Employment discrimination: EEOC deadlines, proof and damages caps in Michigan

In Michigan you generally have 300 days from the discriminatory act to file an EEOC charge under Title VII, the ADA, or the ADEA, not the 180 days that applies in states without a state agency. The longer period applies because Michigan has its own civil rights agency and the EEOC works with it. The clock runs separately from each discrete act, such as a firing, demotion, or refusal to hire, so a missed deadline can end the federal claim.

Title VII sets 180 days, but 42 USC 2000e-5(e)(1) extends that to 300 days, or 30 days after a state agency ends its proceedings if that comes first, when the person first goes to a state or local agency. The ADA borrows that procedure through 42 USC 12117(a). The ADEA has its own 300-day rule in 29 USC 626(d)(1)(B) for states with an age discrimination law, and the Sixth Circuit applied it to Michigan in Loffredo v Daimler AG, an unpublished decision. In Logan v MGM Grand Detroit Casino, the Sixth Circuit explained that because the EEOC has a work-sharing agreement with the Michigan Department of Civil Rights, an employee preserves the claim by filing with the EEOC within 300 days, or by filing with the state agency and then the EEOC within that time. Under National Railroad Passenger Corp v Morgan, each discrete act starts its own clock, and an older act is not actionable even if it relates to a timely charge. A hostile work environment claim is timely if one contributing act falls inside the window. Pay claims restart with each discriminatory paycheck under 2000e-5(e)(3), with back pay reaching two years before the charge. State-law claims run on a different clock, so the federal date is often the one that expires first.

Authority: 42 USC 2000e-5; 42 USC 12117(a); 29 USC 626; 29 USC 633(b); Logan v MGM Grand Detroit Casino, 939 F3d 824 (CA 6, 2019); Loffredo v Daimler AG, 666 F App'x 370, 377 (CA 6, 2016) (unpublished); National Railroad Passenger Corp v Morgan, 536 US 101 (2002). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

After the EEOC dismisses your charge, or after 180 days if you ask for it in writing, it issues a notice of right to sue, and you have 90 days from that notice to file a federal lawsuit under 42 USC 2000e-5(f)(1). The ADA uses the same rule. The Sixth Circuit treats the notice as received five days after mailing, so the 90 days can start before you open the envelope. In some cases the EEOC can issue it sooner.

The 90 days run against the respondent named in the charge, so the correct employer should be on it. Under 29 CFR 1601.28(a)(1), the EEOC issues the notice promptly on written request after 180 days from filing, and under (a)(2) it may issue one earlier if a director certifies that it is probable the EEOC will be unable to finish processing the charge within 180 days. Issuing the notice generally ends EEOC processing of the charge under (a)(3), so request it only once you have decided to go to court. For a government employer, the Commission issues the notice on a dismissal, but the Attorney General issues it in other cases, including a charging party's request, under (d). In Graham-Humphreys v Memphis Brooks Museum of Art, the Sixth Circuit started the 90 days five days after mailing, counted a postal attempt-to-deliver notice as constructive receipt, and said that absent compelling equitable considerations a court should not extend limitations by even a single day. The charge-filing requirement is a mandatory claim-processing rule, not a jurisdictional bar, so an employer that fails to raise it on time can forfeit the defense, Fort Bend County v Davis. The ADEA has its own notice rule in 29 USC 626(e), and state-law claims have separate periods.

Authority: 42 USC 2000e-5; 42 USC 12117(a); 29 CFR 1601.28; Graham-Humphreys v Memphis Brooks Museum of Art, Inc, 209 F3d 552, 561 (CA 6, 2000); Fort Bend County v Davis, 587 US 541 (2019); 29 USC 626. Reviewed Oct. 2026.

The ADEA protects workers 40 and older at employers with 20 or more employees. It differs from Title VII in several ways. You may sue 60 days after filing the EEOC charge, with no right-to-sue letter required first, but once the EEOC sends a dismissal notice you have 90 days from receiving it to sue. You must prove age was the but-for cause of the decision. Liquidated damages are available only for willful violations. Michigan's 300-day charge deadline applies.

The ADEA covers individuals at least 40 years old under 29 USC 631(a) and employers with 20 or more employees under 29 USC 630(b), a definition that also reaches state and local governments. Section 626(d)(1) bars suit until 60 days after the charge, and section 626(e) gives 90 days from receipt of an EEOC dismissal notice. In Gross v FBL Financial Services, Inc, the Supreme Court held that a disparate-treatment plaintiff must prove age was the but-for cause, and the burden does not shift to the employer. Liquidated damages are payable only for willful violations under 626(b), and a jury hears fact issues under 626(c)(2). Section 1981a lists only Title VII and the ADA, so it gives no ADEA damages, and in Commissioner v Schleier the Supreme Court noted that the courts of appeals unanimously hold the ADEA does not allow separate compensatory damages for pain and suffering. A severance release of ADEA claims is valid only if it meets 626(f): plain language, reference to the ADEA, no release of future claims, added consideration, written advice to consult an attorney, 21 days to consider (45 for a group program), and 7 days to revoke. The employer carries the burden of proof.

Authority: 29 USC 631(a), 630(b); 29 USC 626; 42 USC 1981a(a); Gross v FBL Financial Services, Inc, 557 US 167, 180 (2009); Commissioner v Schleier, 515 US 323, 326 (1995); 29 USC 633(b). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

No. Under Title VII, your race, color, religion, sex, or national origin only has to be a motivating factor, even if other reasons also played a part, under 42 USC 2000e-2(m). The ADA, the ADEA, and Title VII retaliation are stricter: the disability, the age, or the protected complaint must be the but-for cause, though not the sole cause. If the employer proves it would have acted anyway, a motivating-factor win brings only limited relief.

Under 42 USC 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), when the employer shows it would have taken the same action anyway, the court may grant declaratory and injunctive relief and fees tied to that claim, but shall not award damages, reinstatement, or back pay. Title VII retaliation sits outside the motivating-factor rule, and Nassar requires but-for causation. The ADA's enforcement section, 42 USC 12117(a), incorporates 2000e-5 but not 2000e-2, and the en banc Sixth Circuit held in Lewis v Humboldt Acquisition Corp that ADA discrimination requires but-for causation and rejected a sole-cause test. It applied Lewis to a Michigan employer in 2025 in Pemberton v Bell's Brewery. The ADEA is the same under Gross. You do not need direct evidence: Desert Palace v Costa held circumstantial evidence can support a motivating-factor claim. Most cases run through the McDonnell Douglas steps of a prima facie case, a stated legitimate reason, and proof that the reason is pretext, and under Ames v Ohio Department of Youth Services the standard does not change because the plaintiff belongs to a majority group. The statute pleaded therefore decides which standard applies.

Authority: 42 USC 2000e-2(m); 42 USC 2000e-5; 42 USC 12117(a); Lewis v Humboldt Acquisition Corp, 681 F3d 312 (CA 6, 2012) (en banc); Pemberton v Bell's Brewery, Inc, 150 F4th 751 (CA 6, 2025); Gross v FBL Financial Services, Inc, 557 US 167, 180 (2009); University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v Nassar, 570 US 338 (2013); Desert Palace, Inc v Costa, 539 US 90, 101-102 (2003); McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US 792, 802 (1973); Ames v Ohio Department of Youth Services, 605 US 303 (2025). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Yes for Title VII and ADA claims. Under 42 USC 1981a(b)(3), compensatory damages for emotional harm and future losses, plus punitive damages, are capped together by employer size, from $50,000 for employers with 15 to 100 employees up to $300,000 for more than 500. Back pay and front pay sit outside the cap. The ADEA falls outside section 1981a and offers liquidated damages for willful violations instead.

The tiers in 1981a(b)(3) are $50,000 (more than 14 and fewer than 101 employees), $100,000 (101 to 200), $200,000 (201 to 500), and $300,000 (more than 500), counted in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year. The cap applies per complaining party and covers future pecuniary losses, emotional pain and suffering, other nonpecuniary losses, and punitive damages together. Back pay and interest are excluded under 1981a(b)(2), and Pollard v E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co held front pay is not subject to the cap. The court does not tell the jury about the cap under 1981a(c)(2). Punitive damages require malice or reckless indifference to federally protected rights and are not available against a government employer under 1981a(b)(1). Kolstad v American Dental Ass'n explains that this standard turns on the employer's knowledge that it may be violating federal law. For an ADA accommodation claim, damages are barred if the employer shows good-faith efforts, with the employee, to find a reasonable accommodation, under 1981a(a)(3). The cap does not limit claims under 42 USC 1981, which follow separate rules, under 1981a(b)(4). For the ADEA, see the separate answer. Remedies under Michigan law are a separate question.

Authority: 42 USC 1981a; 29 USC 626; Pollard v E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co, 532 US 843, 848 (2001); Kolstad v American Dental Ass'n, 527 US 526, 535 (1999). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Not for a Title VII claim. In Logan v MGM Grand Detroit Casino, the Sixth Circuit held that a contract shortening the Title VII limitation period, outside an arbitration agreement, is unenforceable, so the federal statutory deadlines control. For Michigan state-law claims, the Michigan Supreme Court held in 2025 in Rayford that a shortened period in a boilerplate employment agreement gets close scrutiny for reasonableness and can fail as unconscionable.

Logan involved a six-month clause in a casino job application, and the court held that contractually shortening the Title VII period conflicts with the statute's pre-suit process and the uniform national scheme. The Sixth Circuit followed Logan in Boshaw v Midland Brewing Co, which involved a 180-day clause. Logan decided a Title VII claim, and the ADA borrows Title VII's procedures through 42 USC 12117(a), but the authorities listed here include no Sixth Circuit decision applying Logan to the ADA, and Logan itself left arbitration agreements aside. Logan also distinguished Thurman v DaimlerChrysler, which enforced a six-month application clause against a section 1981 claim, but Thurman rested on Michigan law as it stood in 2004. Rayford v American House Roseville I, LLC overruled Clark and, in part, Timko, limited Rory to insurance contracts, and restored the Camelot reasonableness test for adhesive employment agreements; the Court remanded without deciding whether 180 days was reasonable. If a shortened term is unreasonable or unconscionable, the three-year period in MCL 600.5805(2) governs. Until a court rules, calendar the shortest date any document suggests while also protecting the federal charge and suit deadlines.

Authority: Logan v MGM Grand Detroit Casino, 939 F3d 824 (CA 6, 2019); Boshaw v Midland Brewing Co, 32 F4th 598 (CA 6, 2022); Thurman v DaimlerChrysler, Inc, 397 F3d 352 (CA 6, 2004); Rayford v American House Roseville I, LLC, ___ Mich ___ (2025) (Docket No. 163989, decided July 31, 2025); MCL 600.5805(2); 42 USC 12117(a). Reviewed Oct. 2026.