The court must advise a defendant of it before accepting a plea, and tampering with the device is a separate felony.

For first-degree criminal sexual conduct, the statute provides that, in addition to any other penalty imposed under the term-of-years provisions, the court shall sentence the defendant to lifetime electronic monitoring under MCL 750.520n (MCL 750.520b(2)(d)). The Michigan Supreme Court has read that provision to require lifetime monitoring for all first-degree sentences except a sentence of life without the possibility of parole, and it declined to read the age limitation of section 520n(1) into the first-degree penalty provision (People v Comer, 500 Mich 278 (2017)). For second-degree criminal sexual conduct, the court must impose lifetime monitoring if the violation involved sexual contact committed by an individual 17 or older against an individual under 13 (MCL 750.520c(2)(b); MCL 750.520n(1)).

Under the corrections code, the program tracks the individual's movement and location by electronic means from release on parole or from prison until the individual's death. The individual must wear or carry the device in the manner the program prescribes, reimburse the department while on parole, and pay $60.00 per month after discharge from parole (MCL 791.285(1), (2)). A person sentenced to lifetime monitoring who intentionally removes, defaces, alters, or destroys the device, fails to maintain it in working order, fails to notify the department that it is damaged, or fails to reimburse the cost is guilty of a felony punishable by up to 2 years or a fine of up to $2,000.00, or both, and that term may run consecutively to a term for another violation arising from the same transaction (MCL 750.520n(2), (4)).

Because the requirement attaches to the offense of conviction, it is part of what the court must tell a defendant before accepting a guilty or nolo contendere plea. The court must advise the defendant of the maximum possible prison sentence and any mandatory minimum, including a requirement for mandatory lifetime electronic monitoring under MCL 750.520b or 750.520c (MCR 6.302(B)(2)).

Authority: MCL 750.520b(2)(d); MCL 750.520c(2)(b); MCL 750.520n(1), (2), (4); MCL 791.285(1), (2); People v Comer, 500 Mich 278 (2017); MCR 6.302(B)(2). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

It depends on the degree of the charge and the date of the alleged offense. First-degree criminal sexual conduct can be charged at any time. Fourth-degree and assault with intent charges can be filed within 10 years or by the victim's 21st birthday, whichever is later. Second-degree and third-degree charges can be filed within 15 years or by the victim's 42nd birthday, whichever is later, for offenses committed on or after April 2, 2025, and earlier offenses fall under the earlier version of the statute, which gave shorter periods.

The limitation periods are in MCL 767.24, which is written in terms of when an indictment may be found and filed. An indictment for first-degree criminal sexual conduct may be found and filed at any time (MCL 767.24(1)(a)). For second-degree and third-degree criminal sexual conduct, the period is 15 years after the offense is committed or the alleged victim's 42nd birthday, whichever is later (MCL 767.24(4)(a)). For fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct and assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct, the period is 10 years after the offense is committed or the alleged victim's 21st birthday, whichever is later (MCL 767.24(3)(a)). If evidence of the offense contains DNA determined to be from an unidentified individual, an indictment against that individual may be found and filed at any time, and after the individual is identified the period runs from the identification (MCL 767.24(3)(b), (4)(b)). Any period during which the party charged did not usually and publicly reside in Michigan is not counted (MCL 767.24(11)).

The 42nd-birthday period for second-degree and third-degree charges comes from a 2024 amendment (2024 PA 268) that took effect April 2, 2025. The statute states that the changes made by that amendment apply to offenses committed on or after that effective date and do not apply retroactively to an offense committed before it (MCL 767.24(13)). For an earlier offense, the earlier text of the section applies. Under the version enacted by 2018 PA 182, a second-degree or third-degree charge in which the victim was under 18 could be filed within 15 years or by the victim's 28th birthday, whichever is later, and other charges of second-degree, third-degree, fourth-degree, or assault with intent were subject to 10 years or the victim's 21st birthday, whichever is later. Offenses old enough to have been governed by still earlier versions may carry different periods, so the date of the alleged offense and the victim's age at that date decide which period applies.

Authority: MCL 767.24(1)(a), (3), (4), (11), (13); 2024 PA 268; 2018 PA 182. Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Yes, but the statute does not require resistance. A victim need not resist the actor, and the offenses are defined by listed circumstances such as force or coercion, the complainant's age, or the complainant being mentally incapacitated or physically helpless. A complainant who had been drinking is covered only if the alcohol or other substance left him or her temporarily incapable of appraising or controlling his or her conduct, and for the third and fourth degrees the actor must have known or had reason to know of the incapacity.

MCL 750.520i provides that a victim need not resist the actor in prosecutions under sections 520b to 520g. The model instruction tells jurors that the prosecutor does not have to show that the complainant resisted the defendant (M Crim JI 20.26). The offenses are not built on whether the complainant said no or fought back. Instead, each degree is defined by listed circumstances, such as force or coercion (MCL 750.520b(1)(f), 750.520d(1)(b), 750.520e(1)(b)), the complainant's age, or the complainant being mentally incapable, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless (MCL 750.520d(1)(c), 750.520e(1)(c)).

Alcohol enters through the definition of mentally incapacitated. The statute defines it as a person being rendered temporarily incapable of appraising or controlling the person's conduct due to the influence of a narcotic, anesthetic, alcohol, or other substance, or due to any act committed upon that person without the person's consent (MCL 750.520a(k)). Physically helpless means unconscious, asleep, or for any other reason physically unable to communicate unwillingness to an act (MCL 750.520a(m)). For third-degree and fourth-degree charges on this ground, the actor must know or have reason to know of the condition (MCL 750.520d(1)(c), 750.520e(1)(c)). The model instruction asks the jury whether the complainant was mentally incapable, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless at the time and whether the defendant knew or should have known it, and it states that it does not matter if the complainant voluntarily consumed the drugs or alcohol (M Crim JI 20.16). That definition was amended effective October 10, 2023 (2023 PA 65) and the instruction was amended in November 2025 to reflect it, so the date of the alleged act matters.

Where the prosecution relies on force or coercion and the defense is consent, the model instruction explains that a person consents to a sexual act by agreeing to it freely and willingly, without being forced or coerced, and it tells jurors that if the evidence raises a reasonable doubt about whether the complainant consented freely and willingly, they must find the defendant not guilty. Its use note states that the instruction should not be given where the complainant is below the age of consent (M Crim JI 20.27). Drinking alone therefore does not decide a case: the questions are whether the statutory condition existed, whether the defendant knew or had reason to know of it where that is an element, and whether consent was freely and willingly given.

Authority: MCL 750.520i; MCL 750.520a(k), (m); MCL 750.520b(1)(f); MCL 750.520d(1)(b), (c); MCL 750.520e(1)(b), (c); 2023 PA 65; M Crim JI 20.16, 20.26, 20.27. Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Yes, in several ways, but a reduction needs the prosecutor's consent when it is by plea. A plea to an offense other than the one charged requires the prosecutor's consent, a judge or jury can find an inferior degree after trial, and a court can discharge the defendant or reduce the charge at the preliminary examination. The lesser offenses carry different penalties and different consequences, so the offense of conviction matters.

Fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 2 years or a fine of not more than $500.00, or both (MCL 750.520e(2)). Assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct involving sexual penetration is a felony punishable by up to 10 years, and assault with intent to commit second-degree criminal sexual conduct is a felony punishable by up to 5 years (MCL 750.520g(1), (2)). Third-degree criminal sexual conduct is a felony punishable by up to 15 years, and first-degree is punishable by life or any term of years (MCL 750.520d(2), 750.520b(2)(a)). Lifetime electronic monitoring under section 520n attaches to convictions under section 520b or 520c (MCL 750.520n(1)).

A charge can be reduced by plea agreement. The court may not accept a plea to an offense other than the one charged without the consent of the prosecutor (MCR 6.301(D)). The court must ask whether there is a plea agreement and have its terms stated on the record or in writing, and it must establish support for a finding that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged or the offense to which the defendant is pleading (MCR 6.302(C)(1), (D)(1)). Before it accepts a plea, the court must also advise the defendant of the maximum possible prison sentence and any mandatory minimum, including mandatory lifetime electronic monitoring under MCL 750.520b or 750.520c (MCR 6.302(B)(2)). Before finalizing a negotiation that may result in a dismissal or plea, the prosecutor must offer the victim the opportunity to consult about the victim's views (MCL 780.756(3)).

A reduction can also come from the court or jury. At the preliminary examination, if the court finds no probable cause that an offense was committed or that the defendant committed it, the court must discharge the defendant without prejudice to a new prosecution or reduce the charge to a non-felony (MCR 6.110(F)). At trial, on an offense consisting of different degrees, the jury, or the judge in a bench trial, may find the accused not guilty of the degree charged and guilty of an inferior degree or of an attempt (MCL 768.32(1)).

Authority: MCL 750.520b(2)(a); MCL 750.520d(2); MCL 750.520e(2); MCL 750.520g(1), (2); MCL 750.520n(1); MCR 6.301(D), 6.302(B)(2), (C)(1), (D)(1) and 6.110(F); MCL 768.32(1); MCL 780.756(3). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Not on the complainant's say alone. After charges are filed, the prosecutor cannot discontinue the case without stating the reasons on the record and obtaining the court's leave. The prosecutor must offer the complainant a chance to give views before a dismissal or plea, but the statute does not give the complainant the power to end the case. What the complainant now says affects what proof is available, and the prosecutor must still prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt.

A prosecuting attorney shall not enter a nolle prosequi upon an indictment, or discontinue or abandon the indictment, without stating on the record the reasons for the discontinuance or abandonment and without the leave of the court having jurisdiction to try the offense charged, entered in its minutes (MCL 767.29). The Michigan Supreme Court has applied that requirement to informations as well (Genesee Prosecutor v Genesee Circuit Judge, 391 Mich 115, 120 n 10 (1974)).

Under the Crime Victim's Rights Act, before finalizing any negotiation that may result in a dismissal, plea or sentence bargain, or pretrial diversion, the prosecuting attorney shall offer the victim the opportunity to consult with the prosecuting attorney to obtain the victim's views about the disposition of the prosecution, including the victim's views about dismissal, plea or sentence negotiations, and pretrial diversion programs (MCL 780.756(3)). That is a right to be consulted. It is not a right to decide.

If a complainant becomes unwilling to testify or changes the account, the effect depends on the other evidence the prosecutor has. The prosecutor must still prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt, and on the defendant's motion the court must direct a verdict of acquittal on any charged offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction (MCR 6.419(A)). The court can also order, as a condition of pretrial release, that the defendant comply with any condition limiting or prohibiting contact with a named person (MCR 6.106(D)(2)(m)), so a defendant generally routes any contact about the case through a lawyer instead of approaching the complainant.

Authority: MCL 767.29; Genesee Prosecutor v Genesee Circuit Judge, 391 Mich 115, 120 n 10 (1974); MCL 780.756(3); MCR 6.419(A) and 6.106(D)(2)(m). Reviewed Oct. 2026.