Police misconduct: use of force, pursuits and who pays a judgment in Michigan

The court looks at the whole encounter, not just the final seconds. In Barnes v Felix, a unanimous Supreme Court rejected the "moment-of-threat" rule and held that a use-of-force claim is judged on the totality of the circumstances, including events that came before the moment force was used. The Sixth Circuit, which covers Michigan, has since held that its old habit of judging each segment of an encounter on its own was abrogated to that extent.

Before Barnes, some courts, including the Sixth Circuit in its older cases, froze the clock at the instant the officer decided to use force. The Supreme Court called that "chronological blinders" and said the inquiry "has no time limit." Earlier facts can help either side: they may show why a reasonable officer saw ambiguous conduct as threatening, or as harmless. The Sixth Circuit applied this in Hodges v Grand Rapids (a Grand Rapids case) and in Romero v Lansing, which says the court now considers the events preceding a use of deadly force, and the full court declined to rehear Romero. Two limits matter. Barnes expressly did not decide whether or how an officer's own creation of a dangerous situation counts, so that question is still open. And in Eastep v Nashville another Sixth Circuit panel said it did not need to decide how far Barnes undoes the segmented approach. So this helps, but it does not decide the outcome. Qualified immunity is a separate question, and video, dispatch records, and body camera footage usually decide what the earlier events were.

Authority: Barnes v Felix, 605 US 73, 76 (2025); Hodges v Grand Rapids, 139 F4th 495, 517-518 (CA 6, 2025); Romero v Lansing, 159 F4th 1002 (CA 6, 2025), reh'g en banc denied, 167 F4th 394 (CA 6, 2026); Eastep v Nashville, 156 F4th 819 (CA 6, 2025). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Deadly force is reasonable only when the officer has probable cause to believe the person poses an immediate threat of serious physical harm to the officer or others. In the Sixth Circuit that question is dispositive. Having a weapon is just one factor, and the court requires additional signs that someone's safety was at risk, though an officer need not wait for the weapon to be pointed.

The Supreme Court's rule in Tennessee v Garner is that deadly force may be used to prevent escape where the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm to the officer or others. The Sixth Circuit adds that where the person poses no immediate threat, deadly force is unreasonable and violates the Fourth Amendment (Raimey v Niles). Thomas v Columbus treats a weapon as one consideration in the totality of the circumstances, and Campbell v Cheatham County requires additional indicia that safety is at risk. Courts look at what the person did: ignoring repeated orders to drop a weapon, stepping toward officers, and pointing an object at them supported the officers in Eastep v Nashville. In Romero v Lansing, by contrast, the court held a plaintiff plausibly alleged excessive force in a second round of shots fired at a man who had already been wounded and was on the ground. Video usually decides these cases, and under Barnes v Felix earlier events in the encounter count too. Qualified immunity is a separate question, covered in the entries on that defense.

Authority: Tennessee v Garner, 471 US 1, 11 (1985); Raimey v Niles, 77 F4th 441, 448-449 (CA 6, 2023); Thomas v Columbus, 854 F3d 361, 366 (CA 6, 2017); Campbell v Cheatham County Sheriff's Dep't, 47 F4th 468, 480 (CA 6, 2022); Romero v Lansing, 159 F4th 1002 (CA 6, 2025), reh'g en banc denied, 167 F4th 394 (CA 6, 2026); Eastep v Nashville, 156 F4th 819 (CA 6, 2025). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Possibly. In the Sixth Circuit an officer who fails to stop excessive force can be liable when the officer observed or had reason to know that excessive force would be or was being used and had both the opportunity and the means to prevent the harm. If the force was over in seconds, there may have been no realistic chance to step in, and that is where these claims often fail.

The test comes from Turner v Scott and was restated in Burgess v Fischer: the officer observed or had reason to know that excessive force would be or was being used, and had both the opportunity and the means to prevent the harm from occurring. The plaintiff carries the burden on both parts. In Burgess the claim against two deputies failed because the plaintiffs did not show the incident lasted long enough for them to perceive what was happening and intercede. So the timeline matters: a prolonged beating on video, with other officers standing within reach, looks very different from a single blow. Each officer's entitlement to qualified immunity is considered separately, so the officer who used the force and the officers who watched are not treated as one. A failure-to-intervene count also depends on there being an underlying excessive force violation, so the force itself has to be unreasonable under Graham v Connor and Barnes v Felix. Body camera and dash camera footage, dispatch audio, and each officer's report are the main evidence. Preserve them early.

Authority: Turner v Scott, 119 F3d 425, 429 (CA 6, 1997); Hodges v Grand Rapids, 139 F4th 495 (CA 6, 2025); Burgess v Fischer, 735 F3d 462, 475 (CA 6, 2013). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Possibly. The Sixth Circuit requires three things for a tight-handcuff claim to reach a jury: you complained the handcuffs were too tight, the officer ignored the complaint, and you suffered some physical injury from the handcuffing. The injury need not be severe. Bruising, skin marks, and lasting pain were enough to create a fact question in Morrison.

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unduly tight handcuffing during an arrest, but the Sixth Circuit says not every complaint about handcuffs amounts to excessive force. In Lyons v Xenia, the plaintiff had to allege some physical injury from the handcuffing and show the officers ignored her complaints that the cuffs were too tight, and her claim failed because she did not claim she told the officers and did not allege lasting injury. In Morrison v Green Township, the court held the required injury is not as demanding as the officer argued, and bruising, skin marks, and pain over forty to fifty minutes of handcuffing created a genuine issue of fact. Two practical points follow. First, tell the officer, clearly and more than once if needed, and look for body camera or dash camera footage that records it. Second, document the injury at once with photographs and medical records, and note numbness, swelling, or marks that last. This is a separate question from force used after you were already cuffed and compliant, which is covered in a separate answer on force after surrender. The facts of the cuffing, and how long it lasted, will decide whether a claim fits.

Authority: Morrison v Board of Trustees of Green Township, 583 F3d 394, 401, 403 (CA 6, 2009); Lyons v Xenia, 417 F3d 565, 575-576 (CA 6, 2005). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Often not, because Michigan law sets a high bar. A city or county is liable under the motor vehicle exception only if the injury resulted from negligent operation of its vehicle, and Robinson v Detroit requires the police vehicle to have hit the fleeing car or physically forced it off the road or into something. An officer is immune unless gross negligence is the one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause, and in Robinson that cause was the fleeing driver's reckless driving.

MCL 691.1405 makes a governmental agency liable for bodily injury resulting from the negligent operation of a government-owned motor vehicle. Robinson v Detroit read "resulting from" narrowly and held that the mere decision to pursue is not negligent operation. Curtis v Flint, a published Court of Appeals decision, applied the same physical-involvement rule outside police chases, and in a 2019 order denying leave (Schaub v Seyler) one Justice, joined by the Chief Justice, wrote separately to question the rule and a third Justice agreed in dissent, though Robinson remains the law. For officers, MCL 691.1407(2)(c) removes immunity only for gross negligence, defined in subsection (8)(a) as conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results, that is "the proximate cause", meaning the one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause. Robinson held that standard was not met because the fleeing drivers' reckless conduct was that cause. Robinson also held that police owe a duty to innocent people but no duty to wrongdoers, including a passenger in the fleeing car who was a wrongdoer, which is an added barrier for those claimants. A federal claim faces its own hurdle: under County of Sacramento v Lewis, a high-speed chase with no intent to harm does not give rise to Fourteenth Amendment liability. Force an officer deliberately uses during a stop or arrest is judged differently, under the Fourth Amendment reasonableness test described in Barnes v Felix. These immunities protect government defendants only. A claim against the fleeing driver is a separate matter.

Authority: MCL 691.1405; MCL 691.1407(2), (8)(a); Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 457, 458-459, 462 (2000); Curtis v Flint, 253 Mich App 555, 561-563 (2002); Schaub v Seyler, 504 Mich 987; 934 NW2d 46 (2019) (Viviano, J., concurring in order); County of Sacramento v Lewis, 523 US 833, 854 (1998); Barnes v Felix, 605 US 73, 76 (2025). Reviewed Oct. 2026.

Not automatically under the Michigan statute. MCL 691.1408(1) says a governmental agency "may" indemnify an officer or pay, settle, or compromise a judgment, and subsection (4) says the section does not impose liability on the agency. Whether the employer actually pays depends on a source outside that statute, such as a local policy, ordinance, or contract, so ask for it early.

MCL 691.1408(1) says that if a judgment for damages is awarded against an officer, employee, or volunteer as a result of a civil action for personal injuries or property damage caused while in the course of employment and within the scope of authority, the governmental agency "may indemnify" the person or pay, settle, or compromise the judgment. The Michigan Supreme Court read the statute the same way in Odom v Wayne County, noting the agency "may" pay, settle, and indemnify. Subsection (4) adds that the section does not impose liability on the agency. Three consequences follow. First, an agency that chooses not to indemnify is not violating this statute. Second, the statute speaks of personal injuries and property damage and does not say whether it reaches a federal constitutional claim, so a policy or contract may matter more than the statute. Third, a judgment against only the officer is collectible from the officer personally unless the employer or an insurer steps in, which is why it matters whether the facts also support a claim against the city or county itself, such as under Monell. The agency may also settle the claim before or after suit is filed. Ask who is defending the officer and whether the employer has agreed to cover a judgment.

Authority: MCL 691.1408(1), (4); Odom v Wayne County, 482 Mich 459 (2008). Reviewed Oct. 2026.