Dram shop claims: visible intoxication, other bars and underage drinkers in Michigan

You have to show actual, observable signs of intoxication when the drink was served, such as slurred speech, stumbling, glassy eyes or loud and erratic behavior. In Reed v Breton the Michigan Supreme Court held that a blood alcohol result, the number of drinks, or a toxicologist's estimate of how impaired the person must have been cannot replace that showing. Those facts can only reinforce it.

The statute bars a retail licensee from serving an individual who is visibly intoxicated, MCL 436.1801(1), and gives a right of action only if the unlawful sale is proven to be a proximate cause of the harm, MCL 436.1801(2). Michigan's standard jury instruction, quoted in a Reed footnote, says a person is visibly intoxicated when the intoxication would be apparent to an ordinary observer. Reed v Breton says the standard focuses on the objective manifestations of intoxication and that circumstantial evidence can satisfy it, but only actual evidence of visible intoxication. Time spent drinking, blood alcohol levels and the condition of other drinkers cannot, as the basis for an opinion, show by themselves that the person was visibly intoxicated. They can support the finding if otherwise admissible. The trap is timing: what matters is how the person appeared at the moment of service, not how he appeared at the crash. Witnesses who saw him at the bar, video, and the server's own account are the usual sources. Without any evidence of how he looked and acted when served, a case can fail on a motion for summary disposition even with a very high test result.

Authority: MCL 436.1801; Reed v Breton, 475 Mich 531; 718 NW2d 770 (2006). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Sometimes, but the law makes it harder. MCL 436.1801(7) presumes that a licensee other than the last one to serve the person did nothing that creates liability. Under Reed v Breton, you must prove visible intoxication by a preponderance and then also overcome that presumption with clear and convincing evidence that the earlier bar served him while visibly intoxicated. Each bar you name needs its own written notice within 120 days after you hire a lawyer, and the suit must be filed within 2 years of the injury or death.

The presumption protects every retail licensee except the one that last sold, gave or furnished liquor to the minor or visibly intoxicated person, MCL 436.1801(7). Reed v Breton treats the presumption as requiring more than the ordinary case: the plaintiff proves the prima facie case by a preponderance and, against a bar that was not the last to serve, also presents clear and convincing evidence. In Reed the plaintiffs offered only toxicologists' estimates and no evidence of how the driver actually appeared, so the claim against the earlier bar failed. Two practical points. First, figuring out which bar served last matters, because the presumption turns on it, so tabs, receipts and camera footage should be preserved early. Second, each licensee you name is a separate defendant that must receive its own written notice within 120 days after you retain counsel, MCL 436.1801(3), and the intoxicated person must be named and kept in the case, MCL 436.1801(4). Naming only the last bar and learning about an earlier one later puts the notice exception at issue, and that exception applies only if the information could not reasonably have been known in time. The lawsuit itself must be filed within 2 years after the injury or death, MCL 436.1801(3), not the 3 years that apply to most injury claims.

Authority: MCL 436.1801; Reed v Breton, 475 Mich 531; 718 NW2d 770 (2006). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

It can be. The statute reaches a licensee whose unlawful sale "caused or contributed to" the intoxication, and Hashem held that liability continues if there was no break in the intoxication, even if the person drank elsewhere afterward. Assaults can also be covered, but a deliberate, premeditated crime can break the causal chain, as the Court of Appeals held in Seils.

MCL 436.1801(2) gives a right of action against the person whose sale "has caused or contributed to the intoxication" or to the damage, injury or death, if the unlawful sale is proven to be a proximate cause. In Hashem the trial court threw out the claim against a store because its beer alone could not account for the driver's blood alcohol level. The Court of Appeals reversed, explaining that a licensee that contributes to an intoxication is liable for the damage caused during it, and that liability continues so long as there was no break in the intoxication between the sale and the accident. Seils adds the limit on intent. Dram shop liability can rest on assaultive conduct when serving the person is a proximate cause of the violence, but the court held that deliberate, premeditated murders were not shown to be a proximate result of the sale. Every case turns on its own facts. Drinks after the sale and the nature of the act are the things to examine first.

Authority: MCL 436.1801; Hashem v Les Stanford Oldsmobile, Inc, 266 Mich App 61, 73-77; 697 NW2d 558 (2005); Auto-Owners Ins Co v Seils, 310 Mich App 132, 156-162; 871 NW2d 530 (2015). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Generally not under the dram shop statute. In Seils the Court of Appeals held the act reaches the retail licensee and may not be stretched by agency or similar theories to separate companies that were not the licensee. Any defendant you do name needs its own written notice, sent within 120 days after you hire a lawyer, saying you intend to bring a dram shop claim, and the suit itself must be filed within 2 years of the injury or death. A courtesy copy of the letter sent to the licensee was not enough.

Seils involved a festival where a nonprofit held the temporary license and a separate company had arranged the concession. The court said the dram shop act is in derogation of the common law, is the exclusive remedy against a retail licensee for serving a minor or visibly intoxicated person, and may not be expanded by common-law theories to reach nonlicensees. It also rejected the argument that the other company was liable as the licensee's principal. On notice, MCL 436.1801(3) requires written notice to all defendants within 120 days after the attorney-client relationship begins, and Seils held the letter must at least tell the defendant you intend to pursue a dram shop action against it. A lack of prejudice to the defendant did not excuse the missing notice. Where the defendant is a licensee, the notice exception applies only if the information needed to identify it could not reasonably have been known within the 120 days, MCL 436.1801(3). The lawsuit itself must be filed within 2 years after the injury or death, not the 3 years that apply to most injury claims, MCL 436.1801(3).

Authority: MCL 436.1801; Auto-Owners Ins Co v Seils, 310 Mich App 132, 163-168; 871 NW2d 530 (2015). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

For a claim that arises from the bar selling or giving alcohol to a minor or visibly intoxicated person, the dram shop statute is the exclusive remedy for money damages against the licensee, MCL 436.1801(9). A separate negligence claim survives only if it arises from other conduct and the common law recognizes it, such as an unsafe parking lot. Mann v Shusteric applied that two-step test.

The Michigan Supreme Court in Mann used the test it took from Millross v Plum Hollow Golf Club. First, does the claim arise out of the unlawful sale, giving or furnishing of intoxicants? If so, the dram shop act is the exclusive remedy. Second, if the claim arises from other conduct, does the common law recognize a cause of action for that conduct? If so, the act neither abrogates nor controls it. Mann let an intoxicated patron pursue a claim for a fall on an icy lot because that claim did not rest on the sale. Be careful with Mann itself: its open-and-obvious reasoning rested on Lugo v Ameritech, which Kandil-Elsayed v F & E Oil (Mich 2023) overruled, so I rely on Mann only for the exclusivity test. On damages, the statute sets a $50 minimum for actual damages when intoxication was a proximate cause and states no dollar maximum, MCL 436.1801(2). The Court of Appeals in Seils described the act as the exclusive remedy for any action arising under dram shop related facts, so a claim that the bar was negligent for serving is a dram shop claim.

Authority: MCL 436.1801; Mann v Shusteric Enterprises, Inc, 470 Mich 320; 683 NW2d 573 (2004); Kandil-Elsayed v F & E Oil, Inc, 512 Mich 95; 1 NW3d 44 (2023); Auto-Owners Ins Co v Seils, 310 Mich App 132, 164-165; 871 NW2d 530 (2015). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Not for his own intoxication. In LaGuire v Kain the Michigan Supreme Court held that neither the estate of a minor who was served, nor that minor's family, can recover under the dram shop act. A person injured by an underage drinker can sue, and in Hashem a passenger's own underage drinking did not bar that claim. Under the Liquor Control Code a "minor" means anyone under 21.

MCL 436.1109(6) defines a minor as an individual less than 21, so an 18-year-old is a minor for these purposes whatever the age of majority is elsewhere in the law. MCL 436.1801(2) gives the right of action to an individual injured by a minor or visibly intoxicated person, and to that individual's spouse, child, parent or guardian. LaGuire reasoned that an imbibing minor is the person who injures, not an injured individual, and that the family members of such a minor cannot sue either. Subsection (8) separately bars claims by the visibly intoxicated person. The result is different for third parties. In Hashem, a teenage passenger who had bought and drunk liquor was killed in a crash, and the court rejected the argument that his own unlawful drinking barred the wrongful death claim under the wrongful-conduct rule, because that rule requires serious criminal conduct and a causal link to the damages.

Authority: MCL 436.1801; MCL 436.1109(6); LaGuire v Kain, 440 Mich 367, 487 NW2d 389 (1992); Hashem v Les Stanford Oldsmobile, Inc, 266 Mich App 61, 88-90; 697 NW2d 558 (2005). Reviewed Oct. 2026.